



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

19980123 150

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-021

CONTENTS

19 April 1990

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Armenian Supreme Soviet 13 Feb Decree on Blockade Relief [KOMMUNIST, 17 Feb 90]	1
Armenian Supreme Soviet 13 Feb Decree on January 1990 Violence in Azerbaijan [KOMMUNIST, 16 Feb 90]	2
Armenian Official Views Republic's Power Supply Status, Ecological Concerns [Yu. Khodzhamiryan; KOMMUNIST, 25 Feb 90]	3
Estonian CP Draft Action Program [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 15 Feb 90]	7
Continuation of Estonian Democratic Party Program [MOLODEZH ESTONII, 9 Feb 90]	12
Estonian Communist Party Draft Program of Renewal [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 15 Feb 90]	13
Poltava Oblast Leadership Criticized [M. Doroshenko; RADYANSKA UKRAYINA, 30 Jan 90]	16

NATIONALITY ISSUES

Use of Russian as USSR State Language Defended [V. Resnichenko; SOYUZ No 8, 19 Feb 90]	19
Platform of 'Democratic Russia' Described [N. Travkin; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 8, 24 Feb-2 Mar 90]	21
Moscow's Russian Refugee Problem Viewed [T. Okulova; LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No 6, 9 Feb 90]	22
Old Believers Sect Appeals to Gorbachev on Behalf of Armenian Refugees [KOMMUNIST, 20 Feb 90]	23
Armenian Philosophers Issue Appeal on Caucasus Crisis [KOMMUNIST, 22 Feb 90]	24
Armenian Experts Discuss Caucasus Crisis [KOMSOMOLETS, 1 Feb 90]	25
Armenian Political Scientists Continue Discussion of Transcaucasus Crisis [Z. Arevshatyan; KOMSOMOLETS, 27 Feb 90]	31
Commandant on Emergency Situation in Armenia's Gorisskiy Rayon [G.G. Grigoryan; KOMSOMOLETS, 27 Feb 90]	38
Armenian Procurator on Organized Crime, Armenian Genocide Link [V. Nazaryan; KOMMUNIST, 25 Feb 90]	40
Estonian Liberal-Democratic Party Described [E. Pyldroos; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 15 Feb 90]	44
Georgia's Sovereign Right to Control Own Borders Discussed [O. Gumberidze; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 4 Feb 90]	47
National Groups Appeal for Public Order [SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 24 Feb 90]	49
Concerns of the Ukraine's Ethnic Minorities Discussed [V. Desyatnykov; RADYANSKA UKRAYINA, 27 Jan 90]	49
Foreign Services Accused of Attempts to Incite Uzbek Muslims [Yu. Ibragimov; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 28 Feb 90]	51
British TV Director Seen Attempting to Stir up Uzbek Ethnic, Religious Feelings [A. Baranov; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 27 Feb 90]	52

LAW AND ORDER

Medvedev Update on Gdlyan Commission Investigation [R. Medvedev; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 17 Feb 90]	54
Lawyer Representation in Kazakh Supreme Soviet Planned [A. Didenko; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 11 Feb 90]	55
Belorussian SSR Justice Minister on Judicial Reforms [S. Mikhovich; SELSKAYA GAZETA, 17 Feb 90]	56
Strengthening Function of Procuracy [TRUD, 24 Feb 90]	58

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Armenian Scores Caucasus Reportage Content [S. Musayelyan; KOMSOMOLETS, 6 Feb 90]	60
Georgian Youth Paper Surveys Samizdat Periodicals [AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 3 Feb 90]	61

Western Media Misinforming on Lithuania	[A. Ragayshis; <i>RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA</i> , 24 Mar 90]	63
Reorganization in Lithuanian Printed Media	[<i>SOVETSKAYA LITVA</i> , 2 Mar 90]	63

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Russian Writers Protest 'Anti-Russian Media Campaign'		65
Open Letter to Central Committee, Supreme Soviet		
[<i>LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA</i> No 9, 2 Mar 90]		65
'Aprel' Group Counters Protest	[<i>LITERATURNAYA GAZETA</i> No 10, 7 Mar 90]	72
Kazakh 'Aprel' Writers Group Formed		
[A. Samoylenko; <i>LITERATURNAYA GAZETA</i> No 12, 21 Mar 90]		73
Writers Union Selection Process Described		
[V. Smirnov; <i>LITERATURNAYA GAZETA</i> No 12, 21 Mar 90]		73
Institute Rector on Economic Independence of Higher Schools		
[G. Vyatkin; <i>ARGUMENTY I FAKTY</i> No 9, 3-9 Mar 90]		75
Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Official On Religious Conflict		
[N. Kolesnik; <i>SOYUZ</i> No 7, 12-18 Feb 90]		76
Extremists 'Use' Ukrainian Religious Tensions		
[V. Chemodanov; <i>POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA</i> No 3, Feb 90]		78

**Armenian Supreme Soviet 13 Feb Decree on
Blockade Relief**

90US0673A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
17 Feb 90 p 1

[Decree of Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on the Blockade of the Armenian SSR, signed by Chairman G. Voskanyan and Secretary N. Stepanyan of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on 13 February 1990 in Yerevan]

[Text] This is the third time in the last 6 months that the Armenian SSR has been the victim of an Azerbaijani blockade. On 10 January all of the transportation arteries leading to Armenia were obstructed once again. This has deprived the republic of energy resources in a bleak winter, has paralyzed the activities of many facilities on which the republic's livelihood depends, has caused work stoppages in several production units because of the absence of the necessary materials and components, and has disrupted traffic between the republic and other parts of the country.

In our opinion, this act of hostile opposition, which has been repeated with impunity and has been supplemented by armed attacks on populated points in Armenia by gangsters from the Azerbaijan People's Front, by pogroms, and by the deportation of Armenians and people of other nationalities from Baku, is a deliberate politico-military action contrary to the fundamental articles of the Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to the present Constitution of the USSR and a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and other international treaties signed by the Soviet Union.

In turn, the devastating effects of the blockade and the earthquake on the republic economy cannot fail to have a negative effect on the national economy, which has been weakened by anarchy and inconsistency.

In the fourth quarter of 1989 the blockade along the Azerbaijan railway kept 57,984 cars from reaching Armenia. This January only 473 of the 713 scheduled trains arrived in Armenia.

The republic's direct and indirect losses in just the third quarter of 1989 amounted to 229 million and 1.38 billion rubles respectively. Sizable stocks of consumer goods have accumulated in enterprise warehouses although the country is experiencing an acute shortage of these goods. Many manufactured goods and thousands of tons of agricultural products could not be added to union supplies.

The blockade has had a particularly disastrous effect on the earthquake zone, where around 500,000 people were left homeless. Virtually all construction work has stopped in the disaster zone. Many construction crews from different parts of the country and from abroad had to leave the construction sites, and at a time when 240,000 Armenians who fled Azerbaijan and took refuge

in the republic are homeless. The problem is compounded by the uninterrupted flow of refugees from Azerbaijan and other places to Armenia.

The brutal and protracted blockade has created the greatest difficulties for the population of Nagornyy Karabakh.

As a result of the persistent appeals of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and of USSR people's deputies elected from Armenia and other union republics, the USSR Supreme Soviet investigated the issue of the blockade as an impermissible form of economic pressure and condemned it as an illegal action. A USSR Supreme Soviet decree "On Urgent Measures To Secure the Uninterrupted Functioning of Railway Transport and the Main Branches of the National Economy" was published on 3 October 1989. On 24 December 1989 the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR approved a declaration "On the Impermissibility of the Blockade of Highways and Railroads and the Creation of Any Kind of Obstacle Impeding the Free Movement of Citizens and Freight Within the USSR." In spite of this, the blockade has not been lifted, and it has even been more forceful and unyielding.

The latest outburst of economic violence has occurred at a time when a state of emergency has been declared in many parts of Azerbaijan by a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. It is puzzling that the military commanders of the country and the union news media have not even mentioned the elimination of the blockade of Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh and the prosecution of the inciters and organizers of this criminal action among the assigned functions of the Soviet Army, internal troops, and law enforcement agencies in connection with the administration of the situation in Azerbaijan.

The acts of brutality against Armenians in Sumgait and other populated points in Azerbaijan, and recently in Baku as well, are still going on. The decisions of the country's supreme legislative body are not being enforced, and the primary constitutional right—the physical protection of citizens—is not being guaranteed.

The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet stresses that the deliberate and organized paralysis of transportation is a misanthropic act, an act of shameless chauvinism and monstrous brutality, regardless of its political purpose.

The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet hereby decrees:

1. That the USSR Supreme Soviet be requested:

To resolutely condemn the organization of the blockade of Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh by the Azerbaijan SSR and to assess it from the standpoint of political principles;

To take immediate measures to secure the unconditional observance of its own decisions to lift the blockade of Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh.

2. That the USSR Council of Ministers be requested to redress the damages the blockade has inflicted on the Armenian economy with funds from the Azerbaijan SSR budget.

3. That the USSR procurator general be requested to hold the organizers and executors of the blockade of the Armenian SSR strictly accountable.

Armenian Supreme Soviet 13 Feb Decree on January 1990 Violence in Azerbaijan

90US0673B Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
16 Feb 90 p 1

[Decree of Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on the Murders, Pogroms, and Other Acts of Brutality Committed in January 1990 in the City of Baku and Several Other Populated Points in the Azerbaijan SSR and the Resulting Exacerbation of the Situation in the Region, signed by Chairman G. Voskanyan and Secretary N. Stepanyan of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on 13 February 1990 in Yerevan]

[Text] The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet observes that the tragic events of January 1990 in the city of Baku and several other populated points in the Azerbaijan SSR dramatically exacerbated the situation in the region. These included the murders of dozens of people of the Armenian nationality, criminal raids on their homes, pogroms, robberies, and other acts of vandalism. Hundreds have been wounded and thousands have been deported, and there have been numerous reports of violent acts committed against Russians and people of other nationalities and against the members of servicemen's families.

The absence of a political assessment of the crimes committed in Sumgait, the tendency to blame everything on hooligans and criminal elements, the attempt to conceal the political and ideological essence of these crimes, and the reluctance to view these events as organized genocide have effectively caused the further escalation of violence against the Armenian population and against Russians, Jews, and people of other nationalities in Azerbaijan.

The current situation in the neighboring republic is one in which ethnic groups fighting to defend their own national rights, democracy, and legality can become the targets of physical violence, pogroms, and vandalism with absolutely no guarantee of safety. Recent events have proved that the Government of Azerbaijan has not taken any measures to stop the brutal treatment of Armenians.

The events in Baku attest to flagrant violations of the constitutional rights of the individual and provide incontrovertible evidence of the kind of violent chauvinism and racial hatred that incur the most severe penalties under USSR law. These are also unprecedented cases of the infringement of the human rights affirmed by international organizations.

The acts of vandalism and genocide represent a historical anachronism in the civilized world. In terms of their political purpose, they are of a profoundly anti-perestroika nature, and if methods of physical violence are employed as the criterion of action, they will become an insurmountable obstacle in the resolution of ethnic and social problems in our country.

The unprecedented escalation of tension gave rise to armed conflicts in the border regions of the two republics. The violation of the state border a few kilometers from Armenia for a distance of around 800 kilometers created opportunities for the unimpeded movement of armed detachments of gangsters near the border of the Armenian SSR, intensified an already explosive situation, and encouraged despicable behavior in Azerbaijan by making the situation in the republic and the region uncontrollable. There is no good explanation for the inexcusable delay in sending troops to Baku, in spite of the pogroms of the Armenian population, at a time when extremist excesses had driven almost all of the Armenians out of the city.

In spite of measures to stabilize the situation in the region, it is still complex and tense, the blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast is still in place, the highway from Goris to Stepanakert has been blocked, and communications have been cut off between the Armenian SSR and the rural communities inhabited by Armenians in Khanlarskiy and Shaumyanovskiy rayons in the Azerbaijan SSR.

The situation has been complicated by the civil aviation and defense ministries' ban on helicopter flights to the Armenian communities in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon and the Getashenskiy district, depriving the seriously ill of a chance to receive even the most essential medical assistance. The picture is not complete, however, until we add the situation of the Armenians in Artsakh, who have been blockaded for around 2 years, have suffered countless deprivations, harassment, and hunger, and have incurred heavy losses of life and morale.

The flow of refugees from Azerbaijan is growing. There are around 240,000 of these refugees in the Armenian SSR, and this is compounding the problems even more. Tens of thousands of Armenians were forcibly evicted from Azerbaijan to different parts of the country.

Recent events have provided incontrovertible proof that the chain of anti-Armenian acts committed in response to the demand for self-determination by the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, a chain stretching from Sumgait to the vandalism on the Soviet-Iranian border, the mass violations of the state border, the importation of large shipments of weapons, the attempts to overthrow the Soviet Government in Lenkoran and other parts of Azerbaijan and, finally, the genocide of the Armenians in Baku and massacres of people of other nationalities in the city are only a screen to cover up the sweeping ambitions of Azerbaijani nationalists and separatists.

The national leadership is still blaming the situation in the region on the demands of the Armenian population of Karabakh for self-determination, and this is causing the general public to harbor negative opinions of all the Armenian people.

Because of the state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, especially after the recent events, the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet believes that the activities of the Azerbaijan Organizing Committee will destabilize and exacerbate the situation in the oblast and in the Armenian SSR.

The criminal acts committed in Azerbaijan have aroused the anger and indignation of the Armenian people and all people of integrity and are intensifying the confrontation between the two neighboring republics. The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and republic party and soviet organs have received numerous complaints and statements from refugees, work crews, social organizations, and individual citizens demanding the condemnation of the acts of genocide against the Armenians in Azerbaijan and the prosecution of the organizers and executors of these acts.

The chain of tragic events stretching from Sumgait to Baku has reaffirmed the impermissibility of the lack of immediate political assessments of this kind of barbarous behavior and the failure to punish the organizers of the pogroms and murders, particularly those committed for ethnic reasons. All of this, as well as the attempts of the central government to equate the events in Azerbaijan and Armenia, the attempts of some news media in the country to mislead the public, and the fact that the blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was not lifted even after the passage of the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, caused the Armenian people to mistrust the central government and the Supreme Soviet and stimulated negative feelings.

The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet also expresses its dissatisfaction with the tendency of the highest organs of the central government to ignore many of the principled decrees passed by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, decrees of vital importance to the Armenian people, and to thereby discredit the supreme legislative organ of the republic. This has aroused the laboring public's mistrust of central government organs.

The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet hereby decrees:

1. That the pogroms of Armenians in Baku and other parts of the Azerbaijan SSR be condemned and be interpreted as the continuation of the genocide of the Armenian people.
2. That the USSR Supreme Soviet be requested:

To acknowledge and condemn the genocide of Armenians in Baku and several other populated points in the Azerbaijan SSR in January 1990;

To establish a commission of deputies to investigate the causes of these events and submit the results to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Third Congress of People's Deputies for discussion;

To take immediate measures to prevent the recurrence of the acts of vandalism, provide firm guarantees that they will not be repeated, and secure the inviolability and safety of the Armenians and citizens of other nationalities living in Azerbaijan and Baku;

To hold the organizers and executors of the criminal acts in Baku and other parts of the Azerbaijan SSR in January 1990 strictly accountable;

To request the discussion of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast at the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Armenian Official Views Republic's Power Supply Status, Ecological Concerns

90US0698A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
25 Feb 90 p 1

[Interview with Yu. Ye. Khodzhamiryan, deputy chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, by R. Karagezyan: "Armenia's Power Supply System: Status of the Branch and the Search for Ways to Bring It Out of Its Critical Condition"]

[Text] A year ago, by USSR Council of Ministers decree, the Armenian AES was shut down. As of today the shortage of electrical power in the republic's power system constitutes something of the order of 400,000 kilowatt-hours.

At the request of Armenpress correspondent R. Karagezyan, Yu. Ye. Khodzhamiryan, deputy chairman of ArSSR Council of Ministers, discusses the state of Armenia's power supply system and the ways to bring it out of its critical condition.

[Yu. Khodzhamiryan] At the present time the republic actually is in an extremely difficult situation. This was caused not only by the shutdown of the Armenian AES, but also by the fact that, for many long months, we have borne the burden of the blockade. Today actually all the republic's fuel reserves have been used up and, practically speaking, the electric power stations are "running on empty." It is precisely for that reason that the government took stern measures to economize electric power, including even the curtailment of the television-viewing periods. But despite these measures, the shortage of electrical capacities in the electric power system is still very large. Practically speaking, the republic's industry is not being provided with power and is operating at approximately 50 percent of its production capacities. Because of the blockade and the resultant lack of fuel and energy resources, the fulfillment of production plans was disrupted in January and February.

In the conditions that have been created, we requested all enterprises and residents of Armenia to reduce the expenditure of electrical power as much as possible. There has been a reconsideration of the operating schedule at a number of industrial enterprises, but as yet there has been no tangible improvement of the situation. The leadership and the collectives at a number of plants, factories, and individual rayons, as well as a considerable segment of the population, have not properly perceived the need to economize electrical power, and therefore the necessary effectiveness that one might have expected has not been achieved. And yet an elementary computation indicates that if, in every apartment, in every family, just one 60-watt bulb is turned off, the republic would achieve a reduction in consumption of the order of 50,000 kilowatts. I am not even speaking about industry, transportation, street lighting, etc., where a tremendous saving of electric power could be achieved.

[R. Karagezyan] Yuriy Yervandovich, it is well known that the reactors at the Armenian AES have been shut down completely and forever, the blockade is continuing, and there is no guarantee that, if it is lifted today, it will not be repeated tomorrow. In this regard, could you please tell us what steps are being taken by the government to provide the republic with electrical power?

[Yu. Khodzhamiryan] Actually, to my profound regret I must admit that in our state—a state that is striving to become a law-governed one—there are not yet any guarantees against a blockade. Today, of course, trains have started moving along the Nakhichevan sector, but who can guarantee that the extremists who have lost all reason and responsibility will not resume those antistate, antihumanitarian acts of blockade?

Therefore the government is working actively on the questions of providing the vital necessities to the republic in all areas of its activity, and primarily in the fuel and energy complex.

An understanding has already been reached with GSSR Council of Ministers concerning the completion of the construction of a gas pipeline through the Caucasian Range. The construction was temporarily stopped by the Georgian ecological movement. At the present time the construction plan includes necessary changes, the question of financing has been resolved, and Armgazprom, which is building this complicated gas pipeline, is supposed to complete its work by autumn. This will make it possible to improve gas supply considerably.

Work is being done to resolve the questions of constructing special docks on the Black Sea coast of Georgia and laying a pipeline to carry light petroleum products to the borders of Armenia; constructing the Leninakan-Bogdanovka railroad line; expanding the highway system; etc.

A comprehensive program has been developed to develop power engineering. It provides for the construction of new thermal-electric power stations, and the

expansion of the Razdanskaya GRES, where operations to active new units with a capacity of 300,000 kilowatts each have begun. However, it is well known that it is no simple matter to build stations, and therefore the builders have thought things out ahead of time about the high rates of construction—they ordered in various parts of the country the necessary structural elements and equipment in such a way that the first unit at the Razdanskaya GRES will be activated in 1991. But here too the blockade exerted its destructive effect and, practically speaking, it has threatened to make it impossible to meet the construction deadlines. Approximately 1500 tons of metal structurals continue to lie unshipped in Stavropol Kray. Equipment and various structurals have been stalled at plants in Donetsk Oblast and in other places. Therefore the activation of the first unit at the Razdanskaya GRES, which is planned for 1991, has been made very difficult.

A question that is very important is the question of converting the Armenian AES to a thermal-electric power station. The AES can no longer operate as a nuclear power station. By closing it, we have secured ourselves against any possible unpleasantnesses, but we are required to use its structures.

Unfortunately, in world practice there are almost no examples of conversions of AES. There is just one such example at a small station in France, and another in England. In this regard we care carrying out work with the participation of a number of union institutes, as well as foreign specialists, and that work may possibly yield results in the near future.

A factor that is taking on exceptionally great importance is the expansion of underground gas-storage facilities; the completion of the construction of a complex for the reduction and regasification of natural gas; the creation of new storage capacities for storing reserves of furnace oil; etc.

All this will provide the opportunity for a rather long period of time to be provided with fuel, despite the limited receipt of fuel from without.

On the whole, the program is very broad. Nevertheless, within the next two years we shall have to economize electrical power stringently. I must note that the question of economizing electrical power is exceptionally important. When, in 1977-1978, difficulties with energy supply arose in the United States, rigid measures were taken there to economize electrical power, and those measures yielded splendid results.

[R. Karagezyan] But what effect did the shutdown of the Nairit NPO [scientific-production association] have upon the economizing of electrical power?

[Yu. Khodzhamiryan] You have now touched upon a question concerning two ends of a stick. On the one hand we definitely have a substantial economizing of power, and, on the other hand, the republic's power engineering has been put in a very complicated situation. As a result

of the closing of Nairit, the republic incurs large material expenditures—it is necessary to bring in from other parts of the country caustic soda, oxygen, and a number of chemical materials that are in extremely short supply but that are acutely necessary for the chemical water purification of thermal-electric power stations. You will agree that resolving such questions has been made extremely difficult, especially under the blockade conditions.

Obviously, it is necessary to work seriously on the problem of using the appropriate production capacities of the Nairit NPO, provided, of course, that they are absolutely safe for the environment.

[R. Karagezyan] What is the situation with regard to the use of the so-called untraditional sources of power?

[Yu. Khodzhamiryan] In the program a definite place has been assigned to the use of untraditional current sources, such as the energy of the sun, the wind, and biomasses. Another question that is being considered is the use of geothermal energy.

As far as solar energy is concerned, there have been definite successes here, inasmuch as the Armenian Branch of the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Current Sources is in operation, and its collective has been cooperating with Yugoslav specialists.

We already have buildings that are heated by the sun. Substantial successes have also been achieved at the Yerevan University laboratory under the leadership of ArSSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member V. M. Arutyunyan. That laboratory has developed new effective semiconductor transformers. We intend to organize its joint operations with the Ashtarak Semiconductors Plant, as a result of which we expect to achieve success in creating solar energy transformers.

In the area of the use of solar energy, steps have been taken to study the experience gained by the leading foreign countries. For this purpose we have established contacts with them through the Armenian Diaspora and through other foreign institutions. Today the cost of one kilowatt of rated capacity at the best solar electric-power stations with phototransformers exceeds by a factor of 5-6 the cost of a kilowatt at thermal-electric power stations. But nevertheless this is an already admissible figure. Our republic, which has a sufficient scientific potential at its disposal, can successfully resolve this complicated problem.

Something else that is of interest in the development of wind power engineering. Definite work in using this type of wind power is being carried out at Yerevan Polytechnical Institute. Recently the Armenian Universal Philanthropic Organization presented the republic, by way of assistance, two wind generators. One has already been installed in Aragatskiy Rayon on the test grounds of Yerevan Polytechnical Institute, and the second one will be installed within the near future.

[R. Karagezyan] Incidentally, at one of the rallies in Yerevan it was mentioned that a certain Swedish company has offered its services in developing wind power engineering in Armenia, but the republic's government has been dragging out the resolution of the question. What can you say with regard to this?

[Yu. Khodzhamiryan] That is actually so. That was mentioned ArSSR Supreme Soviet Deputy A. Manucharyan, and there was also a deputy's inquiry by R. Kazaryan. And that's the way things stand. At our request, the republic has been visited twice by a representative from the Swedish company, Aramais Mirzakhanyan. He is a fellow countryman, and graduate of Yerevan Polytechnical Institute. He proposed to us that we install a series of wind generators. The idea consists in creating a test grounds, ascertaining which of the wind units is the optimal one under our conditions, and organizing their production in Armenia. This is, of course, a philanthropic act, inasmuch as it is proposed to invest part of the funds at the expense of foreign companies. However, a considerable amount in firmly convertible currency at the republic's expense will also be needed.

Unfortunately, we cannot allocate those funds at the present time, since we need the currency for more important purposes—the restoration operations in the earthquake zone and, in particular, the equipping of hospitals, clinics, rehabilitation centers, children's institutions, and individual production entities that are acutely needed for restoration purposes.

Therefore we see the way out for implementing the recommendations in the consideration of the possibilities of involving the cooperatives and other organizations in this job. That question has already been considered at the republic's Gosplan, and recommendations have been made for the makeup of the working group, drawing from representatives of the leading enterprises, departments, and organizations that are supposed to lead the work in this area and to give recommendations concerning the application of wind generators and their production in Armenian SSR.

I must remark that the use of wind generators requires careful consideration also from the point of view of the ecology. We know, for example, that in Florida, in the United States, a large number of "wind machines" were installed. As a result of their operation the birds and insects disappeared completely, and the environment was considerably damaged, so the action of the "wind machines" was discontinued.

Consequently, we too should think seriously about the place where the wind generators should be installed. Obviously, they could be used for summer pastures and for isolated agricultural projects.

[R. Karagezyan] But are there any other possible power sources, and to what degree can the untraditional sources correct the power balance in the republic within the next few years?

[Yu. Khodzhamiryan] Among the untraditional current sources, we are considering the question of using biomass for small-scale power consumers. Agropom is engaged in that problem. There are interesting ideas at Institute of Microbiology, ArSSR Academy of Sciences.

Something else that looks interesting is the use of geothermal energy. The republic has promising locations with increased temperature from strata lying close to the surface. Their broad use requires a large amount of water. This is, of course, a shortcoming, but it is necessary to engage seriously in the problem.

As for the substantial contribution made by untraditional power sources in the republic's power balance, this is, for the time being, extremely problematical.

In countries with the best-developed use of the energy in the sun, the wind, and other untraditional sources, their share in the power balance does not exceed one or two percent. If one assumes that we shall achieve that level, then for Armenia, where the required electric power consumption is approximately 13 billion kilowatt-hours a year, the one or two percent obtained from untraditional current sources will constitute approximately 130-260 million kilowatt-hours. This, naturally, is very little, and therefore we must continue to put the decisive emphasis on the traditional current sources.

[R. Karagezyan] What do you have in mind other than thermal-electric power stations?

[Yu. Khodzhamiryan] It is necessary to engage seriously in the question of using the energy in small rivers, and this has been stipulated in the republic's power program.

At one time Armenia produced the so-called micro-GES—the Yerevan Plant produced miniature electric-power stations. Then, when the country was seized by "giant fever," the country began building tremendous electric-power stations—the Volgogradskaya, Kuybyshevskaya, Krasnoyarskaya, and others—that killed the flora and fauna and that consigned the small GES to oblivion. In our republic, for example, the Gorisskaya, Aykatanskaya, Yekhegnadzorskaya, Yerevanskaya, and other small electric-power stations were eliminated. Many stations have been put in mothballs.

Meanwhile it is necessary to pay very serious attention to questions of creating even small hydroelectric power stations. And although, unfortunately, Armenia has a very small amount of hydroelectric resources, we must use them completely, but intelligently.

The construction of small hydroelectric power stations in rayons that are remote or relatively inaccessible has not only a direct benefit, but also an economic one: liquid fuel is economized in a large quantity and the transportation expenses are reduced. Their small reservoirs exert a favorable influence upon the environment. Fish can be raised in them, and it is possible to create recreational areas on the banks of the reservoirs.

According to specialists, it is possible to create in the republic more than 50 small GES with a capacity of approximately 165,000 kilowatt-hours.

[R. Karagezyan] We frequently hear the recommendations that, under the conditions of the power crisis, it might be a good idea to give up a few centimeters in the level of Lake Sevan in order to ease the situation. What do you think about this?

[Yu. Khodzhamiryan] We should not give up even a single millimeter of the level of Lake Sevan. The republic is carrying out a large amount of complicated work to raise the lake level. Certain successes, which so far are insignificant, have been achieved. We take the firm position that not a single drop of Sevan water should be released for the special purpose of meeting power-engineering needs, and the releases for land-reclamation purposes must be reduced with every passing year. For this purpose, many reservoirs, irrigation structures, and other projects are being built in the republic.

[R. Karagezyan] But what unused opportunities exist?

[Yu. Khodzhamiryan] The creation of storage-type hydroelectric power stations. A station of this kind was designed in our country long ago. Possible the location for it was chosen not completely successfully—its territory formed a slight wedge into the Khosrovskiy Preserve. Therefore the station was not built. But it must be admitted that if we currently had a storage-type hydroelectric power station, it would make it possible during the nighttime, when the Trans-Caucasian Power System has a surplus of power at its disposal, to pump water from the lower draining area to the upper one, and during the peak hours to use the energy in that water to produce electric power. I repeat: if we currently had that station, we would not be worried during the peak hours about whether television broadcasts have to be turned off.

The question of creating storage-type hydroelectric power stations has been included in our program, and it is necessary to resolve that question very rapidly and to achieve the construction of that extremely important project, having chosen, of course, the most suitable location.

On the whole, to conclude our conversation, I would like to say that within the next two years the situation with the republic power supply will be strained. Although new capacities will be introduced into the Trans-Caucasian Power System and, as we have this year, we shall receive a definite transfer of power, nevertheless it is necessary to carry out the strictest economizing measures. It is necessary, as the expression goes, to put in our belts another notch, especially during the winter. It is necessary to work carefully to resolve the questions of economizing electric power at every enterprise, in every city and village, in every home. What has been said applies in equal measure to the economizing of thermal power, gas, and all kinds of fuels.

I am convinced that our entire nation, all the workers in the republic, displaying the reasonableness that is typical of them, will take an understanding attitude toward this very important problem.

The author has requested that the fee for this article be transferred to the fund to help the victims of the earthquake.

Estonian CP Draft Action Program

*90UN1045A Tallin SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 15 Feb 90 pp 2-3*

["Draft Program of Action of Communist Party of Estonia"]

[Text] The restructuring of all areas of Estonia's life is extremely complex. The renewal of the society underway and the rapid development of democratic reforms, glasnost and the resulting increased activeness of the masses are facing the Communists and the entire party with the need to make profound changes in their work.

The deformations and errors born of the system of administration by command, the distortion of the Leninist principles of socialism, the state structure, national and economic policy, the ruinous effects of supercentralism and bureaucratic administration and injustice to the nation's peoples have led to profound conflicts in the society and brought it to the brink of a crisis.

In Estonia this has greatly increased the self-awareness of the people, who are dissatisfied with the results of the extensive method of developing the economy. The uncontrolled influx of workers from outside has clearly outstripped the development of social capabilities. Neglect of the social sphere by Union ministries and departments, on the one hand, and weakness and indifference to the fate of the people on the part of the former republic leadership and local authorities, on the other, have resulted in a perceptible drop in the quality of life for Soviet Estonia's entire population.

The Communist Party of Estonia acknowledges its share of responsibility for the distortions of socialism which have produced the present crisis in the national economy and the ecological situation and greatly worsened inter-ethnic relations, which have produced negative developments in the party itself. The situation in the Communist Party of Estonia has been exacerbated in great part also by ideological vacillation, profound disappointment and loss of faith in the communist ideals among a part of the Communists, by attacks on the party itself and attempts to oppose everything being done in the republic, the nation, the party and its policy. Confusion and panic are progressing in certain members of the Communist Party of Estonia. Those with little faith, the weak in spirit and careerists are leaving its ranks.

In this situation we need to preserve our realism and loyalty to the ideals of socialism. The main thing is to strengthen the organizational and ideological unity of the Communists. Within the Communist Party of Estonia there are in fact

forces tending to become factions or separate political parties. At the one pole are Communists who believe that the party crisis must be resolved by turning it into a variation of a national social-democratic organization. At the other are Communists who preach dogmatic concepts of socialism. The centrist wing, although a minority, nonetheless has the greatest capabilities for uniting around it the healthy forces of the entire gamut of movements and organizations. This wing of the Communist Party of Estonia, subjected to attacks from the right and left, continues to fight for a rebirth of the Leninist party spirit. Today it is extremely important to combine the fundamental course of renewing socialism with flexible tactics making it possible to draw the masses to the path of revolutionary restructuring.

It has become urgent to completely restore the unity of action of the Communists. The Communist Party of Estonia considers the following principles of united action to be vital:

- pluralism of opinions which accommodates both neo-Marxist and social-democratic views of current and future social processes and opposes bourgeois-nationalistic and great-power, chauvinistic ideological alternatives;
- social selection of restructuring and rejection of neo-capitalist and neo-Stalinist lines of social progress;
- priority for common human values and the interests of the workers which subordinate class and national aspirations to themselves;
- the securing of the Estonian SSR's sovereignty and national statehood within the framework of a rejuvenated Soviet federation and the rejection of separation from the USSR as a policy incapable of bringing about the socioeconomic flourishing of the Estonian people;
- unity of interests of the republic's indigenous ethnic group and non-native population based on joint labor and life;
- a combining of national-democratic renewal with resolution of the finance and economic crisis and a strengthening of public order by taking a firm and consistent course of creating a law-based state.

While critically assessing its work, the Communist Party of Estonia is fully resolved, together with the republic's workers, to struggle persistently to overcome and eliminate the consequences of Stalinism and stagnation and for a fundamental rebirth as a new and sovereign, socialist Estonia.

The Program of Action of the Communist Party of Estonia is based on the following:

- the Communist Party of Estonia, an integral part of the CPSU, is guided in its work by Leninist doctrine and the Program and Charter of the CPSU;

—the Communist Party of Estonia, like the CPSU, is an international party and the society's political vanguard, which relies on the support of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia and reflects the ideology of socialism;

—in matters of state structure the Communist Party of Estonia is for the establishment of a federation of complete equals, an alliance of equal and sovereign republics.

The ideological platform of the Communist Party of Estonia is based on a creative reinterpretation of Marxism-Leninism ensuring ideological and organizational unity of action of the republic's Communist Party.

The Program of Action sets for the Communist Party of Estonia the goal of using the possibilities of the CPSU and the forms and methods inherent in the national republic's party organization to resolve the accumulated incongruities in the social and economic areas and international relations and to effect a restructuring for the thorough renewal of socialism, and of using all political means at its disposal to prevent steps which could stand in the way of this.

I. IME [Self-Managing Estonia] and Economic Policy

The main task of the party's economic policy is to reorient the economy toward satisfaction of the population's material and social needs. The instrument for accomplishing this, IME, is regional (republic, municipal and rayon economic accountability, the backbone of which is the producer, free of administrative tutelage and operating in a multi-structure economy based on shared capital with other firms, cooperative ownership by the labor collectives and individual ownership). The only criterion must be how possession is exercised. That is, there must be no exploitation.

With respect to legal protection and equality of all types of ownership, entrepreneurial activities are regulated by laws which apply to all producers. Direct interference in management by anyone is ruled out. State regulation is exercised at the level of tax and investment policy, credit and financing promoting a balance of money-exchange relationships.

Every sort of encouragement is given to the development of ties, cooperation and specialization of producers both at the Union and republic levels and internationally—up to the point of establishing free trade zones.

Priority in Estonia is given to agriculture, the processing industry and the development of intermodal (combination) transportation systems and technological renewal of the base branches. We are working toward a regional convertible ruble and every effort is being made to find possibilities for acquiring and using foreign currency by increasing the export capability of the republic's production forces.

The Communist Party of Estonia is working vigorously to dismantle the system of administration by command at all levels.

The agrarian policy of the Communist Party of Estonia is based on the recognition of priority for agriculture, taking into account the international division of labor in the agroindustrial complex. Its goal is an ensured supply of basic food products for the population. The land and the fruits of its labor must be controlled by those who work it. For this purpose it is planned to base the development of the agrarian sector on the following:

—improvement of ownership relations and diverse forms of management (kolkhozes, sovkhozes, processing and other enterprises, organizations of lessees, cooperatives, lease collectives, farmers, private subsidiary plots), creating equal economic conditions for all;

—the use of new pricing principles, the organization of crop procurements and a food supply system for the population under conditions of nonsubsidized and self-financing regions;

—the achievement of ecological balance in agricultural production.

The Communist Party of Estonia considers it inadmissible for party organizations to interfere directly in management in the situation of IME. In the area of economics the Communist Party of Estonia considers the most important functions of its organizations to be participation by the Communists in the development of tactics and strategy for resolving social and economic problems, implementing them with political methods and forecasting the political effects of planned undertakings.

The new economic and political conditions urgently dictate the need for close interaction among the Communist Party of Estonia, the republic government and all public organizations and movements to implement IME.

II. Social Policy, the Individual and the Society

The social policy of the Communist Party of Estonia is designed to realize common human values and build a society based on priority for the needs of the individual.

In order to achieve this goal the Communist Party of Estonia considers it necessary:

—to establish social justice in all areas of republic life and create conditions conducive to the all-around development of the individual;

—to ensure for every citizen of the Estonian SSR his share of the public wealth in accordance with his labor and social contribution;

—to build a healthy and safe living environment, restore the "green milieu" for life, develop the cultural-historical heritage, improve living conditions, establish a climate of mercy and compassion for the weak, provide a life of dignity for the disabled, pensioners and the disadvantaged and get the church involved in public charity.

The social policy is based on an economy which is designed:

- to eliminate the social inequality of the republic's citizens by reinforcing the socialist principle of distribution according to labor and to implement a fair pricing policy in the interest of the masses;
- to introduce an effective tax system and a system for recording the income of entrepreneurs and cooperative members and to eliminate dependency and leveling of earnings;
- constantly to consider the incomes of the underprivileged, the disabled, pensioners and students for purposes of determining the subsistence level and meeting their consumption needs out of public stocks or the state budget;
- to set up a system of retraining and redistribution of the work force, which will make it possible to regulate migration within the republic;
- to further develop social security for illness, crippling, disability or temporary incapacitation;
- to orient health care basically toward the rendering of free, skilled aid, encouraging private medical practice by highly skilled specialists;
- to work out a standard concept of health care, with the participation of scientists and specialists, and to discuss it with the public;
- to provide material and whenever possible, moral, incentives for a healthy life style among the citizens and promote the development of physical culture and sports;
- vigorously to combat crime, to provide immediate financial, material and technical support for law-enforcement agencies and increase legal protection for the police and their responsibility for combatting crime.

Toward resolving the housing problem it is planned to increase new construction and create a situation of fair distribution. Individual and cooperative construction is being encouraged.

The Communist Party of Estonia is helping to overcome the social alienation of the youth and to actively involve it in the society's restructuring. The Komsomol remains the assistant and the reserve of the Communist Party of Estonia. It is normal for there to be a multiplicity of

youth movements based on interests and views in keeping with the society's democratic restructuring on a socialist basis.

The education system is creating equal starting conditions for acquiring an education, taking into account the capabilities and interests of both the students and the teachers through its institutions on a differentiated and democratic basis. There are plans for fundamentally altering the methods of teaching the Estonian and Russian languages and for improving the system of financing public education.

It is planned to encourage the functioning of languages of other peoples of the USSR and to open schools using those languages.

The adoption of advanced teaching methods is being encouraged in order to enhance Estonia's intellectual strength, regardless of the language of instruction.

In the development of culture the Communist Party of Estonia has set itself the goal of ensuring creative freedom, ruling out administrative interference in the cultural process and fostering the all-around development of obvious talent. The party's entire cultural policy attempts to reflect respect for the individual's dignity.

Estonia supports fraternal ties and demonstrates its solidarity with all peoples of the USSR and provides material and moral assistance to those in need of it.

III. Reform of the Political System and Division of Power

The Communist Party of Estonia proceeds from the premise that the republic is a sovereign state, a member of the federation of the USSR, which exercises authority within its own territory. The republic defines its own administrative division and structure, has its own citizenship, decides on all matters pertaining to its development, enters into relations with foreign states, participates in international organizations and has the right to initiate the rescission of a Union law if the latter exceeds Union authority.

The Constitution of the Estonian SSR has an important role in enlarging the rights and improving relations of the republic and the country. It must reflect the socio-economic, cultural and other features of the Estonian people and the uniqueness of its historically developed traditions. This will be an organic part of the Fundamental Law of the USSR being developed. The Communist Party of Estonia will fight for just such a Constitution of the USSR.

The Communist Party of Estonia believes that the elimination of major deformations and basic reform of the political system will open up new possibilities for a restructuring involving all the workers, delimit the functions of party and state organs and bring them into strict conformity with the republic's Constitution, help to avoid the negative consequences of the threat of the

republic's self-isolation and will provide the prerequisite for realizing the IME program.

Total power for the soviets of people's deputies must be the foundation for complete statehood and self-government by the masses. They comprise a unified system of power and therefore direct all areas of economic, social and cultural development. Their decisions are binding for all enterprises, establishments and organizations with any form of ownership, for officials and citizens of the republic.

Local affairs must be decided on the basis of decentralization, self-financing, coordination of regional and state interests, simplification of the structure and a reduction in the size of the apparatus. A region should be run only by those who reside and work in it.

The new self-government is impossible without free and direct expression of the will of all the people. To further democratize the political system the Communist Party of Estonia considers it expedient to restore the provisions of the Constitution of the Estonian SSR which define the status of political and public organizations, including the Communist Party of Estonia itself.

The establishment of a second chamber or a committee of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet for nationalities and the extending of the right of legal initiative to them will guarantee international democracy.

Rejecting the formal, nomenklatura approach to cadre policy, the Communist Party of Estonia feels that any deputy possessing the competence, prestige and essential political and moral merits can become chairman of a soviet. Access to this position may not be barred with contrived ethnic, age, language or any other barriers.

The Communists will become true defenders and agents of the interests of their people and the common worker to the degree to which they are represented in the soviets. The proportion of Communists in the soviets will define the Communist Party's responsibility for the welfare of Estonia's entire people.

The Communists will remain in the society's political vanguard, and the exercise of power and control will be transferred to the soviets. The prerequisites for this already exist. The Communists in the soviets will put through political decisions only by means of persuasion, recommendations and democratic agreement and will bear dual responsibility for this to the party and the electors. In the soviets they must represent common positions on political strategy but will have complete freedom of action in all other matters. It will be their job in the soviets not just to work toward the future improvement of life for the population but also to strive toward full realization of the people's aspirations.

The Communist Party of Estonia strives through the Communists in the soviets to gain guarantees of juridical and legal protection of national honor and dignity, restitution for moral and material damage resulting from

affronts to national feelings and infringements of national pride and the banning of chauvinistic and nationalistic organizations, repression, deportations and violations of human rights.

The purpose of restructuring the political system is to improve the people's life, establish tranquility, order, justice and stability, put a stop to unearned monetary payments and eliminate greed and speculation. The amassing and artificial addition of positions and multi-level institutions of the soviets at the expense of the taxpayer and the blind adoption of the way of life of others hamper the renewal of socialism and must not create in trusting people illusions regarding the resuscitation of political formations from the beginning of the century, lead to the rejection of socialist values or force the people to conduct the restructuring in the direction of capitalism.

Within the largest mass organizations of the workers, the trade unions, we need first of all to increase the Communists' responsibility for the outcome of the restructuring and full execution of the functions of expressing the interests of the working man. Within the Komsomol and other political youth organizations the party will have to apply its influence in a situation of their total independence and self-functioning and to strive for closeness and comradely cooperation among party and Komsomol organizations and their members.

It will have to learn to analyze the rapidly changing situation and take a differentiated approach to various organizations and movements, consider their role and place within the sociopolitical structure and engage in dialog and cooperation with them. However, the Communist Party of Estonia does not intend to reconcile itself to antisocialist views or antisocial actions on the part of destructive elements.

The Communist Party of Estonia supports the establishment and the functioning of unions, associations and other public formations contributing to the elimination of crises in the republic, defending the various interests of diverse social and national groups and taking a responsible approach to the tasks involved in the restructuring.

IV. National Policy and the Realization of Common Human Values

In its practical work of bringing harmony to international relations the Communist Party of Estonia shares the CPSU platform with respect to the party's national policy in the contemporary situation. While advocating definition of the status of Union republic communist parties in the CPSU Charter, the Communist Party of Estonia insists that its status conform to the sovereignty of the Estonian SSR. It independently works out and implements its national policy with consideration for the specific socioeconomic conditions and the demographic and national features of a renewed socialist Estonia.

The Communist Party of Estonia advocates a fundamental renewal of national policy and the right of nations to independence and minorities to protection of their interests. The Communist Party of Estonia considers it essential radically to transform the Soviet Federation into a full union of equal republics and restore the Leninist principle of national self-determination in the full sense of the term, which must be backed up with proper democratic legal guarantees and with a mechanism for national self-determination.

Estonia is the main and only territory in the world in which the free development of the Estonian nation, its language and culture must be ensured. The Communist Party of Estonia advocates consistent realization of a program for implementing the Law of the Estonian SSR on the Language. At the same time guarantees must be established by law for the development of the languages and cultures of all ethnic groups residing here. In the area of international relations the Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be absolutely observed.

The Communists of Estonia consider it inadmissible to establish any sort of privileges for certain people or infringe upon the rights of others based on national origin. Proceeding from the need to satisfy their needs in accordance with internationally accepted human rights, the Communist Party of Estonia is working toward the development and passage of a law of the Estonian SSR which guarantees observance of the rights of all national groups residing in the republic. Furthermore, it maintains that the national element is an inseparable part of the common human picture and that national nihilism should in no way be identified with internationalism.

The Communist Party of Estonia resolutely opposes the exacerbation of hostility between peoples and condemns infringements based on nationality, which should be regarded by party organizations as unacceptable and counter to the principles of Soviet statehood. It is the duty of the Communists actively to oppose nationalism and chauvinism especially in their nation and to do everything possible to prevent back-and-forth national criticism both in personal life and in the society as a whole, including such criticism in the mass media.

For the sake of strengthening trust and mutual understanding of all peoples residing in Estonia, the party organizations need first of all the complete and undistorted truth, without "blank spots" and "black holes," on the actual processes of developing the social self-awareness of the Estonian people, its national rebirth and the establishment of international relations in the republic as a whole. The Communist Party of Estonia advocates the objective study and truthful illumination of its history.

V. Democratization of Internal Party Life and Expansion of the Rights of the Communist Party of Estonia

The Communist Party of Estonia unites the progressive part of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia on a voluntary basis. Guided in its functioning by

its own program of action within the framework of the new Program and the updated Charter of the CPSU, it expresses, along with common state interests, also the particular basic interests of the national republic within the framework of the law.

The Communist Party of Estonia believes that democratization of internal party life is the main means of combatting shortcomings. Only on a democratic basis can the party integrate in its policy the diverse aspirations of various strata and groups of the population, unite them around common national goals and interests and ensure international accord in the republic.

Reviving the Leninist understanding of the democratic nature of the party as a self-governing social and political organization, it will ensure complete freedom of discussion, expression and defense of diverse opinions and unity of action following the adoption of decisions. It will take into fuller account the opinions expressed by the minority in the latter's supplementary reports and proposals on certain problems and alternative draft decrees. Decisions will be made on the basis of the qualified majority. The Communist has the right publicly to defend his point of view even when it does not coincide with a decision taken by the majority so long as it is not in conflict with the party Program and Charter. Even then, however, he is still obliged to carry out the party's decisions.

The Communist Party of Estonia is organizing its relations with unofficial organizations and movements on a new basis. The Communist Party of Estonia is guided in its work by precisely defined positions and a differentiated approach to various public formations and movements based on their place and role in the social and political life. Objective goals of intensifying and expanding the restructuring must be the basis for dialog and joint action.

The Communists participate in the activities of public organizations and movements whose goals and activities are not in conflict with the law or the party Program and Charter and implements their line. Every Communist is obligated to resolve internal party conflicts within the framework of the party's democratic mechanisms, not to take their discussion to public organizations and movements, and vice versa.

Proceeding from the understanding that the division of functions of the party and the state is the basis for strengthening the political prestige of the Communist Party of Estonia, it must be considered the main task of party organizations to implement the party line through Communists working within the soviets of people's deputies and their organs, while preserving for the party committees the right to criticize decisions adopted by state agencies.

The Communist Party of Estonia is striving for changes in the CPSU Charter which would grant greater independence to the Union republic communist parties and promote the further development of internal party

democracy and the elimination from the party's work of everything preventing the party organizations from demonstrating initiative.

In order to intensify the democratization of internal party life it would be expedient to conduct direct elections of delegates to congresses of the Estonia Communist Party from the primary party organizations and conduct elections of guiding organs and secretaries with alternative choices at conferences and congresses.

The Communist Party of Estonia organizes its work openly and publicly, opposes covert actions by any public organizations or movements, defends the principle of party-mindedness of its press and its availability to every citizen but does not encourage the use of party publications for personal, group or apparatus interests.

The Communist Party of Estonia is independent with respect to deciding all local issues. It works out its own program of action, implements its own cadre policy and decides all staff-structure, budgetary and other matters not pertaining to problems within the jurisdiction of the CPSU Central Committee. Its relations with the CPSU are based on the renewed principle of democratic centralism, on the basis of equality of democracy and centralism.

Continuation of Estonian Democratic Party Program

90UN1043A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 9 Feb 90 p 2

["Theses of the Democratic Party Program"]

[Text] 1. An economic experiment of worldwide significance (i.e. the building of a socialist society), having been realized in the USSR, has proved the unpromising nature of the idea of national property and the rejection of all alternative kinds of property, including private ownership. The experience of the 20th century proves that a person deprived of property becomes an object which can be easily transformed into a slave, and moreover, it does not matter to each individual whether he or she becomes a slave of a businessman-capitalist or of a state-proprietor. **That is why DP [Democratic Party] considers the recognition of the right of private property its most important goal in the field of economic relations.**

The absolutely correct observation made by Marx and Engels, that the proletariat has nothing to lose but his chains, has led to a paradoxical conclusion: that all members of society would be forced to the level of the proletariat. In reality, this has given a result opposite to that anticipated by the theory: The proletariat has not found the whole world, but all the other members of society have found chains.

The National ownership of the implements and means of production, including land, inevitably turns into state ownership. In such a case, the state, having become an owner of the main means of life support, also becomes

the owner of its citizens' lives. Having become the sole proprietor, the state becomes a monster, hostile to its members.

"The Communist Manifesto" testifies that the Marxist classics did not take into consideration the possibility of the formation of a new class in a new society - a class of professional supervisors, who would run the property on behalf of the state and become a new aristocracy. Consequently, the socialism which was built appeared to be a structure in which two classes exist - that of hired working people (workers, peasants, and intellectuals) and that of professional rulers, and represented their personal class interests as the interests of the whole country and even of the whole world. The long-expected freedom has never come. The state, which according to theory, was supposed to start dying immediately after the socialist revolution, has not only survived but has strengthened its position immeasurably.

2. The ruling machinery, when organized as a class, needs centralization of supervision, which under "real socialist" conditions surpasses all reasonable limits. Such rigid centralization of the economy caused the organization of supermonopolies dictating their terms on the market—high prices and poor quality. Moreover, whenever the state has attempted to stabilize the prices of some products in order to protect the working people's standard of living, the devastating reduction in product quality has resulted in a latent growth of prices anyway.

DP will strive for management decentralization, which will deprive the professional supervisors' class of the economic basis for their existence. DP recognizes democracy as the most valuable political category, and realizes that only a wide variety of ownership forms may become an economic basis for a mature democracy. In view of this, DP considers that the major economic elements should be: In industry, a people's enterprise based on the principles of collective ownership, while in agriculture, a cooperative of private producers. At the same time, natural resources of the earth, water and air, as well as wood, should remain the property of the state.

3. An attempt to eliminate commodity-money relations on one hand and the destruction of the market on the other has resulted in such a situation in which consumer values could no longer be exchange values; to be more precise, they started changing in arbitrary proportions. An economic voluntarism like that has caused colossal disproportions in prices. As a result, sophisticated and high professional work has become of less value than simple, unprofessional labor. The stimulus to improve qualification and professional standing is no longer valid, which has resulted in a catastrophic fall of production quality. Thus a society has been built in the USSR where unproductive labor of poor quality and low qualification prospers.

DP thinks it necessary to immediately restore the market and commodity-money relations to the fullest.

4. DP recognizes the existence in society of latent unemployment, which manifests itself in a large excess of low-paying jobs. Salary very often does not exceed minimum living wages. The universal right to work has turned into a duty to work, which stimulates the creation of excess jobs and causes a decrease in social labor productivity. DP recognizes employment competition. The restoration of the market would inevitably result in the appearance of a free labor market. Existence of a reserve work force is to be at the same time supported by the following conditions:

- a) creation of new jobs, mainly in the areas of excess labor resources;
- b) creation of a state labor exchange for provision of employment and new trades for the unemployed;
- c) unemployment payments to provide minimum living wages.

5. Unreasonably inflated social consumption funds cause a lack of interest of society members in the results of their work. Subsidizing dwellings, transportation, food, as well as free education, at all levels, and medical services, limits the extent of money usage and results in indifference towards the monetary form of labor remuneration. On the other hand, money paid into social consumption funds is depersonalized. The result of such a depersonalization of money is that in the spheres where payments are provided at the expense of social consumption funds, the only stimulus to good work is the worker's conscience. This stimulus cannot be valid for long, because the decrease in the quality of industrial and agricultural production inevitably involves the non-productive sphere as well. As a result, in the non-productive sphere various non-economic stimuli for good work prosper: In other words, the principles of protectionism or conformity to the formula "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours".

DP believes that social consumption funds should be reduced to within reasonable bounds—as needed for the pursuit of a strong social policy. Similarly, state subsidies for various non-productive fields should also be reduced.

6. In agriculture, DP supports turning over the land to the peasants and the farmers as private property. In addition, a transition period is necessary in which the land user will be able to use and cultivate land, on the basis of an agreement made with organs of local self-government. Upon the expiration date of the agreement, the plot should be turned over to the land user along with the rights of inheriting and selling it.

7. Thus in the economic field, DP stands for:

- restoration of commodity-money relations and the market (including the labor market);
- constitutional recognition of equality of all forms of ownership;
- decentralization of the economic management;

—reduction of social consumption funds and state subsidies to the limits of necessity.

Estonian Communist Party Draft Program of Renewal

*90UN1044A Tallin SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 15 Feb 90 p 2*

[Draft "Program of Renewal of Estonia's Communist Party"]

[Text] When we decide the present and future fate of the Communist Party of Estonia, we must proceed from the fact that the Communist Party of Estonia does not exist as an independent party with its own program, charter and membership. It is therefore necessary to create or renew or even form a new party on the basis of the Estonian Territorial Organization of the CPSU. (Footnote: Different versions are proposed: a Democratic Reform Party of Estonia and others, for example.) The search for a positive solution is based on the conviction that the membership of this organization today includes many people who have always sincerely wanted to serve their people and their homeland and have always acted out of conscience, adhering to democratic principles, even during the times of Stalinism and stagnation.

The Communist Party of Estonia believes that the only way out of this socioeconomic and political crisis lies in radical democratic reforms. A certain transitional period and basic decentralization of the republic's entire life—economic, social and political—will be required for effecting them. The transitional period will at the same time lead to the restoration of Estonia's independence. This is an extremely difficult period filled with conflicts, which, along with the legal basis, requires a solid economic and social foundation. Resolution of the real problems facing Estonia will necessitate unity of action on the part of the present CPSU members, who represent various ethnic groups.

In view of this the 20th congress will transform the present Estonian Territorial Organization of the CPSU into the independent Communist Party of Estonia. The party will operate with of its own program and charter, which will be based on the humane values of early Marxism and reflect the objective requirements for developing a modern civilization and man. It will unite like-minded people who want to accomplish Estonia's present and future tasks and are capable of doing so competently and responsibly. Unity of words and actions, selflessness and honor and purity of conscience will be an essential criterion for membership in the party.

Only an independent Communist Party is capable of assuming real responsibility for the situation in the economic and political areas, recognizing the local situation, flexibly altering tactics, establishing the necessary coalitions and successfully competing with other political parties and movements. The Communist Party of Estonia is being formed as an effective political party,

rejecting a monopoly in political power and implementing political self-determination.

The Communist Party of Estonia is aware of the fact that these goals can only be achieved in a situation of continuing democratization of the present Soviet Union and implementation of the principle of a common European home. The Communist Party of Estonia therefore regards as its direct allies the democratic movements of all the present allied Soviet republics protecting the radical political and economic reforms in the USSR and the CPSU. A Communist Party of Estonia congress or an intra-party referendum will decide on the Communist Party of Estonia's membership in an alliance of democratic parties of the Soviet Union or Europe, should such alliances be formed.

The membership of the Communist Party of Estonia is to be based on voluntary personal decisions of today's CPSU members. Furthermore, the party is open to all residents of Estonia who recognize its program and charter, regardless of whether they presently belong to the party. Questions pertaining to CPSU members currently residing in Estonia who do not wish to join the Communist Party of Estonia will be decided by agreement.

The party being formed will be organized on a territorial basis, and organizations will be formed in the larger centers based on type of occupation. The administrative apparatus will be small. The organizational structure will be an intra-party democracy giving every party member the opportunity to influence party policy through free elections of guiding organs and preliminary discussion of basic issues. A decision adopted in this manner by the party members must be adhered to, with an opportunity subsequently to defend one's particular opinion within the party.

How Do We See Estonia's Future?

The Communist Party of Estonia totally rejects the practice of deformed socialism and utopian models of the future which still exist in the so-called nations of socialism.

We believe that traditional capitalist and socialist elements of management are so closely interwoven and synthesized at a new level in the modern developed states that all concepts of a relatively intelligently and effectively organized society which carry an ideological charge have lost their former meaning.

It is the Communist Party of Estonia's strategic goal to establish in Estonia in the future a democratic society each member of which will enjoy the same degree of freedom to choose political, social and economic goals as the peoples of the northern countries.

In this society it will be essential to achieve a standard of living equal to that of the developed European states, internationally recognized human rights and civil liberties must be guaranteed, and every sort of totalitarianism

and monopoly of power and political and national intolerance must be eliminated. The vital milieu in Estonia must be an environmentally protective one, the public climate must be one of protecting the individual, and economic and political decisions must be directed toward the good of man.

Estonia and the Common European Home

The achievement of the above strategic objective of the Communist Party of Estonia will best ensure Estonia's existence as an independent state with a status worked out by the freely expressed will of the people. The almost 50 years of Estonia's existence as part of a unitary power has only confirmed the desire of the majority of Estonia's population for their own, intelligently managed state, which would be open to close economic and cultural contacts with all its neighbors. Upon restoring itself as a subject of international law, Estonia must become a member of a nuclear-free Northern Europe and a common European home. Estonia's relations with other states can only be based on mutually advantageous international and bilateral agreements. Estonia must become an equal member of all international organizations to which our people believe it should belong.

Guarantee of Independence

The achievement of the Communist Party of Estonia's goals is guaranteed by bilateral talks between Estonia and the government of the USSR, which will consider the interests of both parties and guarantee the preservation and development of essential ties between Estonia and other contemporary republics of the Soviet Union, including an agreement on favored economic terms. The Communist Party of Estonia is prepared to take the initiative in arranging the talks, involving in them all the pertinent political forces in Estonia. We see the foundation for the talks as the establishment of equal civil rights for all people residing in Estonia and essential political and economic guarantees of Estonia's independent statehood.

The Democratic Path to Political Stability

We see the political system developing in Estonia as parliamentary and multi-party. The Communist Party of Estonia is prepared to participate in the management of the country, considering the will of the electors, and to function as a constructive opposition or enter into a coalition with other parties, if this does not involve revising the basic positions of the Communist Party of Estonia. In order to resolve the crisis in Estonia we must have a union of the mechanism of democratic control with great executive power. The Communist Party of Estonia therefore supports direct elections of those who are to exercise executive power: the president, uyezd councils of elders and city mayors. Executive power must be balanced by a bicameral parliament, with one chamber chosen by direct elections, the other consisting of delegated representatives of plenipotentiary councils of cities and rayons. If such a parliament is established

and the Law on Citizenship is passed, the Communist Party of Estonia supports the abolishment of electoral qualification certifications.

The Communist Party of Estonia considers it essential radically to alter the structure of administrative and economic power. The implementation of tax, budget and administrative reforms, and decentralization of economic life should transform the republic's volosts, uyezds and cities into independent, integral communities capable of independently determining their economic, social and cultural life.

To Respect Estonia Is to Respect One Another

The Communist Party of Estonia proceeds from the premise that only a common will and cooperation among all representatives of the various nationalities residing in Estonia will make it possible to have economic success in contemporary Estonia and to preserve the unity of our historical territory.

The goal of the Communist Party of Estonia's national policy is to preserve and provide for the free development of the Estonians as a nation in their ethnic territory, to ensure the civil rights of all the members of other nationalities residing in Estonia and to create a climate of international mutual understanding, loyalty and peace in Estonia. Party members protect Estonia as the original land of the Estonians and respect their historical traditions, national symbols, the Estonian language and culture. There must be guarantees of the free development of the language, culture and education of all national groups in Estonia. All preferential treatment and constraints based on national origin for people in Estonia must be eliminated. Membership in the Communist Party of Estonia is incompatible with disrespect for members of other nationalities. After the Constitution of Estonia is adopted, the Communist Party of Estonia supports the granting of citizenship to all permanent residents of Estonia who recognize the Constitution and desire to become citizens. The Communist Party of Estonia condemns all attempts to effect forcible re-emigration. The demographic situation in Estonia necessitates a strict law on migration and firm rules for granting citizenship to individuals residing in Estonia after it is passed.

The Way Out of the Crisis Is Difficult

The Communist Party of Estonia advocates social justice and the extending of social guarantees to all segments of the society. At the same time the Communist Party of Estonia is cognizant of the fact that in the situation of the current profound economic crisis the traditional social-democratic concepts are incapable of providing a way out for the society. The emergency in the economy demands extraordinary measures. We therefore consider a radical restructuring of the economic system to be the only realistic way out of the economic crisis. It is impossible to redistribute and spend nonexistent resources. The free development of entrepreneurship,

including private enterprise, a drastic reduction in the portion of state ownership, decentralization, privatization and all-around protection of property and improvement of the finance and credit system are the only possible means of balancing the market. The transition to a market economy within the next few years will produce a growth of ownership inequality and a lowering of the society's guaranteed standard of living. The only way out of the current state of economic chaos and shortages lies in working persistently and honorably and going through a harsh and lean period. Only this will open up a future possibility of building a society of developed socialism based on the principles of social justice, democracy and solidarity.

Even in the crisis situation, however, the state must guarantee social support for individuals living below the minimal standard of living and also, together with enterprises and sectors of the national economy, provide for the training and retraining of people.

Only after overcoming the economic crisis and accumulating the necessary resources, can we go over to a system of complete social protection and the guaranteeing of greater equality, a just basis for which must be worked out.

One of Estonia's main economic resources is its geopolitical situation and its use for establishing a bridge between the East and West. This requires a cautious and far-sighted policy. Our industry is in need of a total renewal of its production base. For a fairly long time our linkage with the eastern market will therefore be the determining factor. Any policy which rejects this direction would be ruinous. The republic's present economic accountability principle must be synthesized with the principles of a free economic zone with respect to goods circulation, capital and work force, which will be provided by the necessary degree of closure of Estonia's borders. At the same time there must be a guarantee of the free communication of all national groups residing in Estonia with their compatriots beyond the borders of Estonia.

The Land Must Belong to Those Who Work it

A drastic alteration of all public relations in the rural area is also an absolute condition for getting out of the crisis. The land as the means of production has from time immemorial been the property of the Estonian people and must belong to those who cultivate it. Private and public commodity production units—specialized farms and associations of producers—alone can serve as the basis for providing all Estonian residents with food and for the production of goods for export. The state agricultural policy must be based on the restoration and development of such production units. We must have diverse forms of ownership, as well as legal guarantees of their equality and the inviolability of the peasants' property. The state policy of procurement prices and subsidies is in urgent need of adjustment to ensure fair payment for the peasant's labor.

Renewal of the Estonian rural area is the main prerequisite for preserving the Estonian people. Radical reform of self-government and the formation of independent territorial communities (volosts, uyezds) are possible based on the decentralization of administrative and economic life and a fundamentally new tax and budget policy. Reliable social protection of the individual can be ensured precisely within this framework.

Education and Science Need Help

Despite our poverty, the social area and particularly public education require an increased infusion of resources. We should begin viewing education as the foundation for future development of the production sector, as a part of it. Economizing on education ultimately paralyzes all of the society's systems. The state must guarantee free general education while at the same time maintaining alternative paid education. Subsequent kinds of education must be tied to a system of loans for students from enterprises and the state.

Culture and science do not tolerate political interference, but they require support and protection. Sponsorship of the social sphere should be gained by providing tax benefits.

The Communist Party of Estonia is opposed to a brain and talent drain and strives for state subsidized cultural exchanges, training and on-the-job training of specialists with foreign countries.

Estonia does not shun an uncompromising battle of parties and political groupings for a monopoly of truth and for power in a capable alliance of these forces for resolving specific problems.

Poltava Oblast Leadership Criticized

90UN1028A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 30 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by M. Doroshenko: "Poltava: And the Flood Receded. Fundamentally Healthy Passions Boiled Over in the Stadium Where the Rally Was Held"]

[Text] There have been no extraordinary events, such as in Chernigov, in the Poltava area. Nor has the oblast been infected by "the Yugoslav syndrome" as in Chernovtsy. But in the midst of the labor collectives, in the primary party organizations, and among the citizenry lately there has been growing negative assessment of the activities of the leadership, both on the oblast and local levels. And the assessments have been followed by demands for resignation.

In contemplation of the general need to clean up the situation, satisfy the legitimate demands of many workers and communists, engage in meaningful dialogue, and restore confidence, the obkom [oblast party committee] buro and the oblispolkom [oblast soviet

executive committee] last week resorted to radical measures. Let me cite a report printed on Saturday—the same day the rally was held—in ZORYA POLTAVSHCHYNY:

"A meeting of the obkom Buro was held. It examined proposals by departments of the obkom, the buro of the Kiyevskiy Raykom [rayon party committee], and the plenum of the Poltava Gorkom [city party committee]. In consideration of them, the obkom buro deemed it essential to submit to the CPSU Central Committee and the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee the advisability of advancing the date of holding the 28th CPSU Congress; endorsing proposals relating to direct elections of delegates to the Congress on an contested basis; holding reports and elections in the primary, rayon, city, and oblast party organizations after the Congress; having a single party organ—a gorkom—in cities with populations of between 300,000 and 350,000; granting the right to local party committees to carry out reorganization and thereby strengthen gorkoms and primary party organizations organizationally and financially; recognizing the advisability of reviewing the content and formulation of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution; examining questions and proposals relating to reducing the apparatus of oblast party committees; and transferring the obkom's hotel on Pervomayskiy Prospekt to the jurisdiction of Poltava City's health care organs.

"It was officially noted that Oblast Hospital No 2 has, by decree of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers been transferred to the jurisdiction of the oblast health department. Officials of party and soviet organs, and other categories of officials, are to turn to facilities in their place of residence for medical service.

"It was deemed advisable to make fuller use of the facilities of the House of Political Knowledge for cultural and mass work with young people and other measures; and to place the protection of obkom facilities under the jurisdiction of the non-departmental security service.

"The obkom Office of Business Management and the oblispolkom departments have been directed to review the structure of party and soviet organs and submit proposals for reducing the number of vehicles and turning them over to the national economy."

Reports were also heard concerning questions of opening city newspapers, the distribution and organization of the trade in scarce goods, and deputies' monitoring of these matters. Oblispolkom Chairman I. Hopey spoke directly by telephone with residents of the oblast for two days during designated hours, answering the most burning questions. The substance of that dialogue has also been published in the local press. Finally, there was a routine meeting of the Electors' Club, which also held a lively debate participated in by officials of the oblast and city.

It is obvious, however, that all these measures, and ones like them, are too late. Months late? Years late, I think—at least, the years of perestroyka, for which

today's officials bear responsibility. To be sure, their activities cannot be assessed as all bad. Some meritorious things have been done—for example, priority has been given to the social character of the countryside, fresh approaches in the renewal of family and social foundations there (could it be that one of the prerequisites for nominating oblast officials as deputy candidates in rural areas is that they be accused of something?). There has been progress in housing construction and the building of social facilities.

However, progress in this and other spheres has not been enough to satisfy people and meet their most essential needs. All these years the people's discontent has been mounting accordingly, and to some extent has boiled to the surface. Yet soviet and party officials have perceived it in glossed-over, rose-colored tones, concealed the most urgent conclusions in evaluating the state of affairs, and thereby in effect disinformed the public, in some instances presenting as perestroika only the appearance of perestroika, or the first signs of it, contenting themselves with half-way, cosmetic measures where decisive action was required.

Declared intentions to totally restructure the style of their work and make it new and democratic have not been backed up with practical moves by the top leaders of the oblast either. Undoubtedly one of many damaging things has been a stubborn inclination to use bureaucratic methods and piecemeal glasnost in a manner serving their own interests. This was confirmed once more in Obkom First Secretary O. Myakota's speech at the latest Plenum of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

For this reason, probably, one would have to agree with Poltava Oktyabrskiy Raykom First Secretary V. Chornokondratenko, who in a gorkom plenum speech characterized the style of party work as constantly lagging. This is also manifested today in the handling of pre-election work. The situation is disturbing to communists in many of the oblast's party organizations, especially those of Poltava and Kremenchuk.

And at the rally that was held on Saturday at the Kolos Stadium, a number of speakers devoted their remarks to that problem. The discussion of pre-election problems focused on complaints against district election commissions regarding refusal to register the nominees of certain social associations, inasmuch as they themselves were not yet registered. And although the chairmen of the oblast and city election commissions explained at the start of the rally that the decisions had been made in accordance with the law, it didn't satisfy everyone.

In connection with the upcoming elections, the speakers returned again and again to the ineffective activities of the present leadership of the oblast, which hurts the authority of communists and party organizations. ("The informals want to cross out the names of communists on the ballots in retaliation for this behavior on your part.") There was also discussion of the passivity of the party organizations in some of the election districts with

regard to nominating candidates, as well as a fact that is unprecedented in these days—three members of the obkom buro running without opposition as candidates for deputies to the oblast soviet (the oblispolkom chairman and two obkom secretaries), also the oblast procurator and three rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] chairmen. The speakers ascribed this situation primarily to the "activists" of the candidates themselves and the party-soviet apparatus. As V. Zhyvotenko, the deputy secretary of the party committee of the Turbomechanical Plant, said in his remarks at the rally, that was the last straw that broke the patience of the communists and workers.

M. Dobrovolskyy, the former rector of the Agricultural Institute, not entirely tactfully but quite reasonably laid the blame on Obkom First Secretary O. Myakota. If about 76 percent of the 118,000 members of the CPSU in the oblast live in Poltava and Kremenchuk, where is the leader of the party organization supposed to run for deputy? In the midst of the working class, of course. Yet the obkom first secretary is again running in the rural district.

What can you do? Officials, unfortunately, are adding new, rather bad decisions to their previous collection of shortcomings. It is appropriate here to recall the episode of the replacement of license plates on the official cars of party, soviet, and state officials, which a lot of people immediately linked to the events in Chernigov. As I. Hopey explained after the fact in the oblast newspaper, there was no ulterior motive in the replacement of the license plates. Let me quote further from his explanation: "The only reason the license plates were replaced was to rule out any misunderstanding regarding 'V.I.P.' license plates which, supposedly, gave their owners privileges on the road." The question is, Why not publish such explanations before the fact in order not to generate misunderstanding?

The rally in Poltava was marred by attempts to drown out certain speakers as well as by excessive emotion. Generally, however, emotions were healthy. It was gratifying to note that this time, workers and kolkhoz members did as good a job of expressing themselves as officials and representatives of the intelligentsia. After all, politicization goes deep. Remarks by communists rang out frequently and resoundingly at the rally. Both they and non-party members generally came together in legitimate criticism of the oblast and city party and soviet leadership. And although V. Stasovskyy, the party committee secretary of the K. Marx Kolkhoz in Chernukhinskiy Rayon, cautioned the participants against the temptation to give in to a chain reaction to the Kharkov and Chernigov events, the majority of the rally participants voted for a resolution which included, *inter alia*, the demand that the oblast and city soviet and party leadership resign.

It seems to me that O. Myakota's words at this point were reasonable (for some reason he again, all by himself, "lashed back" on behalf of the leadership): "What good can come of it?" Especially given the fact that elections to the Soviet take place in a month, and party

reports and elections are just a few months away. Who is going to report in the event of a resignation? Wouldn't it be better in the meantime to make careful preparations for the election of the new leader, study the possible candidates and heed the voices of all the oblast's communists? After all, electing a good leader is no simple matter, and haste makes waste.

One comment that has to be made. The rally voted for a resolution that was declared to be a second resolution—that is, an alternative resolution, as O. Kelym, who announced it,

said. He read it aloud and then immediately called for a vote. Which most of the participants in the rally did. But how about the first resolution? Why wasn't it put to a vote?

Yet the persistence and perseverance of more than 10,000 participants in the rally cannot fail to evoke excitement. There was a downpour of rain, but no one dispersed. That was how much people wanted to discuss the oblast's social-political problems. And under the shelter of the rally, the flood receded. This is the kind of consolidation and perseverance that is needed to accomplish urgent goals.

Use of Russian as USSR State Language Defended

90US0618A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 8,
19 Feb 90 p 19

[Article by V. Resnichenko, APN Political Commentator: "My Language—Your Enemy?"]

[Text] "...And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men had built. And the Lord said, Behold the people are one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth; and they left off to build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth..."

That is how the Bible describes the appearance of various languages and dialects among people. According to the above-cited version, it happened at the dawn of history, after the Flood, and was, understandably, by no means a gracious gift from on high but, on the contrary, a punishment from God. The conflicts and differences that have arisen since then on the grounds of language have brought humankind quite a few misfortunes. And they have not abated to this day—in our country any more than elsewhere.

Which language is better, which worse? How is one to respond to this question? Linguists have not established absolute criteria for beauty and expressiveness—everything is relative and subjective in that regard. Foreign, unfamiliar and incomprehensible languages can seem beautiful or ugly, pleasing or displeasing, depending, very often, on whether or not we find the particular speaker of a given language to be pleasing.

"How charming, the way that French singer rolls her r's," the woman says, clearly moved by the recording of Edith Piaf that is showing on television. "What a repulsive burr in the neighbor boy's speech," the same woman says angrily, and what's behind the remark is clear: Only recently, the hateful courtyard hooligan had given her precious offspring a black eye. When, as guests at a Caucasian wedding, we listen to the toasts offered with great feeling by the toastmaster, we think to ourselves (though we understand not a single word): "Still, what a rich-sounding language they have!" But that same language, when heard from the lips of two tradesmen talking with one another at Moscow's Central Market, elicits nothing but annoyance on our part. The guilty party, of course, is not the language but the prices on the tangerines, pomegranates or persimmons—prices so high they're downright galling!

The way we perceive some other language—the psychological complexion of that perception—can take on political hues. Recall Makar Nagulnov, the protagonist in

Sholokhov's "Virgin Soil Upturned" who was learning English with a self-teaching text. "They have a lot of words that they've borrowed from us, words they've just put their own endings on," Makar explained. "We say 'proletariat,' for example, and they say the same, except for the ending—and the same holds true for the words 'revolution' and 'communism.' They put some kind of hissing sound on the end, as if they had it in for those words, but how are you going to get away from such words? Like it or not, they've put down roots around the world, and they have to be spoken."

It needs to be said here, of course, that, in studying a foreign language, Nagul'nov set himself goals that were exclusively class-oriented, so to speak: "I'm gonna use my English for stamping out the world counterrevolution without pity! So you drank the blood of the British working classes, the Indians and other such oppressed peoples? So you exploited other people's labor? Then up against the wall with you, you blood-spattered slime bag. And that'll be the whole conversation. I'll master those words first—learn to speak 'em without a hitch."

Fortunately, the times are changing. Today, in stressing the need to master the languages of other peoples, we are primarily pursuing humanitarian goals—the goals of mutually enriching our cultures and exchanging the achievements of civilization, without which human values can never become universal.

However, there are about 2,500 languages in the world (of which about 130 are spoken in the Soviet Union), and carrying out an international exchange in all of them at once is an impossible task in practical terms. Therefore, in human society there have long since emerged languages that play the role of intermediaries, of connecting links and of bridges that tie one bank to the other. Russian is one such language.

These widely known things would doubtless need no repeating if the Russian language were not the object of ill-founded attacks in various parts of the country today, if its importance were not being called into question. I don't wish to use the newly fashionable term "Russophobia," for scarcely had that word made its appearance before it was soiled by a multitude of unclean lips—sullied and ruined from the outset, as it were. But one cannot fail to mention the distaste for all things Russian, a distaste that emerged from the murky depths, came to a boil, and could be seen here and there as a turbid scum on the tempestuous waves of renewal. This distaste—this hostility and intolerance—had by no means its least effect on attitudes toward the Russian language. One way to characterize a stand of that sort is by rephrasing the well known proverb: "Any language of yours is an enemy of mine."

Relations among nationalities are a very delicate matter—an area where it's very easy to hurt a person and much harder to heal a wound that has been inflicted. Here is an example cited by M.S. Gorbachev during his recent trip to Lithuania. "We want to do things in such a

way that a person feels better, and we want to spread that feeling to everyone," he said. "Remember how, just as soon as the question of the Russian Language was posed in the Ukraine the interests of a lot of people were affected. But there are 15 million Russians in the Ukraine: The entire Donets Basin is Russian, Kharkov is Russian, and the Crimea is 66 percent Russian. As you can see, it's not enough just to throw out slogans—you have to think them over carefully."

Unfortunately, thinking over one's words before uttering them is a trait that is by no means inherent in all people. Here is another proverb that applies directly to the subject of our talk: "The tongue speaks, but the head is not engaged." True, "tongue" is used here in a somewhat different sense than that of language—to be exact, it figures here (as Vladimir Dal puts it) as "a meaty projection in the mouth, serving to feed food to the teeth, to detect its taste, and also for oral speech or, in the case of animals, to emit certain sounds." Incidentally, in life as in semantics, everything is interconnected.

Of course, a great deal could be said in the Russian language's defense—and to its greater glory. One need only cite Lomonosov's splendid lines (often cited though they be—but after all, a jewel doesn't lose its luster from frequent use): Charles V, Emperor of Rome, said that it is fitting to speak Spanish with God, French with friends, German with the enemy, and Italian with the fairer sex. But had he known Russian, he would naturally have added that it would be fitting to use it in speaking to all concerned, for he would find in it the splendor of Spanish, the animation of French, the strength of German, the tenderness of Italian and, in addition, the richness and powerfully expressive economy of the Greek and Latin languages.⁴ But do people heed the words of the great scholar and man of learning? They may well say that, as the founder of the Russian literary language, he is an "interested party"—and indeed he is a directly interested party, there's no denying it.

Incidentally, I will readily concede that some people truly don't find Russian to their liking—either because of the abundance of sibilants or the complex declension of nouns. And some will wholeheartedly reject the Russian alphabet (I've even heard a nasty joke to the effect that Cyrill and Methodius got royally plastered while inventing their alphabet, with the result that, in their drunken fog, they confused Greek letters with Latin ones). And Arab cursive, Chinese ideograms or, say, the Latin alphabet are something quite different. There's no accounting for tastes, as they say—and, indeed, is there any way to prove, for example, that writing from left to right is more correct than writing from right to left?

But if someone were to up and state that the Russian language is bad because it is a "language of conquerors," then that is indeed something to reflect on. One might well ask: What great world language was never a "language of conquerors?" Take Latin once again—the Latin carried by legionnaires to the various ends of the earth. It was the basis of many languages that were then also

carried throughout the world by conquerors. Thus, Spanish and Portuguese grew out of Latin on the Iberian Peninsula. These languages, in turn, spread across vast expanses of America and Africa, carrying with them not merely enslavement, but also the light of knowledge and a wealth of culture. Today, hundreds of millions of people speak them, and how many of them have the blood of Romulus and Remus, the founders of Rome, in their veins?

Incidentally, there's no reason to fix our gazes on distant continents. A language derived from that of the Roman soldiers can be heard in our own country as well—in Moldavia, to be precise. It is a known fact that people in those areas spoke differently prior to their conquest. The great Latin poet Publius Ovidius Naso, banished by Emperor Augustus to Tomis, on the banks of the Pontus Euxinus, where the Sarmation Bowman lived alongside the Goth, complained bitterly that the "savage folk" did not understand his speech.

But having mentioned Moldavia here, one could hardly fail to recall a different outstanding poet—Antioch (son of the Moldavian ruler Dmitry Kantemir), who wrote satires in Russian even before the odes of Lomonosov. One of the protagonists (an antihero) of his first satire, "To Those Who Mock Learning," which was written in 1729, takes quite a skeptical view, incidentally, of the usefulness of learning languages: "Before this, when we knew no Latin, we lived in much greater abundance than we do now. In our ignorance, we harvested much more grain. Now, having acquired a foreign language, we have lost our grain. If my speech be halting, if it lack order and hang together poorly, is that anything for the nobleman to grieve about?" It must be said that Antioch Kantemir had a perfect command of Greek, Latin, English, French and Italian.

I believe, however, that people of other nationalities who reject the Russian language know it not from masterpieces of literary elegance, but primarily from the cheerless and clumsy lexicon of the administrative-command system, which has crushed any and all languages, Russian or not, with the weight of its officialese, like a fly mashed by the official seal.

The loutish bellow of a barracks guard, the semiliterate bureaucratic imperatives in official instructions issued to outlying areas from the center, the high-flown style of newspaper editorials, vacuous-sounding as a baby's rattle, the senile verbal ruminations of the "ardently beloved" leader—true, all that is also the Russian language. But it's not language as guilty party but language as victim—it is language that is itself suffering cruelly, having been made a willing instrument in the hands (to be more precise, in the mouths) of power-wielding bureaucrats and martinets.

And now let us imagine what might happen if Russian were neither the state language of the USSR nor the language of internationalist discourse among the peoples that inhabit our country.

I can just see Latvians and Estonians speaking to each other in English, or an Armenian and a Georgian speaking Esperanto—I see very widespread use of sign language. The experience would be like landing in the kingdom of the deaf and dumb.

A routine session of the USSR Congress of people's Deputies. Here, too, the dumb are singing psalms to the deaf, as they say. The representatives of each people—Mordvinian, Lezgian, Greek, Uzbek, Karelian, Mingrelian, German and Samoyedic—are naturally all speaking in their native language. True, a unique computer system has been ordered from a famous foreign company. Soon a control panel with dozens of buttons will be installed at every deputy's seat: Push one of them and you hear a translation into your own language. The Palace of Congresses will be higher than the bell tower of Ivan the Great at that point—several stories will have to be added to house the simultaneous interpreters.

The occupational skills of interpreters and translators become the scarcest skills of all: Thousands and thousands of them are needed. The second-scarcest occupation is that of teacher to train these interpreter-translators. As always, we experience an extreme shortage of personnel.

As a result, mountains of business correspondence, official acts and technical documentation lie stalled. Thus, a scientific discovery made, say, in Syktyvkar and described in the Komi-Zyryan language simply never reaches the Tuvians in Kyzyl. As for works of fiction, it goes without saying that there is neither time, nor are there people, to translate it. Where foreign literature is concerned, things are even worse: Can the Chukchi, for example, permit themselves the luxury of publishing the latest titles from Paris in the Chukchi language?

This absurd futurological picture could, of course, be filled in with many an additional brushstroke. But in continuing to paint it, won't we ultimately arrive back where this article began, at ancient Babel? "So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth; and they left off to build the city." Language can serve to bring people together and to drive them apart, but does it make sense for us to go our separate ways today?

Platform of 'Democratic Russia' Described

WA0203201690 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 8, 24 Feb-2 Mar 90 p 8

[USSR People's Deputy N. Travkin summarizes the platform of "Democratic Russia" in a meeting with ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent A. Uglanov]

[Text] We continue the publication of the platforms of informal groups and social movements.

Our correspondent A. Uglanov met with USSR People's Deputy N. Travkin, who is a member of the council of the Moscow department of the "Democratic Russia" bloc.

The "Democratic Russia" voter bloc unites candidates for people's deputies of the RSFSR of all levels who support logical and pressing democratic and socio-economic transformations. The objective is a transition from the authority of the nomenklatura to the authority of the people.

The constituent conference of the bloc took place on 21-22 January 1990. More than 170 candidates to Russian soviets from more than 20 regions of the republic took part in it. The conference approved: A platform for the voting bloc "Democratic Russia," a declaration "For Democracy in Russia," and a number of resolutions and appeals. To belong to the bloc one must support the basic propositions of its platform and the declaration.

More than 5,000 candidates for people's deputy had already joined the "Democratic Russia" voters' bloc by 20 February.

Bloc soviets are being established on a regional level, and their task includes the confirmation of lists and familiarizing the voters with them. On the staff of its Moscow department are USSR people's deputies who are on the ballot in the present elections: M. Bocharov, B. Yeltsin, I. Zaslavskiy, S. Stankevich, and others, and also I. Bogantsev, V. Bokser, O. Orlov, and others who are activists in the voter movement.

The platform of "Democratic Russia" has been published. Therefore, I will dwell on those principles that are more fully presented in other documents of the bloc.

We are for democracy that can be implemented through democratic institutions that have been tested through world practice, for political and economic demonopolization and decentralization, and for legislative guarantees through a multiparty system and a multi-sectoral economy.

We are convinced that any economic innovations should be assessed according to whether they stimulate human labor that is directed at an improvement in quality and an increase in productivity, or whether they discourage these desires.

The present reforms, measures, and programs increase pressure on the worker. And the more that is taken from him, the poorer he works. Therefore, the logical result of reform should be a gradual lowering of the tax level of the producer. First of all a person should work on increasing his personal consumption, and not on the abstract "needs of the state," which frequently turn into a senseless change or a demonstration to everyone of the state's will and power in somebody else's territory.

We plan to combine the guarantees of effective incentives for high quality or creative labor with a system of amortization measures that enable us to ensure a dignified existence for persons on fixed incomes: pensioners, mothers with a lot of children, invalids, certain categories of employees and teachers, and also workers of the militia and regular servicemen.

For the two last categories, we propose an economically based system of insurance at the expense of the pertinent

departments. The total amount of insurance, constituting not less than R50,000, will correspond realistically to the expenditures and costs of getting set up and for social and professional adaptation.

We will strive for a genuine sovereignty of Russia that presupposes the priority of the legislation of the republic over that of all-union legislation on important questions of economic management and cultural life. We are for a spiritual and cultural renaissance of Russia. It is necessary to return the historical designations of cities and streets, to return temples to believers, and to support the distinctiveness of the ways of life, traditions, and languages of all populations that inhabit Russia.

We, adhering to different points of view on many personal questions, united ourselves in the "Democratic Russia" bloc, because we realize how critical are the times we are living through. It depends on the current elections whether Russia will be reborn and use its own potential for the welfare of the people, or whether it still will play the inglorious role of an "older brother" in a family who is on the verge of bankruptcy. For the time being, still on the verge...

Everyone is calming and reassuring us: "Haste makes waste," and I recall another ancient saying: "Late comers get the leftovers."

Moscow's Russian Refugee Problem Viewed

90UNI094A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No 6, 9 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by Tatyana Okulova: "Will Moscow Defend Them?"]

[Text] Tamara Petrovna Grazhdan spent the last of her money to buy a ticket to run away from Baku. She has nothing left except the ID of a participant of the Great Patriotic War. "I was in reconnaissance," she says. "I fought near Moscow and now I am sitting on its threshold." On her feet, swollen because of war-time wounds and exhaustion, is a worn-down pair of boots. They are her only footwear now.

We are talking at the headquarters for refugee aid which was set up by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers at 2, Rochdelskaya street. The second floor is taken up by the mother-and-child room. The room is huge; there are dozens of bare folding beds. It became a temporary shelter for Russian civilian refugees—women and children of all ages. There are tea and cookies; sometimes people manage to cook something for the kids on the hot plate in this waiting-room.

They left behind the land where many of them were born and where they lived most of their lives, the land which they cultivated. They left behind their homes that had seen years of care and now stand full of bullet holes and venom. They left behind the threats: "Go back your Russia!", "New Year—without the Russians!". People spat in their faces; they hollered: "Fascist's mother" to soldier's mothers. Here is only one story told by the eyewitnesses: a little girl already

dressed in her fur overcoat and her mother were ready to leave for the airport. All of a sudden there was loud noise, the door was broken down by some frenzied men. They killed the mother and threw the little girl down from the balcony.

Those who got lucky and made it to the airport had enough trouble too. Some of them spent some 24 hours there and could not fly out. Even the airport commandant could do nothing to help. There were vacant seats but the plane got packed with flowers put there before the children by resourceful wheeler-dealers. They wanted the flowers to reach Moscow markets before they wilted.

These are horrible flowers. The stories of these people who suffered so much are full of things that I cannot repeat, I cannot even utter them. But a most surprising thing is the absence of any animosity towards the local population which might have appeared under those circumstances. They remember how their Azerbaijani neighbors used to buy bread for the whole house after the Russians were denied bread in the stores. They remember how the neighbors warned them about the danger, how well they used to live together. Thin and silent Natasha had worked in a factory for 20 years and continued working to the last days until it became unbearable. She told me: "They were shooting and I was going to work anyway—I missed my factory. I still miss it!" "And I miss my books," added another woman. "I've spent a lifetime collecting my library."

How full of human dignity are these bitter words, in spite of all the humiliation these people had to suffer!

They are very grateful to those who received and helped them here, at the headquarters. Cosmonaut Komarov's widow came several times; she made whole lists of blankets, shoes, and everything necessary and bought it all for the refugees. The flow of love and kindness in our famished and destitute land does not end. People donate their own belongings and send money to the refugee aid fund.

But none of it is sufficient today. There must be some fundamental solution for the problem done by the government.

"Start everything anew now, even if you are retired," says a gray-haired man who evidently has seen enough in his lifetime. "It is shameful to cry, but the tears wouldn't stop."

They are unsettled and quite uncertain about their future life. I was told that the first money allowance for the civilian refugees comes with great delays; a lot of them had to live on bread and water. I recall the faces of the people as they listened to the loudspeaker announcing that the busses came to take the refugees to their temporary homes in different cities. Sitting on their suitcases and very often not even having those or anything else but their passports, they are anxiously waiting for someone to decide their fate for them. They will stay for some time in boarding houses and rest homes where they will be fed and helped. But there will be no job, no assurance of the future. For how long can this go

on? Very many of them want to go to work immediately; they do not want to be the parasites of the state.

"I know how to do everything: I can work as a bricklayer, a metalworker, a carpenter," Igor told me, the young father of three children. "They put us up at first in summer houses with no heating. So we ran away again and came here. Give us some normal accommodation for the beginning and we will build our house ourselves!"

Let God send peace to the Azerbaijani land! But the Russian mother who had spent a night with her child hiding from bullets in her bathroom has the right to choose for herself whether she would want to go back.

Here, at the headquarters, I spoke to Galina Ilyinichna Litvinova, doctor of jurisprudence, chairman of the Russian and Russian-speaking refugee aid foundation. The foundation was recently formed by the "United Council of Russia" Association.

"It is necessary to design and adopt the refugees' legal status, to give a precise definition of their rights, to set up the rules of providing them with social benefits, job placement, and with compensation for the monetary and other damages," is the opinion of G.I. Litvinova. "Special emphasis should be put on the social protection for women and children and those who cannot work. The damages should be paid by the republics whose authorities allowed the mass violations of the people's rights thus turning them into refugees. We need to create a committee for the refugee problem as soon as possible. We need to define the committee's rights and duties and the financing sources. A USSR Supreme Soviet commission on privileges is very active today. Let this commission find a possibility to settle the refugees in the government dachas near Moscow, for instance. We need to find a way to settle the people more or less together, in big groups, so that it is easier for them to adapt by being neighborly after they all lived through a mutual disaster. I think that all these problems should be the first priority on the agenda of the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We cannot procrastinate over the solutions."

I would like very much to see the capital of our country and of Russia become for the Russian refugees the same loving mother it had become for the people of other nationalities who lived through a similar cataclysm, and not be just a stepmother.

And again I recall Tamara Petrovna Grazhdan, the woman who had defended Moscow. Let Moscow defend her now too.

Old Believers Sect Appeals to Gorbachev on Behalf of Armenian Refugees

*90US0638A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
20 Feb 90 p 1*

[Appeal of the Society of Spiritual Christians (Molokans) in Yerevan to the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, M.S. Gorbachev]

[Text] We, the Spiritual Christians (Molokans) reside in Armenia. The beginning of our settlement dates back to the 1820s, when upon the Ukase of Emperor Alexander I and then Nikolas I, our ancestors were exiled for their religious convictions from the central regions of Russia, such as Tambov, Saratov, Voronezh and other provinces to places in the Transcaucasus which were considered at that time to be harsh in their climatic conditions, remote and little populated. And here, our communities, the Spiritual Christians (Molokans), by force of circumstance acquired a second homeland for themselves.

In dwelling thus peacefully and unrebellingly, and due to the respect, aid and charity of the industrious, simple and much-suffering Armenian people who in their own history had learned much of grief, humiliation, suffering and hardship, we, the Spiritual Christians, for almost two centuries now have been able to maintain our religious traditions, our holy cults and rites.

Even during the times of stagnation, when neglect and a negative attitude were shown to believing people, we always felt the profound and sincere understanding of the Armenian people and the republic leadership for our spiritual needs and requests and there never was from them any obstacles in the performing of our religious services and our other rites.

And we all, from young to old, express a feeling of profound gratitude and recognition to all the Armenian people for their noble, sincere, Christian love and respect for us, the Russian people and who helped us preserve our ancient religious principles. For Jesus Christ himself, while on this earth, taught us all to love one another as "he loved us" (St. John 15:2) and the Armenian people in relation to this have remained the followers of these words of Christ.

All peoples, including ourselves, the Spiritual Christians, from the outset of the perestroika processes occurring in our nation have placed great hopes and these are already being realized in our life, including religious life. We strongly support the line of the nation's leadership to renew our society and in our daily prayers we ask Almighty God for aid and the granting of his mercy in this noble undertaking.

However, the events which have occurred recently in our region cause in all of us, believing people, a feeling of uncertainty and sadness, for all that is happening is alien to our religious convictions and even comprehension, for blood is being shed of completely innocent persons, fathers and mothers who have lost their sons and daughters are weeping, children who have lost their fathers and mothers are weeping, and people who have lost their close ones and friends are weeping.

Every day on the streets we see the unfortunate refugees from Azerbaijan, old and young, beaten and down-trodden, wounded and deprived of their housing and property and all of this evokes in us, believing Christians, a feeling of bitterness and sadness as well as regret for all the occurring misfortunes all the more as such a

merciless and inhuman attitude of man to man, as the creation of Almighty God, is occurring in peacetime.

Still fresh in our memory is that grief and those sufferings which befell the Armenian people and all of us as caused by the natural disaster, the earthquake, which carried off many human lives and these wounds for a long time to come will cause grief in our hearts.

Many of us at present are not working, for there is not enough electric power, not enough fuel, and there are difficulties in delivering food to the republic; there is one cause here—the blockade.

The blockade of Armenia is being constantly continued and this is being utilized by cruel and immoral persons as a weapon of pressure to achieve their goals at any price.

Certainly all of us have children and it is very difficult and absurd to explain to the children who is responsible for the heartlessness, cruelty, immorality, perfidiousness and inhumaneness.

We, the Spiritual Christians, condemn any sort of violence as alien to our religious convictions and equally the murder of innocent persons, their merciless massacre, the expulsion from their homes, any outrage or belittling of human dignity and the violating of man's rights and freedoms.

For such actions contradict also the teachings of our Lord Jesus Christ and the holy commandment "Thou Shall Not Kill."

The holy scripture teaches us: "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of them that do well" (I. Peter 2:13-14).

Mikhail Sergeyevich, we, the Spiritual Christians, appeal to you as the leader of the nation and entrusted with supreme power, to draw your attention and take the necessary measures in order to put an end to the atrocities, to comfort the weeping, the injured, insulted and humiliated, so that people who by misfortune have ended up in a lamentable situation gain confidence in the triumph of truth and justice, that they see the light of saving hope and gain full confidence in the coming of the new happy day of our Lord.

Armenian Philosophers Issue Appeal on Caucasus Crisis

90US0638B Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
22 Feb 90 p 1

[Appeal from the Constituent Assembly of the Armenian Philosophical Society to the Philosophers of the Soviet Union and the World]

[Text] In this critical time for all the Armenian people, we, the participants in the constituent assembly of the

Armenian Philosophical Society, appeal to your sense of justice and not compassion, to your heart and not merely to your reason.

For 2 years now, the Armenian people in Nagorny Artsakh and together with them all the Armenian people, both in the motherland and in the diaspora, have been waging a harsh struggle to realize the right to self-determination of the Artsakhs [inhabitants of Karabakh] and for the defense of their elementary human rights. From the very first days of its genesis, our struggle has been carried out by peaceful and constitutional means, in focusing on common human values and the basic principles of international law. Unfortunately, the forces opposing us from the very outset have resorted to different weapons including violence, genocide, an economic and informational blockade, physical and informational terror.

The last wave of violence is too fresh in our memory and there is no need to speak of it. We would merely point out that the genocide process in Baku has assumed such forms that we, the Armenians, have been forced to conceal its terrifying details from our wives and children since normal human thinking is incapable of dealing with all of this.

The armed encroachment on the Armenian-inhabited areas of Azerbaijan, Artsakh and the frontiers of Armenia itself have forced the Armenian people to resort to the right of self-defense which is generally recognized by the international community. The official authorities and the armed forces have refrained from intervention until the blind frenzy of the crowd which had been swept up in a nationalistic hysteria changed its direction, threatening not only the destruction of all other "foreigners" including Russians, Jews and other representatives of the Russian-speaking population along with the Armenians, but also to overthrow the bases of the Soviet state. Only at that time was an attempt made to bring the situation under control. The official condolence published in those days expressed in most general terms mentioned the interethnic clashes, the violence, disorders, the victims on both sides, but did not mention a word about the new Armenian genocide.

One of the major thinkers of the century, Theodore Adorno, felt that after Auschwitz, all human culture, including its negation, is mere rubbish.

And after Sumgait or Baku?...

Only self-defense organized by the Armenian population on the approaches to Northern Artsakh and Nagorny Karabakh made it possible to promptly halt the advance of the Azerbaijani detachments armed and outfitted with modern army supplies and prevent inevitable slaughter and deportation. But at present, the threat has not been dispelled and there is deep concern over the fact that under the conditions of the state of emergency, the population of these Armenian areas has been disarmed and hence deprived of the opportunity for self-defense, while in the surrounding areas tens of thousands of

Azerbaijani fighters convinced of their impunity as they were not disarmed under the pretext of "avoiding excess bloodshed" are merely waiting for a convenient hour....

The mass information and propaganda media, in presenting the Karabakh question as an interethnic conflict and even supposedly as strife between two republics over the territorial question have concealed from the public at large that this is a national liberation struggle of the people of Artsakh against a merciless foreign rule imposed on them and that at this very moment when you are reading these lines, tens upon tens of thousands of families in Nagornyy Karabakh, Northern Artsakh, as well as a small ethnic group of Udins which profess Armenian-Gregorian Christianity and who for over 18 months now have lived under conditions of a harsh siege and terror are now confronted with a real threat of physical annihilation and deportation. This is nothing more than an attempt to resolve the Karabakh question following a scenario which had been tested out in Sumgait, Fergana, Kirovabad, Baku and repeated the evil deed of 1915, when there were the genocide and deportation of the Armenian people from the territories of their historical motherland. History will not forgive any of us if yet another island of ancient culture and its carrier people disappear from the map of human civilization.

No momentary political considerations, no matter how poignantly they may be presented, are capable of morally justifying the position of political utilitarianism and conciliation on the given question. The incorporation and hence the locating of Nagornyy Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan is completely devoid of legal basis, as this was carried out illegally and contrary to the will of its people. Not to recognize this fact means to proceed from a false premise of the primacy of politics over law, truth and humanitarian values. Does this also not explain the fact that at present they do not want to consider the principle of international law which incidentally at one time was also proclaimed by the leader of the Russian revolution, Lenin, who recognized the inalienable right of a people to self-determination on their own territory and described the holding of a people under alien rule contrary to their will as "annexation, that is, seizure and violence." Is it not the atmosphere of political utilitarianism and compromise which explains the fact that at present they are endeavoring to dispose of Nagornyy Karabakh above or to the side or behind the back of its people, without listening to its authentic representatives, having seized it by the throat and shut its mouth. Repressions are being undertaken in order with the aid of coarse strength to carry out decisions adopted contrary to their will.

Certainly, it was in such a situation that it became possible to have the enforced relocation of many peoples, and it was precisely in such an atmosphere that the phenomenon of Lysenko became possible in science, it was precisely under such conditions that the tragic fate developed for the Vavilovs, the Tsvetayev family, Mandelshtam, Meyerhold, Pasternak and Sakharov, and precisely this atmosphere is to blame for the tragic consequences of the Chernobyl accident....

Now the time has come for the people of Nagornyy Karabakh and for all the Armenian people. But they are confident that they will be able to raise their motherland from the ruins, heal the wounds of their compatriots who became the innocent victims of violence and lawlessness, dry the tears of their children and finally see a portion of their motherland, Artsakh and its people, liberated from foreign rule. Whether their belief in human justice is justified depends on all of us.

We turn to the philosophers of the world with the appeal:

- To demand that a political assessment be given to the acts of genocide against the Armenian people in Azerbaijan, in Sumgait, Kirovabad, in other regions and, finally, in Baku;
- To make a decisive protest and initiate concrete steps in order to prevent the further implementation of the monstrous plans to deport the Armenian people from the territories of their historical motherland, the Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and Northern Artsakh;
- To rise up against the barbarian and illegal methods of suppressing the national liberation movement of the people of Artsakh;
- To come to the defense of the struggle of the Artsakh people for realizing their inalienable right to self-determination on the territory of their motherland.

Thereby the philosophers, in being called upon to express the conscience of the age and the ideals of truth and justice, will carry out their moral and civil duty.

Armenian Experts Discuss Caucasus Crisis

90US0575A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
1 Feb 90 p 3

["Congress" of political scientists' meeting recorded by Z. Arevshatyan: "Crisis. Forecasts... Safeguards?"]

[Text] Of course, the word "congress" does not entirely accurately reflect the essence of the intent of the editorial office, which decided to put very serious questions to people who have something to say. The profundity and indisputableness of what they said will be for the readers to judge, but meanwhile let us disclose the pseudonyms under which they speak in the discussion:

"Political scientist"—Levon Bagdasaryan, candidate of philological sciences, deputy editor of the journal LENINYAN UGIOV.

"Philosopher"—Agaron Adibekyan, candidate of philosophical sciences, assistant professor at the Yerevan Pedagogical Institute Theory of Scientific Communism Department.

"Sociologist"—Gevorg Pogosyan, candidate of philosophical sciences, head of the Sociological Research Department of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law.

"Legal scholar"—Karen Khtryan, chief of the Armenian SSR Ministry of Justice Legislative Administration.

"Orientalist"—Ruben Safrastyan, candidate of historical sciences, lead associate of the Department of the History and Culture of Overseas Armenian Communities of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences.

"Economist"—Stepan Simonyan, candidate of economic sciences, associate professor of the Yerevan National Economy Institute Political Economy Department.

"Leader"—Vartan Grigoryan, candidate of philological sciences, editor of the newspaper KOMSOMOLETS.

[Leader] The processes occurring in our country, in the Transcaucasus and, in particular, in Armenia are so complex that it has long seemed to very many of us that they are spontaneous. This, possibly, is the reason for the lack hitherto of serious attempts at an analysis and, even more, a forecast. It is possible also that the reason lies in the absence until recently of political science practice, rather. It is not fortuitous that today public opinion is literally rushing around and dashing to extremes, not entirely clear about what is happening and what the goals of what is happening and what its driving forces are. At the same time analyzing, forecasting and "turning to account" are possible and necessary, essential even, and proof of this is the activity of Western and certain Soviet political scientists, who were able long before the present events to predict them. But in private conversations and in private with ourselves we all engage in this form or the other and with a varying degree of success—and for this reason the editorial office decided, having combined these intellectual efforts, to launch an "assault" and attempt as far as possible to "compute": "what is happening?" and "what to do?"

Today's meeting is devoted mainly to the first question, although broaching the second is not forbidden. There is just one condition: expressing one's own viewpoint, and not criticizing another's (amplification and rebuttals are permitted).

So your opinion of the present political situation in Armenia?

[Philosopher] Much of what I will say ensues from an analysis of the special sociological polls and "brainstorming" of the nation's current problems. The situation is uncertain—owing to the multitude of factors operating simultaneously and owing to the fact that a number of factors, the center's position in relation to us, for example, is uncertain also. The Balts (Russians included), say, know what they want, know who is impeding them in this and in what way and are finding solutions.

With us there is Karabakh, the earthquake and the struggle against the command-administrative system—three confused tangles, each of which requires independent solution. At a deeper level all these three problems are at the same time interrelated: were we to abandon

Karabakh, it would be easier restoring the zone and struggling against the "old apparatus" (this is preserving itself precisely under Karabakh slogans). Had it not been for the earthquake, it would be easier for us to solve the Karabakh problem and combat the apparatus. Were it not for the old apparatus, we would be more decisive on the Karabakh issue and would be making more optimum use of assistance in restoration of the disaster zone.

And this situation will last a long time inasmuch as this is profitable to the apparatus.

[Political scientist] Such long inconceivable concepts, seemingly, as genocide, refugees, economic blockade and military operations on the republic's borders are becoming a part of our life. All this together with the socioeconomic position of the country and Armenia is doing away in the consciousness of the republic's population with the stereotypes in respect of the central government inasmuch as its capacity for understanding the situations which are arising and adopting adequate decisions has been called in question....

[Sociologist] Two important forces, which at the coming elections will lay claim to power in the republic, have as of the present emerged. These are the AOD [Armenian Pan-National Movement] and the party and soviet authorities. Sociological studies conducted in Yerevan's Mashtotskiy and Spandaryanskiy rayons were geared to study of the electorate's political tendencies. Simply put, it was hoped to ascertain for whom they would vote. The results were as follows: 28 percent believe that the party apparatus is still powerful and will at the elections get its representatives elected, and about 16-18 percent are convinced that AOD representatives will be elected. But it has to be said that the situation is changing constantly: the AOD's authority among the people sometimes rises, sometimes falls—depending on how it behaves in this situation or the other....

[Leader] You are obviously referring to the behavior of the leaders?

[Sociologist] Mostly, yes. Actions rise and fall, as they say. Recently they have risen sharply, although at the conclusion of the AOD congress they were low. The sociological studies conducted at that time showed that the population was unhappy with many aspects at the congress. But recent events in Baku and the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], which evoked active operations on the part of the AOD, once again raised the people's trust in it. In a word, the situation is changing by the day, and saying firmly whose side the majority will be on at election time is very difficult. Although I should make the reservation that there is at present an overwhelming majority which both sides lack—the so-called apolitical, politically passive masses. This is the customary picture for Western countries also, where prior to the elections more than 50 percent are not firmly settled in their political affections. In such situations everything is decided by the election campaign itself, when these people are literally pulled

into this process and vote for this candidate or the other. And, however paradoxical, it is they who decide the outcome of all elections. And this fact should always be taken into account. The political situation in Armenia today is undoubtedly exacerbated by the Karabakh problem and its lack of resolution on the part of the central authorities. And, as we are seeing for ourselves, the longer it goes on, the worse it gets—even now Armenian pogroms in Baku, a new exacerbation of the situation and, in consequence, the imposition of a state of emergency in Azerbaijan. All this must undoubtedly be reflected and is being reflected in the political situation in the republic itself. Nonetheless, if we try to forecast the results of the coming elections, it seems to me that we are headed toward a coalition government in which there is no complete unanimity. Such are my thoughts on this issue.

[Leader] Do you look for an improvement or, at least, a stabilization of the situation?

[Philosopher] More for stabilization than improvement, the more so in that transition to financial autonomy awaits us. Accomplishing this will be more difficult than solving the Karabakh problem.

[Leader] It would seem that there are no other opinions and that it is at best a question of stabilization.

[Sociologist] A stabilization of the situation in the republic will depend on two factors—external and internal. External—the Karabakh problem connected with mutual relations with Azerbaijan—and internal—the problem of the distribution of political forces in the republic itself. An improvement will be possible when both factors are engaged—the Karabakh problem has been solved and the political situation determined.

[Leader] On what will stabilization depend to the greater extent: on the center and on union social processes or on events occurring in Armenia?

[Political scientist] Political stabilization in Armenia is possible only given progress of the restructuring processes in the direction of democracy and the solution of cardinal, key questions of the country's economic and political life, toward which, as we can see, the center is moving under the pressure of apparatus and departmental interests extremely slowly and indecisively.

[Sociologist] The situation currently is such that, whatever government is in power in the republic, it will be very difficult for it to solve our problems on its own. The Karabakh issue is one which is linked with the fate of perestroika and democracy in the country. If this process intensifies, there is hope that the Karabakh problem will be solved also; if, however, it founders, it is difficult to say what will happen. It is clear even today that if the situation is left to the whim of fate and a spontaneous solution, we will be standing on the brink of war; more precisely, we are in this state already. What is meant by war? Constant border conflicts, casualties, teams of fighters and guards.... If, on the other hand, the country's

leadership were to find within itself the strength to solve this question, not taking as a basis the theory of balance (some to these, some to those—this would be the wrong occasion), the situation would embark on the path of stabilization. Of course, we are all well aware that passions surrounding Karabakh would not subside all at once but the process would be moving in line of attenuation. Incidentally, many processes in the country in general and in the republic itself in particular depend on the solution of this problem. And although representatives of the AOD believe that, in the event of their assuming office in Armenia, there is much that they would change, I have to say that very little would depend for the fulfillment of their promises on they themselves—this needs to be recognized also. Nor can the present leadership be accused of inaction today: much is being and has been done (albeit belatedly in some respects).

[Philosopher] Reliance only on the processes in Armenia, for what is happening in the USSR is merely the background, and each member of the federation uses what is in its interests. The task (which is recognized by all circles) is the formulation of a national program, whose essence being what we should derive from the possibilities of perestroika.

[Leader] Inasmuch as the majority inclines to the opinion that stabilization of the situation in Armenia largely depends on how events will develop in the country as a whole, the question arises: what are your forecasts concerning the achievement in the USSR of the goals of perestroika and the implementation of radical reforms in the national-state arrangement and the political and economic spheres?

[Philosopher] A forecast is complicated by the fact that the goals are unknown, so it makes sense forecasting the goals themselves. I believe that these goals resemble a matryoshka—what is in the latter, only the authors of perestroika know. We can only guess. Is the preservation of the "empire" and the "socialist model" contemplated or will we move in the channel of development common to all mankind—an answer to these questions is the content of the proposed forecast.

The most difficult thing is economic reform, which affects the interests of the majority, and they are fraught with a destabilizing fuze (unemployment is anticipated and so forth).

[Sociologist] There is hardly anyone, I believe, who could forecast how perestroika will end. The situation in Armenia is unstable—it is unstable in the country also.

[Political scientist] Events in Armenia, the Baltic, Moldavia, Georgia and, recently in particular, in Lithuania and Azerbaijan show the impossibility of further control of the country from the center with the old forms....

[Legal scholar] A constitutional crisis is at present being observed in the country. Almost every morning we learn from the newspapers that every conceivable legislative

instrument not conforming to the USSR Constitution has been enacted in this republic or the other. And whereas earlier this phenomenon was of an isolated nature, a definite trend may now be traced. But there is a certain regularity here—the USSR Constitution is manifestly out of date. The cosmetic “makeup” which people are attempting to put on the constitution is groundless. Deputies, representatives of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies specifically, have put forward the demand for the alignment of the constitution with existing realities. Currently, however, we are witnessing a paradoxical situation: on the one hand part of the constitution is manifestly out of date, yet in another part thereof purely outward changes in accordance with the new living conditions are being made. But in such a situation the republics cannot, naturally, enact legislative instruments which conform in all respects to the USSR Constitution. I fully share the misgivings of certain deputies expressed at the second congress to the effect that the Constitutional Oversight Committee which has been formed could become, figuratively speaking, a muzzle for the legislative bodies of the union republics. There is a danger of such, and for this reason, I believe, the constitution itself should have been changed before the creation of this committee.

And what in fact do we have? At the present time legislative inflation in general is being observed in our society. Whereas previously laws were enacted occasionally and the nature thereof was established, now attempts are being made to quickly regulate with some new legislative enactment any social relationship. This contains a danger of all our social relationships being excessively regulated. In addition, given such an abundance of new legislative enactments, lack of confidence in them in the population could arise, that is, legislative material would lose that social charge which it should contain. The result would be that many laws simply would not work.

[Leader] Well, there have been no forecasts as such. In this case I will directly formulate the question worrying our people to the greatest extent: is there a real danger of the destabilization of the USSR as a whole and of serious social and political upheavals, and if so, which factors are the most menacing?

[Philosopher] Four types of consciousness operate in the political arena: partocratic, technocratic, ethnocratic and populist. Each is a factor of destabilization, but uses this destabilization in its own way. What is menacing, in my view, is populism, which engenders unchecked spontaneity, and this spontaneity is easily enticed by “simple” slogans—of the “bread and circuses” type. This concept once engendered fascism and Stalinism.

The three other types acquire political force to the extent that their ideas gain popularity. For example, in Kazakhstan the partocracy has wholly squeezed out any manifestation of “informal” movements, having advanced the proposition of the “what is the point of

informals if the party is capable of expressing and defending the interests of all strata” type.

In Azerbaijan ethnocratism has merged wholly with populism, and serious political tasks are being tackled at this level. Armenia today is greatly in need of a technocratic consciousness capable of formulating programs and concepts and indicating ways of realizing them.

[Sociologist] It is believed that perestroika has entered a phase in which a return to the old ways is impossible. I believe that this is not the case, unfortunately, and that a return is possible. Whereas an opinion as to the need for radical reforms has become firmly established in many people, in others, the reverse reaction: it is necessary to strengthen centralized authority and the army for keeping the country from disintegrating. But we would then be taking the so-called Chinese path of development: that of an intensification of centralized authority. How all this will turn out in fact, it is very difficult to say. I shall not venture to forecast since each new congress and party plenum is producing entirely new results. As yet, in my view, a process of the curtailment of democracy is under way, although the slogans here remain as before. The anti-perestroika forces have realized that they can operate under conditions of glasnost also, when people criticize, but no measures are adopted and bribery and corruption continue to flourish. That is, it is necessary to clearly recognize that not only the democratic forces but their opponents also have strengthened. In any event, the struggle continues, and in the immediate future quite a difficult period will have to be negotiated—in the economic plane (which is being experienced already) and in other aspects.

[Political scientist] It exists now inasmuch as the stated perestroika has not in the country taken the path of practical action and has remained essentially hollow. The indecisiveness and inconsistency of the center are manifested in the approaches not only to the Karabakh problem but also in all problems central to the country: whether they be the laws on property, changes in constitutional provisions or democratization of the electoral system. One has the impression that the administrative-command system has been able to fully mobilize its forces and is decidedly leading the country toward chaos, the way out of which will be proposed in the form of a return to this modification or the other of totalitarianism.

Serious demands for this have been made. It is naive to think that the replacement of leaders of ministries and departments will in itself lead to a change in the nature of the activity of the apparatus structures. And while they remain, so will departmental and other interests, service of which presupposes destabilization of the economic and political life of society. Whence both the various shortages and the emasculation of the democratic essence of legislative instruments by way of the insertion therein of at first sight imperceptible inhibitors. And even actions conniving at a stimulation of criminal forces. The bureaucratic system proves in all its actions

the bankruptcy of an idea by way of a *reductio ad absurdum*. This is how we should view the actions pertaining to the dispelling of the myth concerning the permanency of the country's borders. Whereas earlier the "sentries of the motherland" guaranteed the inviolability of the border, now the state border may be violated over 800 km!

It reduces the idea of the real sovereignty of all national-territorial formations to a sharing out of power and spheres of influence between the bureaucratic structures at the center and the union republics. And the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" presupposing the building of the state from soviets of the lowest level (community, village), competent on their territory, and the transfer to the highest levels only of the powers which cannot be exercised by the local authorities once again does not in the interpretation of the specific documents on the powers of these authorities solve questions of the competency of the people via the soviets and leaves room for the existence of apparatus-bureaucratic structures.

And meanwhile... the statements, not buttressed by economic calculations, "I believe," "I am convinced," and "I think," are calling for a reanimation of the stillborn *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* [collective and state farms], the consolidation of leasing and serfdom relations in the countryside are being heard, democratic processes are being impeded, and the national interests of peoples crushed by double and triple oppression are being ignored—explosive material is accumulating in society.

The postulate of dialectical materialism concerning the transition of quantity into quality operates irrespective of the wishes and desires of individuals or the interests of individual social groups. Unfortunately, not many people understand this.

The bureaucracy is loosening the state, and the people, seeing the inactivity of the power structures, are losing faith in them.

[Legal scholar] The chief menacing factor of a destabilization of the situation in the country is the question of interethnic contradictions. The well-known American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski maintains that danger threatens the USSR not from the side of the economy, which is at present with us seemingly in its death throes, but from the side of interethnic contradictions. Unfortunately, this issue has been insufficiently studied in our country, and there is no comprehensive analysis of the present state and a forecast for the future on this issue. For example, the United States regularly makes an analysis and, on the basis thereof, generalizations pertaining to the given state of affairs, which are periodically reported to the president. And, naturally, the situation is, thanks to this, constantly monitored, and possible serious interethnic conflicts are avoided.

[Leader] In the light of all that has been said it is obvious that a threat of the serious destabilization of the USSR nonetheless exists, and if this is to the benefit of some

people somewhere, it is, in any event, not to the Armenian people and not in Soviet Armenia.

[Orientalist] Secession from the USSR in this situation would be inexpedient for the Armenian people.

[Leader] However, the events in Nakhichevan (the destruction of the USSR state border), Baku (open armed rebellion) and Stavropol (unwillingness to "interfere" in the internal affairs of the Transcaucasus) suggest to us, possibly, that we need to prepare for the worst. Whence, I believe, the almost instinctive desire of the nation that draftees perform their service on republic territory. How, in this connection, do you evaluate the geopolitical situation in the Near East and, in the event of the "conversion" of Armenia (I repeat: at this historical stage—forced!) into a sovereign state, the nature of its relations with the states of this region?

[Philosopher] Analyzing a program of the global development of the Armenian nation, we concluded in an organizational and technical game in Nor-Amberd that ethnic, religious and political factors operate in isolation from one another. This alone could explain a war between Islamic states, the struggle for spheres of influence, and so forth. Consequently, Armenia could preserve its independence and sovereign relations with all countries of this region.

[Sociologist] Yes, this issue has not as of the present been seriously discussed—the problem of Armenia's sovereignty in the event of its secession: what would become of it? There have always been people who have called for secession. This call has been and is still perceived as a seditious phrase, since the opinion that, in the event of secession, Turkey, which lies alongside, would immediately "gobble up" Armenia is deeply rooted. The problem of secession cannot be substantiated thus today. Regardless of whether we decide to secede or not, it is essential even now to create a powerful concilium of scholars—of all fields—and discuss this question in all its details. All other talk in this connection is of a purely dilettantish nature. We need to know all the pros and cons. It is, after all, not only a question of Turkey's seizure of our territory (although I do not rule this out, such a thing is improbable), it has to be a question of Armenia's economic existence and the forms of political power therein. Do we currently have the political forces which could in the future control a free Armenia? In a word, there is no serious approach to the issue, and we perceive only the phenomenon: to secede or not, and a whole slew of economic, political, and social consequences are not being discussed at all. That we should not be afraid of this issue, raise it for serious discussion, associate therewith all available forces not only in Armenia but in the diaspora also, and bring it up for nationwide discussion is another matter—we need not be afraid of this. It should not be thought that since today the question is not "ripe" for Armenia, it is not to be discussed. It should be borne in mind that if the process of *perestroika* develops such that the country begins to break up, we (like it or not) could find ourselves

outside of the USSR. Why once again confront the republic with an extreme situation, why not prepare for it? With economic computations and calculations and every conceivable political partner in the West and with the establishment of some contacts even now—both with Iran and with Turkey. All economic, diplomatic and political contacts are possible and necessary.

[Orientalist] Nor am I one of those people who believe that as soon as Armenia quits the Soviet Union, Turkey will immediately attack it. I proceed from the historical experience of Turkey's social and political relations with Armenia and Turkish political circles' approach to the Armenian question—this would not happen in the given geopolitical situation. Although there would undoubtedly be quite strong political and economic pressure on its part. Nonetheless, today's Turkish politicians do not aim at the annihilation or seizure of present-day Armenia.

Why? First, because this is today not that important for Turkey; the main goal of Turkish foreign policy is rapprochement with Europe and an orientation toward the West. Of course, the ideology of pan-Turkism remains, but it has become secondary. There are historical prerequisites for this also: Turkey was the first country of the East to embark on the path of modernization (Japan later). And the present generation of Turkish politicians wants and dreams that its country will be a part of an integrated West. And to preserve Islam here as a faith uniting all Turkic-speaking peoples. At the present time quite interesting processes are occurring in Turkey in the sphere of political ideology, and a new political concept of the country's development, which is to replace Kemalism—the ideology of the Turkish Republic—is being advanced. Turkic-Islamic synthesis—this is the name of the new concept, which has been advanced by the Society of Turkish Intellectuals organization. It is now being discussed extensively there in newspapers and journals. The main aim of this concept is, taking advantage of the technological achievements of the West and relying on the so-called spiritual superiority of the Turks, which is conditioned by their affiliation to Islam, to achieve a rapid surge forward. It is interesting also that this concept has been officially supported by the Turkish Association of Businessmen, who are prepared and wish to take this ideological construction as a basis in trade and other economic relations.

To speak of Turkey's aggressiveness in relation to Armenia, it makes itself felt on the question of nonrecognition of the genocide against Armenians. Understandably, raising this issue very strongly influences Turkey's prestige in the world. Alas, the Turkish intelligentsia has yet to rise to the level of the German intelligentsia, which has acknowledged blame for fascism. Other factors are at work here also: were Turkey to recognize the genocide, it would have, Turkish political circles believe, to tackle the question following on from this—the return to Armenia of the territory taken away from it. And, afterward, one further question, which is

already being raised—compensation for the material losses which were incurred by the Armenian people and which is put at several tens of billions of dollars. So recognition of the genocide in respect of the Armenians would entail subsequent processes which Turkey, in any event, is trying to avoid. But as regards territorial claims and other aggression on Turkey's part given the present state of affairs—this can be ruled out, since in the form that Armenia exists today they believe that the Armenian question has been solved.

Economic and political contacts? Hardly: we are of no interest to them in either sense. They are endeavoring currently to gain entry to the all-European market and are strongly boosting their economy, although, as far as I know, many European countries are opposed to this—from both political and economic considerations. This uncertainty is connected primarily with the fact that providing a stable forecast of the situation in Turkey itself is not possible—this is, after all, not Europe....

[Political scientist] We need to know also what Western and Near Eastern political scientists and international affairs experts are thinking and writing in connection with the situation in the Transcaucasus. Many of them are maintaining that the forces which unleashed the war in Afghanistan (linking it with Russia's age-old geopolitical aspiration to southern seas) are now playing the Karabakh "card" in the context of a destabilization of the situation in the countries contiguous with the USSR and throughout the Near East....

[Leader] There has never been nor is there now a shortage of such speculation and "concepts," discerning in everything the "hand of Moscow" and the "Soviet threat." Other viewpoints also are prevalent in the West currently, specifically, the "start" of a newfangled "North-South" confrontation, which has replaced the traditional "East-West" confrontation; the start of a grand confrontation of two world religions, and so forth, are discerned in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict. I fear that in having begun to analyze them we are, in accordance with Socrates' aphorism, "getting so close to the truth that we are losing touch with reality." Let us return to our problems; rather, let us continue discussion of the question of the paths of the republic's way out of the crisis, economic included. We hear from all sides: "republic cost accounting" and "free economic zone," and broad strata of the population are linking their hopes precisely with the latter, what is more, for a rapid restoration of the cities and neighborhoods which suffered from the earthquake and an actual rise in their living standard. But, many people believe, there have been few specific steps in this direction. What is preventing Armenia actually becoming such a zone?

[Sociologist] Nothing, I believe. It is simply that we are once again waiting for "upstairs" to give Armenia the status of free economic zone. But let us assume that such a decision is made, what then? We need now to prepare the ground for this, which, incidentally, no one is preventing: to create joint ventures. After all, it is a paradoxical

situation—with great opportunities here (I refer to the diaspora—entrepreneurs, for the most part), we are inferior to Azerbaijan even. They have far more joint ventures and cooperatives than us, which are already operating. Of course, there is a braking mechanism here also, but we are being impeded more by inertia: we point the finger at the center and administrative barriers and... yield our positions. A free economic zone will itself emerge when the number of joint ventures, establishments, and so forth, is large. There is a critical mass, after which it is immaterial whether the zone is established by "decree" or not—it will be actually operative.

[Philosopher] I will speak purely about the human factor. Such a zone presupposes not only a free man but also a personality with a number of requisite qualities. The tens of thousands of Armenians who left for the United States and Canada have, on the whole, as experience shows (in the last 10-15 years), the necessary qualities of "adaptability"—but in the system which already existed there! Our task is much more complicated: creating such a system while lacking or possessing a minimal quantity of the requisite personalities.

[Economist] The factors preventing the conversion of our republic into a free economic zone may be divided into two groups:

- 1) preventing the very process of conversion into a free economic zone;
- 2) preventing the free development and operation of an economic zone which has already been created.

Almost any of the world's 500 free economic zones prior to its announcement as such was in fact performing or was ready to perform certain functions characteristic of free enterprise zones. Armenia has in this respect to start from scratch, from a minus point even, if the present difficult situation in the republic is considered.

Besides the fact that the constitution (basic law) of a free economic zone has not been created and that there is no corresponding experience of the creation of such, even the enactment of the legislative instruments (on leasing, property, republic financial autonomy) which could facilitate this process are being held back in our country.

It is essential to surmount the bureaucratic barriers of many of the organizations concerned, from the foreign trade, Intourist and Aeroflot monopolies (this latter being very important, given the absence of free outlet to the sea by railroad), visa registration, and the free migration of workers through the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport and the State Concert Organization.

The process of conversion into a free economic zone is being delayed to a large extent as a consequence of the absence of the appropriate personnel and infrastructure. And the studies are being conducted by republic specialists, many of whom do not shine with high professionalism in this sphere. The experience of foreign specialists, on the other hand, is largely unacceptable to Armenia.

The appropriate political, economic and social mechanisms which would guarantee practical realization of a free zone, even in the event of its legislative (constitutional) acceptance, have not been created in the republic.

The lack of particular safeguards for overseas businessmen for the introduction of capital is a large impediment. On the one hand, there is the bitter experience of the USSR's violation of many international economic contracts; on the other, the unstable and "unpredictable" relations of the republic with its neighbor.

[Leader] I propose that we break off our first meeting here. The subject of the second will, I hope, be suggested by the readers themselves. I would like to thank all who have taken part and emphasize that everyone who has anything to say may attend our meetings.

Armenian Political Scientists Continue Discussion of Transcaucasus Crisis

90US0696A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
27 Feb 90 p 3

[Stenographic record, by Z. Arevshatyan: "What to Do?": The 'Congress' of Political Experts Continues Its Work"]

[Text] By the second session, the ranks of the "congressmen" were augmented. We present Karen Svasyan, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, leading scientific associate at the Institute of Philosophy and Law, Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences. He speaks without a pseudonym, under his own name.

We remind the reader of the names of the "old" participants: "Philosopher"—Agaron Adibekyan; "Sociologist"—Gevork Pogosyan; "Political Expert"—Levon Bagdasaryan; "Legal Expert"—Karen Khtryan; "Economist"—Stepan Simonyan; Moderator—Vartan Grigoryan.

[Moderator] My dear congressmen, at our first session we displayed a unanimity that is rare for scientific forums and came to the conclusion that in Armenia, under the action of external and internal factors, an emergency situation has been created (aside: although, in my opinion, it did not require any particular mental strain to come to that conclusion). But it is indeed obvious that the emergency situation also requires the taking of emergency measures...

[Political expert] Let us start by defining ourselves, by ascertaining what we understand by the term "emergency measures." If we are discussing the very serious damages inflicted on the republic's economy by the earthquake and the blockade, if we are discussing the need to take immediate steps to resolve the problem of providing the refugees with housing and work, then everyone understands that these emergency measures are needed, but only in the sense that they are rapid, error-free, and planned both for the immediate future and for the long-term future. Obviously, the spheres of economics and politics are very closely intertwined here.

[Sociologist] There is no doubt that the emergency situation dictates the need to take emergency measures. But the events of the past two years have demonstrated to everyone that our society is completely unprepared for emergency situations. We can easily recall that at the beginning of the Karabakh events—as, incidentally, during the first days of the catastrophic earthquake—the government was in complete confusion. This attests to the fact that we are unprepared either for social or elemental cataclysms. And yet no one has any guarantee against them, and we do not know precisely what is awaiting us tomorrow. Our department, in particular, is currently engaged in a study of the social consequences of the earthquake and the development of social technologies for recovering from crisis situations. We can already say precisely that, in the strategy of restoring the disaster area, serious mistakes were made. I have already written about this in a number of published articles, but now we must discuss the prevention of errors in the future. As everyone knows, after a considerable delay, the Council on the Emergency Situation has been created in the republic, as well as a group to forecast possible events. I do not know on the basis of what methodologies these groups are operating, but one thing is obvious: without any serious research, the development of forecasts will differ very little from the reading of tea leaves. I have a large number of proposals relative to various emergency measures in the emergency conditions that were created—measures that it is not yet too late to take. I think that today we do not have any shortage of people who have things to say or propose. However, all this is discussions “to benefit the refugees.” No one needs proposals that no one will listen to, or especially that no one is planning to implement, or even to discuss. We now do not simply chatter away about perestroika, but we also drown in blather even our most vitally important problems. Therefore I shall make just one proposal: attempt, through your newspaper, to convince the state figures that there is a vital need to create a scientific research institute—or you can call it, if you wish, a scientific center—that must efficiently analyze the situation and forecast its development. It should be an institute in whose work the best forces in the country and abroad could be involved, and whose recommendations could be considered publicly and at the governmental level. Your newspaper could speak out with this initiative. I am convinced that this kind of institute is needed just as we need a center to study public opinion, and only professionals should work there. It is time to put an end to the political alchemy. The nation must know who is making the responsible decisions and how they are being substantiated.

[Philosopher] This is the way I understand emergency measures: when, under the existing conditions, society cannot function. Therefore the leadership is given *carte blanche* and begins to operate outside the law, but in the name of bringing society out of its serious position, to bring it up to the level where the action of the law is possible. In this sense, for 70 years we have been in an emergency situation—all this time we were directed

from the center, and all that time it was illegal. Currently the question is: should we continue our development in the same spirit, or should we take our own fate in our hands? From this point of view I am in favor of any emergency measures, but when this occurs with the violation of legality, that is, when the reliance is made on someone's strong hand—I am against it. It is not a “humanitarian,” “educated” dictator who is supposed to restore order in our house. It is ourselves, working together, who should do this. If this requires the changing of any laws or going beyond its confines, then it necessary to go beyond them.

[K. Svasyan] Throughout our country today, it is very difficult in the sphere of politics to carry out any emergency measures. But the sphere of the economy is more open. So why don't we, proceeding from the situation that was created—the earthquake syndrome, the refugee syndrome, the blockade syndrome—begin to implement the Aganbekyan version: “Armenia is a free-enterprise zone.” This is the time, proceeding precisely from the objectively unbearable situation, to make that decision. To a definite degree this will be an approximate resolution of certain political problems: it is difficult to “tie” everyone together, to encroach on the interests of a republic that has been inundated by foreign concessions. It is necessary to come to an understanding with Georgia about the railroad, and this must be done not by relying on “fraternal assistance,” but by paying Georgia interest for doing this. It is necessary to establish smooth economic relations and, by word, to demonstrate one's own initiative, rather than waiting for sanctions from Moscow. It must simply be made known that it is the Balts who are doing this.

Emergency measures in the political sphere is much more complicated and more dangerous. We have been convinced of this once again by the example of Lithuania.

Incidentally, when speaking about extraordinary measures, one should not forget that they must be carried out by extraordinary people, those people who can assume the risk and show initiative. In my opinion, everything rests on this.

[Moderator] I would like to ask all of you to describe the activities of the analytical group that was mentioned by the sociologist—since you belong to it...

[K. Svasyan] The analytical forecasting group was created under the Council for the Emergency Situation at the culminating moment of the worsening of the events in Baku. At that time there was discussion about those events, about the possible behavior of the deputies at the forthcoming session, and it was proposed to present a document to be read aloud there—with a demand to censure the Armenian pogroms. But I do not see any prospects for the activities of that group, despite the fact that it was possible to forecast quite a lot. The fact of the matter is that, despite the correct forecast, it is not possible to act in conformity with it, or to take adequate

measures. The situation is as follows: the prospects can be seen clearly, but we cannot do anything, or it is very difficult to do anything. For a number of reasons—both objective and subjective. The objective reason is the rather rigid position taken by the “center,” and the subjective one is our rather inflexible position: a sluggish, inert position that lacks initiative. In this respect the global forecast seems to me to be rather unpleasant. And when you analyze many factors during the past two years that could have been done differently, then, yes, these “unexplored areas” will appear—alas, *ex post facto*—when it seems that something could have been achieved. Today’s situation is also lamentable because it is only now that we have begun speaking in the language that we should have speaking in two years ago. But today we are confronted by other problems, that require a new and improved approach, but we are compensating for our inflexibility only *ex post facto*, attempting somehow to make up for what was lost. Concerning the Sumgait tragedy we have finally, to put it crudely, snapped, whereas two years ago we shamefully remained silent. But did you notice how the Georgians behaved immediately after the Tbilisi slaughter? After the events of the 19th and 20th in Baku, the Azerbaijani immediately declares a three-day mourning period—and the center even expressed its sympathy toward them. But we did not do that. On the contrary, we remained silent... For me personally, what happened in Sumgait was a kind of test: would there be reaction, or wouldn’t there be one? Practically speaking, there wasn’t any reaction: it was possible to learn more about Sumgait from reading the union newspapers than by reading our own. We were indignant because the center was remaining silent or distorting the facts, and yet, at the same time, we ourselves were remaining silent. If you wish, this is the fatal feature that constantly causes us to suffer defeat. Incidentally, one also sees in this the lack of historic perspective in our way of thinking: as long ago as the end of the nineteenth century, when we were being slaughtered, we began to raise the Armenian question, at a time when the Serbs, in response to similar actions by the Turks, staged an uprising. But we simply raised the question—of how we were a very ancient civilized nation and they were slaughtering us—and wanted everyone to make the decisions for us. And we continue to see the same thing—why is Moscow remaining silent? But why are you remaining silent yourself?

[Moderator] What specific measures, then, are proposed for stabilizing the republic’s political life?

[Political expert] We need an election, as a result of which people with a nonstandard, independent way of thinking will arrive at the agencies of power, people who will understand that it is only by resting on the interests of the nation that it is possible to make a realistic policy. The republic needs soviets that are capable of assuming the responsibility for the fate of the nation, that are capable of operating without looking over their shoulder for help from the central ministries and departments, and capable of limiting their *diktat* to the republic’s

territory. And it is impossible to create that kind of power structure without a serious pre-election struggle.

[Moderator] But would it be correct—under these already tense conditions, that are fraught with social explosions—to hold an election with its inevitable political struggle?

[Philosopher] In principle I agree—in the present situation the collision among the political forces actually existing in the republic is dangerous. The universal mobilizing of forces requires unity, primarily ideological and political unity. Therefore, putting it in crude terms, it is necessary for everyone to become pragmatists and centrists.

[Sociologist] I feel that the election should be held, but not the way that it was last year: under conditions of the curfew, when an obvious slump in the political participation of the masses was observed. This time it is necessary to avoid all this if we want to elect worthy deputies. At the last session I said that we studied people’s moods before the election. Obviously, we are proceeding toward the creation of a coalition government. Armenia’s parliament, obviously, will include representatives of various political trends, movements, and parties. That is not bad, inasmuch as society needs new, bold, innovative leaders who will not look over their shoulders to see whether there is any pressure from below, but who will make the responsible decisions themselves.

[Legal expert] I feel that it is necessary to hold the election in any instance: we need a new parliament. There are questions that the old makeup is simply incapable of resolving.

[Moderator] However, the worldwide experience of overcoming crises and of waging wars indicates that, in similar situations, not only are all kinds of political campaigns, and especially elections, postponed, but there is even created a kind of nationwide agency that has been endowed with emergency powers.

[Philosopher] As of today this kind of agency is in operation—the Council for the Emergency Situation in the Republic, that includes representatives both of the informal organizations and the official authorities.

[Moderator] But this is a public and, in any instance, consultative agency. We are talking about transferring to it the entire power in the republic, endowing it with emergency powers, if only to prevent us from being inundated by the rising wave of crime...

[Philosopher] It is in operation today and is making specific decisions. But is it worthwhile to have it replace the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers, etc.? It will be better if it did not take the place of, but, instead, became part of the already existing structures.

[Sociologist] I think that we should not create any special agency for national consent. The Armenian nation lives in consent with itself, it pursues the same goals, and has

a single fate. If individual political figures cannot come to an understanding among themselves, that does not yet mean that we need an agency of national consent. We need sober, competent, and serious politicians. And the agency that can become the agency of national consent is the highest agency of power—the republic's parliament. If our people takes a responsible attitude toward the election, this is exactly what will happen. It is a different matter that not to make any preparations and to let the course of the election be held completely hostage by the apparatus. In order to avoid pressure from the apparatus, it would be desirable to create independent election commissions in the center and in the outlying areas. The election commissions themselves should be formed on an electoral basis, and temporarily, for the duration of the election campaign, the complete power with regard to the election must be concentrated in their hands.

[Legal expert] I also think that it is undesirable to create this kind of agency, since the duplication by that agency of the functions carried out by the party's Central Committee and the Council of Ministers can inevitably occur. Even if this kind of agency is created, how will it function? In all instances it will have to coordinate its actions with other agencies, and that will introduce confusion. In my opinion, the Council for the Emergency Situation that has been created already has representatives of all the political forces—both the formal and the informal ones—and therefore there is no need for a new agency.

[K. Svasyan] There can be no talk of national consent. The moment has been lost. Because what happened? In response to the Azerbaijanis' actions, in order to defend ourselves, we should have taken up arms. But the segment of society that did take up arms is the segment that can be called "Soviet Lumpens." As the expression goes, they have nothing to lose. Their entire life up until today was spent mindlessly: there was neither material nor psychological satisfaction. Correspondingly, there were no spiritual needs. The armed Lumpen is something that very fearful, but it is very difficult to knock that psychology out of them. They feel that they are the bosses. Or, rather, they have always felt that they have been such, but unarmed people are one thing, and an armed "boss" is another. Therefore, it is very difficult to speak nowadays about national consent. Consent between the informal and formal agencies is another matter. But the fact of the matter is that today we have seen the appearance of hundreds of organizations that are not being monitored even by the AOD [Armenian United Movement] board. Without even mentioning the criminal world, which has become very active. In a word, much newly rests upon extraordinary people who have to introduce the state of emergency, but in a local procedure, that is, this must be a state of emergency not in form, but in essence.

[Political expert] In order to answer your question about the creation of an agency with emergency powers, we shall attempt to formulate the most serious problems

that are confronting the republic. If one oversimplifies somewhat, the most important problems can be represented as follows. The country's economy in the foreseeable future does not provide any grounds for optimistic forecasts. Armenia's economy, which is linked to the country's economy by thousands of threads, within the confines of the single national-economic complex, also cannot count on a rapid upsurge, especially with the blockade that is becoming a permanent factor. What, then, is needed in order to get out of the situation that exists? Let us define our priorities: the republic has to build a lot and has to feed and clothe the population. Consequently, it is necessary to rely on internal resources to the maximum degree. But are there any internal resources? Our small orchard and garden—the private plots of the urban residents—provide the entire republic with fruits and vegetables. I think that figures here are nonmandatory—the situation is that obvious. Consequently, what we need is a political decision concerning the transfer of the land to those who cultivate it. That decision will make it possible to set agriculture on its feet rapidly in the disaster zone. Is an emergency agency needed for that purpose? I don't think so. It is simply necessary to have the election put into the republic's parliament not those persons who have a self-interest in preserving the existing relations in the rural areas, but, instead, those who will be able to look at the problem from the point of view of common sense.

The republic needs building materials. We go around looking for them and we experience a shortage of building stone, etc. You certainly must agree that it is time to lease this industry out to labor collectives, to introduce the joint-stock type of ownership, and to develop cooperatives. And this also does not require any emergency agency. It is necessary to resolve the local problems without looking over one's shoulder to the center for guidance. We must not wait for authorization, but instead we must make it possible for the republic's Ministry of Finance to change from being an agency that executes the instructions issued by the central ministry, to being an agency that resolves questions of financial policy on the spot. So what we need is not an emergency agency, but a new approach to the republic's economy.

[Moderator] Our esteemed political expert has graphically demonstrated the inseparable tie between politics and economics. Without a doubt, the task of political stabilization depends upon the improvement of the economy. Should we wait for the enactment of nationwide laws, or should we ourselves make radical decisions, and, if so, which ones first of all?

[K. Svasyan] We must definitely not wait! At the next republic session we ourselves must make the specific decisions, and enact the very same law governing economic independence. We must sign contracts and inundate the entire republic with them. Is that advantageous to the West? They view us now as a virgin land of unused opportunities. The only thing that is not advantageous to them is our hopelessness, but in this instance it is

possible to stipulate all the terms. Any gain in our situation—even the scantiest—is a luxury.

[Philosopher] The experience of the Baltic republics has shown that, whatever decisions are made locally, they must be included within the framework of the improvement of the nationwide economy. One can rejoice at the boldness of the decisions being made by them, but they have not yet yielded anything realistically. The Balts are "playing" at running ahead of everyone else. We cannot do that right now—the disaster area has not yet been restored and the problem of Artsakh has not been resolved. But it is also wrong to wait until the Union finally changes over into a new economic system. It is necessary right now to make specific decisions.

[Sociologist] It is no secret to anyone today that the blame for our profound economic crisis lies chiefly with the shameful management system. The dismantling of the system and the creation of a new one certainly cannot be done in a single year. It will take a lot of time. Under these conditions, should we wait for the slow-moving center to make new decisions and extend them to the country's vast, clumsy economy? In a small republic, innovations can be introduced much more quickly. What remains incomprehensible is why Armenia, a nation that has produced many talented economists, has never become, even once, the initiator of the introduction of progressive economic innovations that are capable of improving the health of the national economy.

[Legal expert] In the situation that has been created, we cannot carry out any radical measures to improve the health of our economy. It is necessary to wait for the enactment of nationwide laws at the third session—laws governing the land, property, and local self-government. It is only those laws that will be able to serve as an orientation marker for enacting republic laws. In this way we will be able to avoid the need to "coordinate" them with the nationwide laws or to carry out additional work. Another question is whether or not they will satisfy us. But until they have been enacted, we must wait.

[Political expert] Of course it is not necessary to wait for nationwide laws. It is necessary urgently to enact our own Land Law and the Law Governing Soviets, which must become the fully empowered bosses on our territory, and to delegate to the republic parliament only that part of our powers that cannot be guaranteed independently. We need our own laws about state enterprises and cooperatives with more merciful taxation, unlike the union ones that are aimed at stifling production. We need laws governing the benefits for families with many children. For example, it might be possible, starting with the third child, to free the parents from paying income tax, and in rural localities to give a plot of land to those families. That is, to begin to carry out an active demographic policy that encourages both the increase in the population and the providing of them with food products. And if the resolution of this series of problems begins today, in two or three years it will be possible to see the results.

[Economist] The necessary measures in the field of economics in the emergency situation, in my opinion, are as follows. First, it is necessary to change the structure of production and consumption. Namely, to reduce the amount of consumption that frequently is not carefully thought out, and to increase at the same time the quantity of output of production using "our own" grain supply, of which, incidentally, we have enough for 40-50 days, but at the expense of reducing consumption and increasing grain production we can have a reserve for half a year. This also pertains to the consumption of power resources, fuel, and transportation—these are the laws of life under emergency conditions, and we shall have to take this path. It is also necessary to reorganize the structure of agricultural production, attempting at such time to achieve the most independent, most self-satisfying structure, also by activating all the available resources.

[Moderator] It turns out this way: waiting for union laws with our own economy which, as Comrade Markaryants says, is lying on its side, means delaying criminally. But enacting our own laws is risky. One can make this conclusion: for the time being, we should use the opportunities provided by the already existing laws and should activate the available reserves. Is that correct?

[Economist] Yes. Right now, today, we are encountering a situation in which the new economic laws that have been enacted are not operating. The mechanism for their action is being inhibited by the rayon authorities, the union leadership, etc. What should be done in the emergency situation? I think that, as of today, it is necessary for everyone—both the formal and the informal organizations—to assume the responsibility for implementing the progressive laws in each specific management, and to help it and answer for the results. That is what is needed—a real job, rather than abstract judgments and the theoretical analysis of the opportunities provided by the new economic laws.

[K. Svasyan] There are no people capable of carrying out these laws, even if the mechanism for applying them is developed. Where is the peasant? And, generally speaking, how is it possible for years to eliminate something, and then to introduce it objectively? In my opinion, this is simply mythology that is completely without foundation.

[Philosopher] Nevertheless at the present time we are incapable by ourselves alone to revive our economy. When all the "spigots" are in other people's hands—transportation, energy, state production orders, etc.—we cannot resolve anything. And it is also necessary here to ascertain the limits of our competency. For example, we closed the AES and we closed Nairit—the center is to be blamed for that, since we occupy no more than one percent in the Union's economy. This is a niggardly amount, and in order not to look ridiculous and pitiful, it is necessary to press down not for the outward effect, but always to know what we are doing and why. I am personally opposed to the shutting down of Nairit; if the earthquake had not occurred, I would also not have

supported the shutting down of the AES. These things have to be done in stages, in order to avoid such a serious blow to the republic's economy. We should have found the correct decision: money that Nairit would have "earned" and channeled not into the state budget, but into guaranteeing the enterprise's complete ecological security. And real independence would have also manifested itself in this matter.

[Economist] I agree completely. From the output produced by Nairit we could have had approximately \$500 million a year—twice as much, say, as all of the petroleum in Baku could provide. I also feel that at this stage the shutting down of Nairit was undesirable for our republic. I say this not only because of the economic reasons, but also because of the political ones. Actually, it was the only project in the republic that was of great importance for the Union. It produced molybdenum also, but not so much. Today, however, when the economy is in a very difficult situation, it will be necessary to spend as a minimum \$400 million to buy the output that Nairit used to produce. That's the reality. And there is something else: if Nairit were operating, I do not think that the country's government would be so complacent about the blockade. So that's how it is—the chief thing that used to be shipped out of Armenia is not being produced at all.

[Moderator] But can we, as a reserve for improving the state of the economy, count on the opportunities or, as one of our authors proposed, the cadres in the "shady" economy?

[Economist] The so-called "shady" economy cannot be viewed today separately from our entire state economy. Largely speaking, its forms and methods have taken root here too. For example, in order to bring definite allocations into the republic, it is necessary to give someone a self-interest in doing so. That's simply the way it is, and this is our real-life situation today. No one will give anyone any allocations. That is, within the framework of any state enterprise there already exists the mechanism of the "shady" economy. But now another question arises—shouldn't that mechanism be put at the service of the national interests, that is, shouldn't we use the enterprising, businesslike qualities of these people? In my opinion, much rests upon the pricing system. If the price of a commodity corresponded to its real production costs—that is, if you've expended so much manpower, raw materials, etc., then you will get so much—everything would be different. But at the present time this truly economic mechanism for pricing commodities does not exist. Incidentally, that barrier hampers very strongly the republic's conversion to cost accountability, although certain people do not take it into consideration.

[K. Svasyan] Both the "shady" and the "legal" economy are outside the law. It is simply that they periodically exchange places, but their activities are constantly criminal. I think that there cannot and there must not be here any game between two crooks. It is necessary to get rid of

both of them. Incidentally, the qualities of "businessman" that are ascribed to those same shop workers do not have anything in common with business, since business is never founded on dishonest actions. The phrase that is so popular nowadays—"underground capitalists"—in and of itself is absurd: a real capitalist fears the underground most of all. But **THESE** crooks, thanks to the comical democratization of our country, hope to become crooks with the presumption of innocence.

[Philosopher] That's right. When the cooperative movement in the country began, it was thought that the illegally earned money would be "laundered" in the cooperatives, and the "shady" economy would receive the opportunity to legalize itself. That is, it would stop living parasitically on the state economy and would adapt itself to the cooperative economy. Life has shown that that was only an illusion, because the "shady" economy, the "shop system," is the product of the socialist administrative management system: the "shop manager" pays the worker on the basis of state production rates, and also buys raw materials and equipment at state rates, but as soon as he leaves the state sector, he is deprived of that. Therefore the "shady" economy will exist as long as the system of management by administrative fiat exists. As soon as the market economy is created, the "shady" economy itself will become obsolete and will be deprived of the vital juices that feed it. Can it be viewed as a reserve for restoring our economy? No. Without a doubt, creatively gifted people and typical entrepreneurs work there. But their "ardor" has been expended not on the field of the free fruits of free enterprise. They have profited and they themselves have created the weaknesses of the socialist economy and have lived parasitically on it.

[Sociologist] The "shady" economy already has found a method for "purifying" its money via certain cooperatives. Practically speaking, nothing prevents it from directing the funds, say, into restoration operations. It is another matter that this is unprofitable for them, inasmuch as the income from the production of various trinkets and "jam" is much easier to acquire and is more profitable than the possible income from the construction, for example, of buildings. Incidentally, the wheeler-dealers in the "shady" economy unabashedly earned themselves a lot of capital just on the graves of the earthquake victims. It would scarcely be desirable to create for them the conditions of superprofit income in construction. In any case, our tragedy, which shook the entire world and evoked an unprecedented wave of charity, could not melt the hearts of our underground millionaires. Not a single one of them got the patriotic idea of transferring several tens of thousands of rubles to the construction of a kindergarten or of buying with currency (which is something they certainly have) a couple of wheelchairs for children who need them. It is difficult to say whether it is the fear of being discovered or the lack of desire to share what has been stolen that has prevented them from using a rare opportunity to be useful to their nation. Of course, giving back stolen

money is much more difficult than making patriotic speeches. Unfortunately, that is the moral outlook of the sharks in our "shady" economy.

[Legal expert] The law opposes the legalization of the "shady" economy—that is unambiguous.

[Political expert] Hmm... However, the first laws governing the cooperatives, as was already noted, had the purpose specifically of giving them a "place in the sun." Actually, by producing output and paying taxes, that economy could exert a substantial influence both upon saturating the market and upon improving the country's financial policy. But bringing that economy out of the "shadows" substantially harms the interests of the Mafia-apparatus structures. "Yes, there is a Mafia," Dmitriy Muratov wrote in December in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and he mentioned a figure—"approximately two-thirds of its income is channeled into bribes paid to the corrupt apparatus." I think that there is no longer any need to answer the question of who is the boss of the "shady" economy. Also, everyone knows to whom its existence is beneficial. It is also easy to understand who is standing behind the populist slogans of harming the cooperatives, if two-thirds of the income from the "shady" structure is pumped into the apparatuses. It is also obvious who will hinder the development of the relations under which the "shady" economy is deprived specifically of all economic meaning. Because raw materials and equipment, finished output, etc. are being pumped from the legal economy into the "shady" economy. So that the sooner we legislatively resolve what has been existing since the postwar years, the earlier we will be able to eliminate the corruption in the apparatus. And to do this it is also not necessary to wait for union laws. We today are not in a position to allow ourselves to feed several levels of the corrupted apparatus—the local level, republic level, and central level. But the principle here is simple—authorize that which, as practice has shown, is impossible to ban, and thus put into the service of society the initiative of people who are thinking today only about their own income.

[Moderator] What is surprising is that everyone has expressed only a negative attitude toward the "shady" economy and does not see any real opportunity for putting it at the service of national interests. And sad as this may be, there also are few hopes of the independent improvement of the state of the economy. Not even to acquire "independence" from the railroads and highways that run across the territory of Azerbaijan—in a word, to preclude the threat of a blockade?

[Political expert] I have already said that it is possible to preclude completely the threat of a blockade, inasmuch as our neighbors, despite the lulling statements in the central press, are seriously preparing to leave the USSR. But it is possible to reduce to the minimum the negative consequences of the blockade. This is where the republic's economy should be oriented both in the near future and in the distant future.

[K. Svasyan] This is possible if we, on an economic basis, enter a confederation with Georgia, conclude treaties with it, and even, if necessary, elicit them from Georgia. That's the only way.

[Economist] There is a way out—to strive for the republic's economic dependence upon the railroads and highways that run across Azerbaijan, by building new ones. Simultaneously it is necessary to plan shipments in such a way that the share of the Azerbaijan Railroad will be an unessential part—or, rather, a very low-priority part—of the freight shipped.

[Sociologist] The question of the blockade has been covered, in general, by some kind of mystical crepe. It is not enough that people have begun using the blockade to explain the collapse of the restoration operations in the earthquake zone. Now they have also begun talking about the way in which the blockade is hindering the creation of a free economic zone. Involuntarily the question arises, is it really true that they have also planned to carry out trade with Europe and America by way of the Azerbaijan Railroad? I remember how all of us were unpleasantly surprised by the report that 85 percent of the republic's freight turnover travels over the Azerbaijan Railroad, and only 15 percent over the Georgian Railroad. If we had known that, we certainly could have foreseen a lot. But today, instead of the unsuccessful attempts to lift the blockade, it might be desirable to direct all our efforts to changing this correlation to the reverse: that is, getting 85 percent of the freight by way of Georgia. Perhaps this is technically impossible. I do not know. The specialists will have to talk about this. But there is something else that is incomprehensible: the Baykal-Amur Mainline alone has made it possible to supply the boundless expanses of Siberia. Are we really supposed to think that, in order to supply small Armenia, it is necessary to have at least two railroad mainlines? What is the situation in those countries where only one railroad is in operation? Would we really be doomed to an eternal blockade if the Azerbaijan Railroad did not exist at all? It is difficult to reject the idea that there are those who want very much to represent to us the blockade as a situation from which there is absolutely no way out. One could also think a bit about sharper responsive measures, and about seeking opportunities for exerting economic pressure on the border republic. It is possible to submit as a legislative initiative for consideration at the session of the country's Supreme Soviet a legislative draft concerning the application of rigid economic sanctions—from penalties to embargoes—with respect to a republic that resorts to such piratical actions. In a word, the palette of responsive actions can be very varied and more effective than the interminable letters, messages, and complaints that everyone has become fed up with.

[Monitor] And now the last question for today: is it realistic, under the present conditions, to count on aid from Western entrepreneurs (including our own countrymen) for the creation of joint enterprises, investments, the importing of technology, etc.?

[Philosopher] We should place our hopes on our "American uncle," when there is lack of the necessary infrastructure of transportation roads, utility lines, level of production efficiency, etc. They can help us, but we should not place all our hopes on them. There is little that we ourselves can sell—we have a shortage of resources. The only thing we have is intellectual potential and our hands. Here too it is necessary to develop a high level of production efficiency, so that it will be profitable for our partners to invest their capital in Armenia, rather than in Hongkong or South Korea.

[Legal expert] It is, as yet, impossible to stipulate the legal factors for providing guarantees for the Western companies investing their capital here: everything is too unstable and the government as of today cannot provide those guarantees.

[Sociologist] I am ashamed to ask the question of how realistic, under our conditions, the aid from the West is. Practically speaking, we are receiving this aid and we could receive ten times more if certain apparatchiks were not so sluggish and mercenary. I had several opportunities to be convinced that, even without having firm guarantees, Western entrepreneurs nevertheless took the path of rapprochement, the search for economic cooperation with us, fully understanding and sympathizing with our tragedy. However, each time they were irrevocably disappointed by their collision with our hard-headed and incompetent bureaucratic machine. Our battle-trained apparatchiks rarely "go into action" if they do not sense some direct personal advantage. I could give a rather large number of examples of this. Take, for example, the scandalous situation that recently hit the republic's press—the officials who, upon returning from Austria, forgot to report the advantageous proposal that had been made to them.

[Economist] Our maximalism manifests itself in everything, including the economy. It is impossible, at the expense of any single branch, to achieve independence—the economy must be comprehensive. We must not rely only on the hope that Western entrepreneurs will come here, will exploit of mineral waters at a modern level, and we will "get on our feet." It is necessary once again to proceed from the reality. Western businessmen are divided into three categories: those who are completely indifferent about where they invest their capital, so long as there are guarantees of profit; others agree, on the basis of philanthropic interests, to take this path also, but they also need guarantees. And, finally, there is the small percentage who, because of purely patriotic feelings, are ready to invest their capital. But they today also have their wait-and-see tactics, since they also understand that the situation in our republic is unstable, and no one knows yet what may develop from all of this.

Editor's note: Of course we did not succeed in answering unambiguously the question, "What should we do?" Yes, for the time being, there may not be any categorical answer. But we were frank in our attempt. Well, then, we

dealt with politics, economics... What else is there? The spiritual sphere! We shall deal with that at the next session.

Commandant on Emergency Situation in Armenia's Gorisskiy Rayon

90US0693A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
27 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with Col Grigoriy Gareginovich Grigoryan, commandant of the state of emergency and Armenian SSR deputy minister of internal affairs, by KOMSOMOLETS stringer Z. Vartanyan: "A 'Special' Rayon"; date and place not given]

[Text] As is well known, a state of emergency was imposed in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKA0] and a number of Azerbaijan SSR rayons by the ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, dated 15 January of this year. Simultaneously with this, the territory of the Armenian SSR's Gorisskiy Rayon was also declared a special situation zone.

We call to the attention of the readers the interview with Col G.G. Grigoryan, commandant of the state of emergency and Armenian SSR deputy minister of internal affairs.

[Vartanyan] Grigoriy Gareginovich, how would you comment on the decision of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet regarding the imposition of a state of emergency in the territory of Armenia's Gorisskiy Rayon?

[Grigoryan] I have been entrusted with the duties of commandant of the special situation rayon and I will try to discharge them to the best of my ability. With regards to my attitude toward the imposition of the special situation in the rayon, well, in my opinion, with regards to this matter, it is necessary to address directly those who adopted this decision—the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This decision was adopted by the politicians, while we have been entrusted with the functions of its execution. Thus, we will "comment" on this decision by maintaining law and order throughout the entire rayon.

I should say that, on 16 January, at extraordinary sessions of Gorisskiy city and rayon deputies, a negative attitude was expressed toward this decision, nevertheless, the populace regarded with understanding the specifics of the situation and hospitably welcomed the subunits [podrazdeleniye] which arrived in the rayon. No incidents were recorded when the ukase was put into effect and order is being maintained by the populace and the soldiers. The people realize the full gravity of the situation and are observing the requirements of the state of emergency—there have been no instances of strikes or unsanctioned meetings and the situation is under control in Goris itself and in the rayon. Soldiers have been deployed in the city and in 40 "hot" spots—in 13 rayon villages contiguous to Azerbaijan. I would like to point

out that we did not consider it advisable to use the entire set of measures provided for by the state of emergency, let alone resort to the most extreme of them—there was simply no need for this.

[Vartanyan] Judging by the TASS reports, as usual, an information “policy” of strategic parity between the two republics is being pursued. But, indeed, a different picture is taking shape in the Azerbaijan rayons adjacent to Goris.

[Grigoryan] Yes, in my opinion, whereas the situation in Armenia can be rated with a “plus” sign, unfortunately, the situation in Azerbaijan is different, especially in the rayons on the border with Armenia. Therefore, it is completely unclear what has caused this notorious “equalization” during the assessment of the events in the region. I reiterate, the situation in the Gorisskiy Rayon is normal. In connection with the arrival of the contingent of soldiers to help us and the internal security forces located in the 13 rayon village contiguous to Azerbaijan, it is no longer necessary for the people’s home guards to be armed.

[Vartanyan] Grigoriy Gareginovich, in your opinion, have enough forces been concentrated on the border?

[Grigoryan] It seems to me that the contingent which arrived is completely capable of ensuring proper order. Only the availability among the populace of a large number of seized weapons is causing some concern. We are taking all the necessary measures to see that they are returned and our efforts are producing results. The process of returning the weapons is proceeding—the authorized weapons of the militia and the VOKhR [republic internal security troops] have been returned locally almost completely. I know many of the home guards and I know full well that they never use their weapons needlessly and, in fact, they are also surrendering their weapons. But, indeed, weapons may fall into the hands of criminal elements, which would greatly complicate the operational situation. Therefore, we have been given the specific task of eliminating this problem. We should all realize that the sooner we do this, the easier it will be. Otherwise, it is possible that the state of emergency will become harsher and it will also be imposed in other rayons of the republic.

There are no other alarming factors in the special situation rayon’s territory and I would like to take this opportunity to appeal to the people and call on their help in speeding up the process of the surrendering of weapons.

[Vartanyan] Grigoriy Gareginovich, what is the crime situation in the rayon?

[Grigoryan] The level of crime in the rayon was stable, even before the state of emergency was put into effect. A clear trend toward a reduction in crime is being observed. It is sufficient to say that, lately, we have not recorded a single crime on the part of the local inhabitants whatsoever. As you see, the facts speak for themselves.

[Vartanyan] But what about the operational situation?

To put it briefly, the tension continues to remain. I am talking about the situation in the villages bordering on Azerbaijan. Currently, both the MVD and army troops have an unambiguous order—open fire, if need be—this is also important for normalization of the situation.

In brief, for our part, we are guaranteeing law and order, but, indeed, not everything depends on us. The tension is coming from the Azerbaijan regions adjacent to us and the elimination of the hotbeds of tension there would mean the stabilization of the situation as a whole. But there is still a lot of work to be done, especially in connection with the field operations.

We are maintaining constant communication with the offices of the commandants of the neighboring republic’s contiguous rayons and we are meeting regularly with one another, discussing our problems in light of current affairs. The rayon’s leaders have also proposed conducting meetings at the level of the rayon authorities, to which, unfortunately, no response has been forthcoming as of yet. To be brief, as you see, we are doing everything possible to stabilize the situation, but, I reiterate, not everything depends on us.

[Vartanyan] Have the Armenian National Movement [AOD] and other organizations assisted you?

[Grigoryan] Both the AOD and, in particular, the Gtutyun Society have helped us a lot all during our work in the rayon. We have formed good mutual relations with them. And, if you take into consideration the fact that the local komsomol actively undertook to “help” the soldiers and worked closely in interaction with them, then, it is not surprising that the results achieved in the work are reassuring.

It is impossible to forget that the Gorisskiy Rayon is a strategic one, because of its geographic proximity to the NKAO, and, therefore, tranquillity and order here are especially important. It is precisely through Goris that the main highway of highest importance runs to Stepanakert, through the Lachin “corridor.” We should “prove” that our people, even in the most complicated periods of history, have never lost their self-control.

[Vartanyan] Thank you for the interview.

P.S. This material was being prepared for printing when alarming news began to arrive from the NKAO—to the effect that the state of emergency there is being applied only to the Armenian population. The impression is being created that there has been a decision to “solve” the Artsakh problem once and for all using Aliyevan methods—simply driving all the Armenians out of there by creating unbearable living conditions for them. Even peaceful flights into Stepanakert have been prohibited, not to mention the blockade of the strategic Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert road... EW/WHITE/aw 09/1802z apr

**Armenian Procurator on Organized Crime,
Armenian Genocide Link***90US0693B Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
25 Feb 90 p 3*

[Interview with V. Nazaryan, Armenian SSR procurator and doctor of juridical sciences, by KHORURDAIN AYASTAN and KOMMUNIST correspondents: "Organized Crime: The Essence, Content and Forms of its Manifestation: Commemorating the 2d Anniversary of the Sumgait Tragedy"; date and place not given]

[Text] Two years have passed since the day of genocide of Armenians in Sumgait. In connection with this, newspaper correspondents from KHORURDAIN AYASTAN and KOMMUNIST addressed questions to V. Nazaryan, Armenian SSR procurator and doctor of juridical sciences.

[Correspondent] Recently, in official documents and even in speeches by leaders of the law-enforcement bodies and scholars, the concept of "organized crime" is frequently being used. I would like to find out your opinion, as a scholar and a republic procurator, about the substance of this concept. To what extent does it pertain to the genocide of Armenians in Sumgait?

[Nazaryan] The concept of "organized crime" pertains directly to the genocide of Armenians in Sumgait and not just in Sumgait. The concept characterizes the essence and substance of the Sumgait genocide and, what is very important, it emphasizes its organized nature and thereby concentrates our efforts on the exposure precisely of the organizational aspects of the evil deed committed, which, in the juridical scheme of things, gives urgency to the task of unmasking, in addition to everything else, the instigators and organizers who have acted both during the preparations for and in the commission of a single crime. Such an approach also makes it possible to expose attempts to conceal the genocide committed under the guise of the illegal actions of some elements engaging in hooliganism.

In order to expose the substance of the very concept of "organized crime," an etymological analysis is clearly inadequate, for, in the ordinary sense, the concept encompasses nearly all crimes specified by the criminal code, with the exception of those committed solely through negligence. Hence, it is necessary to have a thorough juridical analysis of this concept. With all due respect to the humor of Stanislav Govorukhin, who believes that, in our unorganized country, it is hardly possible for crimes to be organized, it is not difficult to believe that any crime committed by two or more persons, in essence, really is an organized crime.

At the same time, the concept of "organized crime" also has a specific and completely defined substance. It encompasses crimes which are massive in scope and directed against entire peoples, classes, people of a specified profession and so on. From this point of view, organized crimes were committed by Stalin and his cohorts during the forced collectivization of agriculture,

the dispossession of the peasant kulaks, 1932's artificially organized famine in the Ukraine and in other regions of the country, the mass repressions of "enemies of the people," the protocols in the mid '30's to the treaty concluded with fascist Germany in 1939, the forced resettlement of the Crimean Tatars and a number of other nationalities, the 1949 repressions, and the nationwide persecution of so-called cosmopolitans and formalists in the spheres of culture, art and literature and so on.

Presently, a whole series of organized crimes of a specified type arose after the genocide of Armenians in Sumgait and, to a certain extent, they are the result of its inadequate assessment. It is also possible to add to this list the well-known events in Fergana, the blockade of Armenia, the destruction of the USSR's state border with Iran, which extended for hundreds of kilometers, the genocide of Armenians, which was organized in Baku and Gandzak, the interethnic conflict in Dushanbe and others. Undoubtedly, the entire Artsakh tragedy, beginning with the notorious decree of the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP(b) of 5 June, 1921, right up to our time, is an organized crime. The treaty concluded with Turkey on 16 March, 1921, in particular, those articles of this treaty which unjustly changed the historical destiny of Nakhichevan, must also be considered an organized crime.

Perestroika and glasnost have helped us, along with the enumeration of the achieved "successes," traditional for the times of the cult of personality, voluntarism and stagnation, to compile also a list of the mass organized crimes committed in the past, i.e., to ascertain not only the successes and achievements, but also the sufferings of the people.

Among the latter, Sumgait occupies a special place, for it embodies the ominous start of similar and more heinous mass evil deeds. This is why the genocide of Armenians in Sumgait is a bitter lesson for all the Soviet people. It proved once again the correctness of that obvious truth which comes down from prehistoric times that, in all instances, when adequate assessment is not given to a crime and all the criminals, without exception, and first and foremost, its organizers and instigators, are not unmasked, then an atmosphere of impunity is formed in the country, which gives rise to new, similar evil deeds.

Without dwelling for now on the errors committed by the law-enforcement bodies in this matter, about which I will talk a bit later, I would like to emphasize that the Sumgait genocide, first of all, should receive a political assessment. The bitter experience of the past testifies to this, for the struggle of our people for a political assessment of Sumgait has developed under the conditions of the lack of such a political assessment of the genocide of millions of Armenians, which was inflicted by Turkey in 1915 in Western Armenia.

[Correspondent] How do you explain the lack of a political assessment of Sumgait?

[Nazaryan] From a psychological point of view, this may be explained by the decades-old tradition of that frame of mind that such crimes as genocide, the mafia, the forced resettlement of a huge mass of people and so on, are typical only for a capitalist system, whereas socialism, by the very fact of its existence, precludes them. The extraordinary boneheadedness of such thinking is testified to by its exceptional tenacity, starting with the Stalinist collectivization right up to the absurd persecutions of S. Prokofyev, D. Shostakovich, A. Khachaturyan, M. Bulgakov and others.

The bitter tradition is this: a whole series of merits, which did not need to be proven, are ascribed beforehand to socialism in a process of presumption. Also precisely, in view of the humanistic nature of socialism, which has been acknowledged beforehand, the most painful forms of human suffering and injustices are artificially excluded from it.

Unfortunately, the Sumgait tragedy is in the latest exclusion list and, in view of such an approach, its acknowledgement became impossible. By the way, also on this list is a whole series of other mass evil deeds, which, instead of a political assessment, are receiving, to put it mildly, strange explanations. For example, the events in Fergana allegedly occurred because of several kilograms of strawberries or the destruction of the USSR's state border with Iran for a distance of 790 km—was nothing more than a harmless courtesy visit to relatives living in the neighboring state and veneration of their graves.

Until we begin to call things by their proper names, we will not have perestroika, lawfulness, democracy or glasnost.

[Correspondent] Is there a connection between everyday crime and organized crime?

[Nazaryan] Undoubtedly, such a connection does exist, for organized crime itself is manifested in the set of everyday crimes (murders, rapes, pogroms and other heinous crimes), each of which taken separately is an independent crime.

In this connection, I want to express my own disagreement with the position of V.V. Bakatin, the USSR minister of internal affairs, which was stated at the 2d USSR Congress of People's Deputies. He considers "organized crime" as a new level of everyday crime and as a natural stage in its evolution. It turns out, as one of the jurist scholars noted ironically, that the Churbanovites, the Aliyevans, the Rashidovites and others sprang from ordinary speculators and hooligans. I believe that such an approach is extremely erroneous and, what is very important, directs our thinking into the wrong channel. The genetic roots of Rashidovism, Churbanovism and Aliyevism need to be sought not among hooligans, but rather, precisely in that immense social and frequently ethnic injustice, which has reigned for many decades in our country.

It is my understanding that everyday crimes and especially their heinous forms may be shown as being independent and isolated and may also serve as ominous forms of organized crime. This is why it is extremely necessary, at the very first stages, to give a correct political and juridical assessment of the evil deed committed and not to conceal, for example, genocide or a blockade in the various compositions of everyday crimes. This is what happened in Sumgait when a single criminal case, instituted by the USSR Procuracy, on someone's orders, was broken down into several dozen criminal cases according to individual facts.

It is completely natural that, with such an approach, the crime's instigators and organizers as a whole can not be unmasked, for a single crime is viewed not as an integrated set, but rather, in fragmentary fashion, and it is broken down according to blocks, entrances and apartments, as occurred in Sumgait.

The inquiry conducted by the ArSSR Procuracy of the eyewitnesses and victims of the Sumgait genocide testifies with absolute reliability to the fact that committed there were not uncoordinated, independent murders, rapes, pogroms and other evil deeds, but rather, what was committed there was precisely a previously prepared and organized genocide of Armenians living in this city.

This is also testified to by the thousands of interrogations conducted by us of eyewitnesses and victims of the genocide of Armenians committed in Baku in the middle of January of this year. The republic's procuracy believes that the joint investigative group from the USSR Procuracy and the USSR KGB, which is conducting an inquiry into the Baku misdeeds, has taken a correct stand, viewing its task as an integrated set and not artificially breaking down a single criminal case.

The political assessment of the Baku misdeeds as genocide of Armenians and a merciless persecution of persons of other ethnic groups would become a great help to this inquiry. The bitter experience of Sumgait prompts us about this.

[Correspondent] I would like to know in more detail about the participation of the ArSSR Procuracy in the inquiry into these evil deeds and about the rendering of the necessary juridical assistance to the victims.

[Nazaryan] In addition to the direct interrogations and other investigative actions, we organized assistance, which was enormous in its volume and content, for the refugees, the number of which amounts to nearly 300,000 in our republic. The flight of refugees as a social phenomenon, according to the old stereotype, is also not typical of socialism, which explains the lack of legislation which makes it possible to solve the problems of these unhappy people, which affect their fate.

Our activities in this sphere are proceeding in two main directions. First, there is the rendering of the necessary juridical assistance within the framework of the currently operating and, unfortunately, far from perfect

legislation. We have developed wide-ranging work on the protection of property, housing, labor, pension and other rights of refugees. For this purpose, a special department has been established in the ArSSR Procuracy and it is implementing oversight over the observance of law in the sphere of interethnic relations. Over a brief period of time, the department has rendered assistance in the restoration of the rights of more than 6,000 refugees.

Another no-less-important direction of the activities of this department and of the republic's procuracy as a whole is the preparation of a USSR draft law "On the Status of Refugees in the USSR," which takes into consideration all aspects of their lives and which is aimed at compensating them completely for the losses inflicted on them and at protecting their constitutional rights. After the preparation of this draft legislation and its scrupulous discussion with representatives of juridical science, members of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Juvenile Affairs were invited to the republic's procuracy and presented by us with the draft legislation with detailed substantiation. At our request, on the very first day of the USSR Supreme Soviet's current session, one of this committee's members introduced our draft legislation for the USSR Supreme Soviet's consideration. Considering the fact that the flight of refugees in our country, unfortunately, has become not solely an Armenian phenomenon, we are hoping that, in the near future, the country's highest representative body will consider the draft legislation submitted by us and will adopt the USSR Law "On the Status of Refugees in the USSR."

[Correspondent] Among the large-scale organized crimes, you mentioned also the continuing blockade of our republic. I would like to know what steps the ArSSR Procuracy is undertaking to remove the blockade.

[Nazaryan] Yes, indeed, the blockade of our republic is a typical example of organized crime, which consists of a whole set of everyday crimes and rights violations. The damage from each of the blockades is estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of rubles. If you take into account the consequences of the destructive earthquake, as a result of which more than 500,000 people have been left homeless, as well as the extreme need for the quickest solution of the problem of housing hundreds of thousands of refugees, then it is not difficult to arrive at the unambiguous conclusion that the consequences of the blockades are of catastrophic significance to our republic, so long as we are talking about the material aspect of the matter. But, indeed, in addition to this, the blockade is also profoundly immoral.

At the same time, according to the old stereotype of thinking, the blockade of our republic on the part of a neighboring republic, also turns out to be not typical for socialism, which also explains the lack of legislation directed against such phenomena. The declaration adopted hurriedly by the 2d USSR Congress of People's Deputies, "On the Intolerability of a Blockade of Roads and Railways and the Establishment of Any Obstacles to

the Free Movement of Citizens and Cargoes Within the Borders of the USSR," is of a wishful nature and nothing more. It does not contain really compulsory legal norms and, therefore, is being cynically ignored by the blockade organizers. The ArSSR Procuracy, viewing the blockade of our republic as a flagrant example of organized crime, has raised the matter of the necessity of its political assessment and the instituting of a single criminal case.

In addition to the criminal law aspect, the blockade also has a very important civil law or property and economic law aspect. A union republic, according to Article 76 of the USSR Constitution, is a sovereign Soviet Socialist Republic. Sovereignty presupposes the supremacy of state power, which is disseminated to all of its territory, to all state bodies, officials, enterprises and institutions, public organizations and to all the citizens of this republic. At the same time, the constitutional law on sovereignty, adopted last year in the neighboring republic, does not provide for the supreme responsibility of this republic for illegal actions committed on its territory by state bodies, officials, enterprises and institutions, public organizations and citizens.

Proceeding from this, our republic's procuracy developed a draft USSR Law "On the Economic Responsibility of a Union Republic for Harm Caused to Another Union Republic." It provides that a union republic has no right, with respect to another union republic, to apply political or other measures of a compulsory nature, which are aimed at infringing upon its sovereignty. Consequently, the economic harm caused by one union republic to another union republic as a result of the illegal actions of its state bodies, officials, enterprises, institutions, public organizations and citizens shall be subject to compensation in full from the union republic's state budget. If disagreements arise between union republics on these matters, then the USSR Supreme Court shall have the right to consider the suits of a union republic based on the claims made regarding compensation for economic harm caused by another union republic. At the same time, according to our draft legislation, a union republic which has paid compensation for harm shall have the right of reverse claim (regress) against those who directly caused the harm.

Thanks to the help of that USSR Supreme Soviet committee, we were able also able to introduce this draft legislation for the USSR Supreme Soviet's consideration.

It is necessary to turn attention to the important circumstance that compensation for property damage on the part of the guilty parties, undoubtedly is of sobering significance and may prevent new instances of organized crime in the form of a blockade. By the way, some of the ideas of our draft legislation, unfortunately, for the time being to an insignificant degree, have been reflected in the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 17 January, 1990, "On Measures for Urgent Assistance to Citizens Forced To Leave the Azerbaijan SSR as a Result of the Aggravation of Interethnic Relations," in which,

in particular, the USSR Ministry of Finance was instructed to pay, with subsequent compensation from the AzSSR's budget, the expenses of the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, the USSR Ministry of Railways and the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation for transporting without payment of the travel cost the citizens forced to leave the AzSSR. We consider this extremely inadequate and therefore are conducting a consistent campaign to see to it that the guilty sovereign union republic pays all expenses and pays compensation for all the damage caused by the illegal actions of its citizens, public organizations, enterprises and institutions, officials and state bodies. Such an approach fully corresponds to the principle of social justice, for it is intolerable that the all-union budget—the property of the entire Soviet people—should answer for the sins of a specific republic. In the opposite instance, the burden of responsibility is placed on the victims themselves, for the blockade of our republic is inflicting harm not only on its inhabitants, but also on the peoples of other republics who need the products we produce.

[Correspondent] It seems that the lack of a political assessment is the main obstacle in the path of the struggle against organized crime.

[Nazaryan] A general political assessment combined with an adequate juridical assessment is the necessary foundation upon which it is possible to unleash an effective struggle against organized crime. Such an assessment is a distinctive social guideline which directs the efforts of the law-enforcement and other bodies to a full and comprehensive exposure of organized crime which is global in scope and to bringing all "involved" persons to just punishment, be they the instigators, the organizers or the perpetrators.

A general political assessment also makes it possible to expose the reasons for a committed crime and to work out effective measures of an economic, social, political and moral nature for their elimination.

Thus, a political assessment is a distinctive integrating basis which joins together the activities of all the state bodies, officials, public organizations, labor collectives and citizens in the struggle against organized crime. This is why the lack of such an assessment is viewed by us as a primary obstacle in the struggle against organized crime.

Of great interest in this plan are the investigations of the practice of false, i.e., not corresponding to reality, political assessments of one or another social phenomenon and the profound understanding of their negative consequences. I am talking about so-called social orders. Typical examples of such essentially concocted orders-assessments were the demand of Stalin and his accomplices that kulak farms, which did not actually exist, be found. As a result of the execution of this order, millions of honest village workers were subjected to repressions. It is necessary to consider as such a social order the tasks,

given to the NKVD bodies in the mid-30's and subsequently, to find and to unmask the "enemies of the people," the fulfillment of which is the most shameful page of our country's history. Such essentially anti-people social orders-assessments were formed arbitrarily, under office conditions, without consideration of the actual state of affairs and without consideration of the objective state of the situation in the country. Moreover, they were aimed at producing an objective reality in conformity with an imaginary guideline. At the same time, on the basis of such a social order, distorted information was frequently supplied, i.e., the person who gave the order was misinformed.

In particular, as a result of such misinformation, the Artsakh matter—the just demand of the Armenian people for the restoration of ethnic justice, which was arbitrarily violated in 1921—was declared the handiwork of extremists, corrupt elements and blackmarketeers and, in accordance with the old tradition, the law-enforcement bodies were given the task of finding the guilty parties at all costs.

Because of this, hundreds of representatives of the country's law-enforcement bodies came to us in order to prove the unprovable. Let me list one typical example. Back at the beginning of last year, in the newspaper PRAVDA, a USSR MVD report was published about the embezzlement of state property worth millions of rubles which allegedly occurred at the Yerevan Champagne Plant. An investigation and operations group of MVD workers, which represented the entire geography of the country, flew to us. This group was composed of 48 investigators and operatives from various republics and oblasts of the country. In June, 1989, the group was supplemented by 18 more investigators. What emerged were admissions of guilt from people who maintained that they had paid bribes in the amount of 800,000 rubles. However, after a year-long investigation and the compiling of 700 volumes of a criminal case, everything turned out to be a sham. With regards to five of seven people, the criminal case was dropped, while two were charged with the commission of certain malfeasances.

Lately, we have had a lot of such visits. Their result is one and the same. At the same time, decrees about dropping criminal cases are being issued by the visitors themselves.

As a result, it turned out that, despite all efforts, the Artsakh problem would not fit in any way within the previously prepared framework of concepts of corrupt elements and extremists. I believe that democracy and glasnost will categorically repudiate the order method of solving problems which affect the fate of a people.

Another stereotype of the so-called social order is the unconcealed attempt of the central mass media to create, at all costs, parity between the situation which has taken shape in our republic and that in the neighboring republic. The forms for carrying out this order vary, beginning with the general rubric, "The Situation in the

Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR," and ending with the criminal fabrications about the enmity of the Armenian and Kurdish peoples or the persecution of the family members of military personnel in our republic. In my opinion, the activities of the mass media in creating an artificial parity is a distinctive form of organized crime directed against the Armenian people.

With regards to the Artsakh tragedy itself, it is, in fact, also a distinctive form of organized crime, which has been continuing for decades. In this connections, of great interest is the analysis of the positions of the main opponents of a just solution of the Artsakh problem. They can conditionally be subdivided into two basic groups. The proponents of the first position acknowledge the fact of the ethnic injustice committed at the beginning of the '20's. They acknowledge that, over the course of a number of decades, the constitutional rights of this autonomous oblast were violated in the crudest fashion. However, such acknowledgement by them is combined with the promotion of the following absurd conclusion: all these injustices were committed prior to perestroika. Meanwhile, perestroika, in and of itself, possesses the potential not only for opening our wounds, but also for curing them. Here it is appropriate to recall how, without any proof, all kinds of nonexistent merits were ascribed to socialism. Hence, the one conclusion is that it is not worthwhile to bring up the Artsakh problem and that it is necessary to wait for some indefinitely prolonged period of time and perestroika, by itself, will solve this problem.

The proponents of the second, more cynical position maintain that the Armenians are an ungrateful people, for they are demanding another's land. Consequently, they themselves are to blame for all the murders, pogroms and blockades, for, if they had not at one time raised the Artsakh problem or had renounced it in advance, then there would not have been a Sumgait or a Kirovabad or a Baku. Thus, the proponents of this position view the genocide and the blockade as some normal and acceptable means of solving interethnic problems. Involuntarily, there arise before your eyes the ominous pictures of Buchenwald, Auschwitz and Maydanek. The theme is one and the same—the murdered people themselves are to blame for their own deaths. EW/WHITE/aw 09/1808z apr

Estonian Liberal-Democratic Party Described

90UN1046A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 15 Feb 90 p 3

[Interview with Enn Pyldroos conducted by G. Rozen-shteyn: "Where Has Enn Pyldroos Gone and Why?"]

[Text] I could not make up my mind to call Enn Pyldroos for a long time. I had the feeling that there would be no discussion forthcoming. This uncertainty had been evoked by telephone calls and chance conversations: "Is it true that Pyldroos has at a critical time for the party quit the KPE [Estonian Communist Party] and the Central Committee Bureau?" Malicious, abusive words

about him were heard also. There were also those who, to stretch the point somewhat, might be called sympathizers or, rather, understanding. In a word, where has Enn Pyldroos gone and why? A meeting was necessary, and it took place a few days ago.

[Pyldroos] For me this was not a switch from one camp to another. The Communist Party had hitherto been the sole form of activity. Now this is all in the past, and greater "specialization," perhaps, is needed.

[Rozen-shteyn] Nonetheless, charges are being leveled at you. I confess, I also believe that you have chosen not the best time....

[Pyldroos] Were I an ordinary member of the party, the issue would not be that serious. I would not then, possibly, have been in such a hurry. But the fact that I was a member of the party leadership could not have failed to have prompted me to take the decisive step. Remaining would have been dishonest. Two years ago the program maximum for me was a reformed socialism in the spirit of Dubcek's "Prague Spring" and a renewed federation of the USSR. These years were not simply a period of turbulent activity but also a time of agonizing reflection. And it became clear that Estonia's problems could not be solved within the framework of the federation. And world processes have been prompting persistently the thought that there have been, in the system of our socialism, not simply blunders and errors.... The accession to power of this dictator or the other may be considered an accident. But the fact that the system is defenseless in the face of such "messiahs" has become a regularity. And there is nothing to be done about it, evidently. It is time to have done with experiments which have cost the people and all mankind so dear. And since I had arrived at such thoughts, was it honest remaining in the leadership of a party which is called communist?

[Rozen-shteyn] The killing words "Pyldroos was never a patriot of the party" have been heard in conversation....

[Pyldroos] It is inappropriate, I believe, appending the word "patriotism" to a party. This concept is connected with the motherland, the people. I feel loyalty to and love for Estonia, but feel nothing of the sort for any party, to the Communist Party either. All this is secondary. All parties are merely a means en route to the realization of ideals.

[Rozen-shteyn] Your party is called the party of liberal democrats. Was it born in a void?

[Pyldroos] The current which is today being officially structured as a party of liberal democrats took shape in our society, in the Estonian Communist Party included, long since. If we recall the times of stagnation themselves, we immediately sense the suffocating atmosphere in which each honest word had to fight its way through the thorns. Nonetheless, there were people who were saying what it was not customary to say out loud or who taught us to read between the lines.

[Rozenshteyn] Aesopian language?

[Pyldroos] To some extent, yes. The hints were well understood. There were people who attempted to defend human rights and campaigned for diverse education. In the sphere of culture, literature and art also, incidentally, it was possible in Estonia to preserve some indications of creative freedom. It would be wrong to think that someone had disinterestedly presented this to us as a gift. It was the result of struggle and a monstrous waste of nervous energy and health. Something similar was going on in science and other walks of life also. The fact that in Estonia socialist history was somewhat briefer and that ideals common to all mankind were still fresh in the memory could have played a part. On the other hand, I do not know why but we had few avowed stagnationists in culture and art.

[Rozenshteyn] The question arises: why?

[Pyldroos] It is difficult to say, historical research is needed. There were continually people who proceeded from humanitarian, liberal ideals. It is they who constituted that same current in the Communist Party which today wants to become a party.

[Rozenshteyn] Tell me, how was it thought up—the party of liberal democrats?

[Pyldroos] Two years ago, as you know, there was a joint plenum of artistic unions. At that time this was an exceptional event and catalyst of a chain of subsequent events. And it was when the political landscape began to take shape, when many forces—"greens," united plant outfits and so forth—had found themselves a place, that a strange situation emerged. Namely, the forces which had formerly been initiators found themselves dissolved in other movements and organizations and had no opportunity to act cohesively. It seemed to me that a disturbing situation had been created. Why? We are speaking a good deal today about the IME [Self-Managing Estonia] program, about economic development. This is important, the most important thing currently. But at the same time dangerous trends have made their presence felt—aspirituality, technocratism, a cult of gain and new forms of violence against man. They cannot fail to be to the detriment of spiritual values. Such trends in society are, alas, an objective reality. For this reason there is an urgent need for the organization and cohesion of the forces which could confront such trends. More precisely, notconfront but balance.

In our view, the most important driving force in society should be the free initiative of the individual. This applies to education, choice of lifestyle, work and free enterprise. We are, evidently, also for material success and, of course, technical progress. But all this should be balanced by spiritual values. The same thing in politics also. In a multiplicity of political forces we are not for the principle of confrontation but for mutual addenda.... To continue the idea: this area on the political landscape remained vacant, and we believed that this was fraught with...

[Rozenshteyn] We means....

[Pyldroos] ...people, as far as I know, with ideals. They put the ideal above any mercantile advantage. Showering praise on one's movement is a little-esteemed occupation, let someone from elsewhere do this. But I will speak about my comrades. These include the well-known writers Paul-Erik Rummo and Teet Kallas, Yaak Yyeryuyt, the composer Lepo Sumera and the journalist Ene Khion. Many scientists have inquired about our party, and what has been surprising for us, people with the highest technical education have responded. There are workers and technicians.

[Rozenshteyn] Is there a national accent in your activity? Was the decision to form a party connected in some way with concern for national priorities?

[Pyldroos] Undoubtedly. Although values common to all mankind are central for us. It is clear that Estonians are patriots of their motherland. We are concerned both about the fate of the people and our statehood. But it would not be inappropriate here to emphasize our first postulate: no civil rights or human rights may be connected with national affiliation. Naturally, we believe that concern to preserve Estonian culture and education will be a particular concern of the Estonian Republic. But together with this, the right of any nation, any people to cultural autonomy and contacts with their primordial motherland. I support the point in the People's Front program which says that under the conditions of an independent Estonia questions of the self-administration of the national minorities will be entirely legitimate.

[Rozenshteyn] Your justification for tolerance?

[Pyldroos] This does not mean that we will listen patiently to all that is said about us and nod our heads in agreement. Not at all. We will argue. But this argument should be conducted within a civilized framework. Provided that the other side also remains on the level of legality. If this line is transgressed, this is a different discussion.

[Rozenshteyn] And if your opponent resorts to falsehood?

[Pyldroos] We can only say that lying is ugly. So for the liberal the highest value is man, the individual, the family. This being so, we must respect the thoughts of this individual, his ideas and his way of life. Freedom of the individual, of course, within limits which are limited merely by the forms of freedom of another individual. Whence the demand for tolerance. We put the rights of the individual and the family above the collective interests of the group, class and state even. All collective forms may operate only for the sake of the individual.

[Rozenshteyn] How do you conceive of your relations with other social and political structures? With the citizens' committees, the People's Front and the KPE, for example?

[Pyldroos] We support the idea of the re-creation of the Estonian Republic. In this sense the congress of citizens' committees has a part to play, and for this reason we are taking part in it. On the other hand, both the citizens' committees and, say, the Estonian National Independence Party have a common shortcoming—they are organizations with a single goal. To restore the Estonian Republic, but what then? What kind of Estonia will this be, in what kind of structure—they are giving no thought to this. That is, they come up to scratch, but how to proceed further?

[Rozenshteyn] And your program?

[Pyldroos] The ideals which we proclaim basically depend on the kind of life there will be in Estonia. We have ideals common to all mankind and we believe that the sole way to realize them is an independent Estonia. In short: a free Estonia is not an end but a means. This is why for us the main concern is the democratic nature of the future republic in a spirit of the best European traditions. As concerns relations with the People's Front.... The People's Front is also, evidently, at the crossroads today. It started out as a people's movement, but increasingly new structures are today gemmating from it.

[Rozenshteyn] If I am not mistaken, there are many People's Front representatives in your party also.

[Pyldroos] Yes, they are largely the backbone of the party. So we stem from the People's Front. The People's Front is evidently in its former mass form beginning to lose its significance and is acquiring importance as a coalition of several parties.

[Rozenshteyn] A reader of ours, L. Polyakov, a workman at the Tallinn Wood-Processing Plant, writes in a letter to SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA: "Enn Pyldroos, member of the KPE Central Committee Bureau and chairman of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Artists Union, has now abandoned art and is living on politics."

[Pyldroos] I believe that I have earned my keep, I have this illusion, in any event. A situation has been created with us now where the income and earnings of intellectuals are lower than those of shopfloor workers.

[Rozenshteyn] And how much, if it is no secret, did you earn as chairman of the Artists Union?

[Pyldroos] R270 a month.

[Rozenshteyn] And a candidate of the Central Committee Bureau is not paid?

[Pyldroos] No. I did not, of course, live on R270, I earned substantially more from the sale of my pictures. I am still, after all, an artist, incidentally. I have now quit as chairman and live entirely thanks to my artistic work.

[Rozenshteyn] You share it with the state?

[Pyldroos] Without fail. Here is just one fact. If a picture of mine sells for foreign currency, I receive crumbs—about 10 percent—the rest goes to the state and to the Artists' Fund. But let us not forget the main thing: an artist's works are primarily of social and spiritual benefit, which cannot be gauged only in rubles or dollars.

[Rozenshteyn] Your party's program contains several points which sound attractive. The exclusive right to education, for example. What does this mean—exclusive right?

[Pyldroos] It means, first, the question of the accessibility of education and, second, its multi-variant nature. Depending on the capabilities of the individual and his interests.

[Rozenshteyn] Does not this mean that you allow also the option of parochial schools and divine law?

[Pyldroos] This is one option. But in the general school there should be room for forms which afford any child an opportunity to develop. This in itself demands a diversity of the structure of education, that is, schools of different types, with different curricula.

[Rozenshteyn] And you consider this possible within even such a small republic as Estonia?

[Pyldroos] Why not? Education should not depend either on privileges or on parental wealth, only on the capabilities of the individual. People speak of man's duties to society. But they are closely dependent on his rights. Society may demand fulfillment of an individual's obligations only when it secures for him his rights.

[Rozenshteyn] The priority of human rights?

[Pyldroos] Of course. No rights—no duties.

[Rozenshteyn] What do you think: can the socialist society in its present form ensure the priority of the individual, the family?

[Pyldroos] The ideals of the socialist society are a fine thing. If they could be implemented.... There have been many attempts—from national socialism, African included, through our socialism. And of these attempts, not one has been successful. It has everywhere resulted in the degradation of the economy and difficult problems concerning human rights. We talk continually about mistakes, excesses and so forth. But if we cannot cite a single positive example, they are not, consequently, mistakes but a normality. Hence the defects are in the system itself. And therefore when we now try to correct something or other, things do not turn out all that well. And if some things have been achieved in places, it has been at a price of a departure from general principles, in contraband fashion.

[Rozenshteyn] Is there anything in common between the views of Academician Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov and your party's program?

[Pyldroos] Very much. Sakharov's position was also the position of a humanist. I may, of course, argue with him on certain assessments and disapprove of some tactical moves, but we are very close in principle. Although Sakharov was not, as I understand it, attempting to create an orderly system. He was in politics something of a dreamer and poet, but as a scientist he was distinguished by a balanced approach. Of course, Academician Sakharov was a great personality.

[Rozenshteyn] Would you care to see representatives of the nonindigenous nationality in your party?

[Pyldroos] Naturally. We have already had calls, and people have inquired in Russian about our program. This, I believe, is the angle from which this problem should be approached: what is the role of the Russian-speaking population in an independent Estonia? Clearly, it is not only Estonians who live in Estonia, and there's no escaping this fact. Not to mention that talk about mass re-emigration is not only inhumane but simply stupid. It cannot be taken seriously.

[Rozenshteyn] Do the Estonian liberal democrats intend establishing ties to colleagues from other countries?

[Pyldroos] Preliminary contacts have already been made. I was recently in the FRG, on other business, it is true, but visited the headquarters of the Schleswig-Holstein free democrats. It was interesting for me and, seemingly, for them also. Although now, of course, their contacts are geared to the GDR. We have also introduced ourselves to the Hungarian Liberal Alliance, and there have been contacts with Finland and Sweden. These ties will be developed, the ideas are, after all, common to all mankind....

[Rozenshteyn] And is there such an association on the political map of the Soviet Union?

[Pyldroos] Alas, there is very scant information. There is something similar in the Transcaucasus. As far as Russia is concerned, however, the democratic forces there, it seems to me, are moving toward social democracy.

[Rozenshteyn] What is the situation in your party now?

[Pyldroos] We have not yet taken shape as a party officially and therefore cannot nominate our candidates for parliament. But the People's Front is supporting many of our comrades.

[Rozenshteyn] And do you yourself intend fighting for a seat in parliament?

[Pyldroos] Yes, for the fifth district—Lomonosov Street, part of Lasnamyae, Pirita.... Mine is a four-seat district.

[Rozenshteyn] Do your sympathizers live in Tallinn?

[Pyldroos] And in Tartu. It is the organizational period there also now. There is less activity in the rayons as yet.

What else? A commission which is preparing the documents has been formed. We will hold our congress at the start of March.

[Rozenshteyn] Thank you for the interview.

Georgia's Sovereign Right to Control Own Borders Discussed

90US0631A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
4 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Col (Res) Otar Gumberidze: "Sovereignty Begins With the Frontiers"]

[Text] At the November (1989) Session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, it was stated that: "...There has been a significant broadening of the range of questions considered extremely important from the national-state viewpoint and relating to the competence of the superior Georgian body of authority. Such questions as the state frontiers of Georgia were considered above all..."

V.I. Lenin called the question of state frontiers one of the main problems touching on the fate of the nation. The frontiers are the territorial limit for the exercising of state leadership and the guarantee of the sovereignty of peoples. And if we in fact respect the right of a nation to the independent determination of its fate on a territory within which it was formed, then there must be a fundamental revision of the frontier question.

Georgia borders in the north on the RSFSR, in the east with Azerbaijan, and in the south with Armenia. Just what do these frontiers represent and how should they be classified?

As internal state? No, although the USSR is also a state of sovereign states. As interrepublic? Also no, although the states which created the Soviet Union have come to be called republics. These frontiers are administrative. There is no difference between the Georgian-Russian and the Kamchatka-Chukot frontiers. But there is a difference and a substantial one which must be defined and designated. How? On this score we have no pat formula. But, in agreeing with the necessity of clarifying the frontiers, particularly on the threshold of granting the republics the status of complete economic independence whereby each inch of land can be weighed in gold, the author is categorically against revising the currently existing frontiers both internal and external.

Let us look at the southwest of Georgia where its frontier with Turkey coincides with the state frontier. Is this also the frontier for the republic? Let us begin with the name "the Georgian sector of the state frontier of the USSR." Let us put it frankly that this is a very unsuccessful and politically inaccurate name which, in my view, belittles the dignity of a people which has a centuries-old tradition of statehood.

Article 21 of the "Law Governing the USSR State Frontier" proclaims: "For resolving questions related to

maintaining the conditions on the USSR state frontier...from among the officers of the Border Troops, border representatives of the USSR are to be appointed (border commissars, border agents and their deputies)."

For whom are the commissars charged with resolving important questions of defending state interests, ensuring law and order on the frontier and maintaining good neighbor relations with Turkey? It must be assumed that this is done for Georgia as well. However, among them there is not a single representative from the indigenous nationality of the republic. The last of the Georgians was P. Georgadze who is now a major general in the reserves. But this was a long time ago, in 1965. Here he performed his functions on a small sector and in the role of a deputy border commissar. At the same time, it would be better to appoint as the border commissar in Georgian primarily individuals from among the Georgians and Abkhazians. And if such cannot be found among the officer command personnel, then, I feel, we should borrow the experience which is found in Turkey as there these functions as a second job are performed by civilians, the governors. In our republic such work could be carried out by representatives of the Union or autonomous republic council of ministers.

Information for reflection: Is it possible for a Georgian or Abkhazian to fish in "his own" part of the Black Sea? Possibly, but with the permission of the border troops. From whom does an inhabitant of the republic obtain a pass to travel to the border zone? From the border troops. And permission to work there? Also from them. To reside? Also with their agreement. Who is permitting whom?

...For a period of 4 months, the producers of a film were unable to secure permission for a Spanish actress to enter Akhaltsikhe where several episodes were to be filmed and pavilions and decorations had already been built. It is impossible, they said, because it is a border area. One might ask: were they afraid that the guest might flee into Turkey? If she had to go to Turkey, then she need not flee but calmly travel there from Spain. But it remains that they did not let her. These and other similar curiosities could be avoided if the republic had its own border district.

A slight digression back into history. It was 13 October 1921. This was the 9th month of Soviet power in Georgia. The republic government independently concluded a convention with the Turkish Republic on the crossing of the Soviet-Turkish frontier by the population of the border zone having permanent residence in the villages and towns located a distance of 10 km from each side of the frontier.

Can we, some 70 years later, imagine such a bold "escapade" by an Union republic? Would such spontaneity be permitted by the command-administrative bodies, including the border ones? I doubt it.

A rhetorical question: Is sovereignty possible without frontiers? And is a state without frontiers possible?

Hence, on our agenda is the acquiring of frontiers, the creation or, more accurately, the restoration of the Georgian Border District.

The Transcaucasus District which guards an enormous sector of the state frontier from the Taman to the Apscheron Peninsulas is difficult to control. Proof of this is the events of recent days on the Azerbaijan-Iranian frontier.

This would also be beneficial from the economic viewpoint. A future Georgian district would not require one-third of the current district which during the years of stagnation became inflated to unreasonable size. But the main thing is something else. Many acute problems which for a long time have been settled with difficulty at the center could be resolved much more efficiently and easily in Tbilisi if Georgia had its own border district with the right corresponding to republic sovereignty on the questions of guarding the Georgian-Turkish sector of the state frontier. Incidentally, the warming of the general political climate, the opening of transport communications via Sarpi and direct contact between the Soviet and Turkish citizens, in turn, also dictate the necessity of changing the structure and functions in managing the border troops.

Obviously, here a question arises: to whom should the border district be subordinate? There have been analogues: in 1921-1924, the Georgian Border District was of republic subordination; in 1938-1953, the border district as a second position was also commanded by the republic minister of state security. Different variations could also be imagined.

Several words about the border zone. Its minimum width would be 50 m and the maximum 2,000 m. In our republic it is even more. As a result, some 20 percent of the entire territory of the Adzhar ASSR has ended up under the close scrutiny of the border troops. And this means that access to the land is difficult for the workers. There still are bottlenecks of equipment and personnel at the gates, for there are few of them, and they are not located where it would be convenient for the farmers. The results of the labor are also negatively influenced by the rules which have been raised by someone to the rank of a law with entry, work and exiting from the zone only as part of a brigade; drivers are prohibited from traveling alone in the border zone. These and certain other restrictions are scarcely advisable.

In our view, it is essential that the republic Council of Ministers allocate to the border troops land proceeding from the principle of a reasonable sufficiency, with maximum careful use of these lands by the border troops.

One of the points of the legislative initiative of the November (1989) Session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet states: "To pose for the USSR Ministry of Defense the question of manning the border troops of the Transcaucasus Border District of the USSR KGB...stationed on the republic's territory, drawing basically

on the local youth." A completely feasible task which at the same time would resolve many problems and in addition already has an analogue in the history of the border troops. During the life of V.I. Lenin, in 1921-1924, the Georgian Border District was manned on a nationality basis.

Let us compare the two manning principles of "on a nationality basis" and "basically with local youth." Both has the common feature of the territorial approach of manning. But the second version also provides an international approach to manning for the local youth is made up not only of Georgians but also Abkhazians, Ossetians, Armenians, Azeris, Kurds, in a word, everyone who lives on the land of Georgia. Moreover, they will also be called up to the frontier from other regions as is indicated by the word "basically." There is no doubt that the given legislative initiative by the superior Georgian body of power is a well balanced and well conceived step forward.

The time has come to complete the disassembly of the "monument" of mistrust in entire peoples and nationalities and to consider the sovereign rights of the republics, that is, to be the master in their own home and on their own frontier.

National Groups Appeal for Public Order

90UN1122D Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
24 Feb 90 p 1

[Appeal "To the Government, Political Parties, and Residents of Lithuania"]

[Text] We, representatives of the ethnic communities of Lithuania, express our anxiety at the acts of hooliganism we have seen time and again recently, at times turning into open vandalism. Their targets are state flags, kindergartens, schools, monuments, and cemeteries. Such actions are interpreted most often as organized nationalistic and chauvinistic attacks. Thus, various rumors are being propagated in our society, and tension is increasing in which we sense hidden political and ethnic meaning. We appeal to the government of the republic with a request that it take additional measures to facilitate a halt to this wave of negative bias, that it take energetic steps to identify the organizers of such provocation and inform the community. We will not allow the fires of dissension to flare up in Lithuania!

We appeal to all political parties, all social organizations and movements, hoping that they share our alarm and anxiety. We call upon you to use your political authority and prestige in taking a public stand regarding provocative occurrences of this nature. We ask all the inhabitants of Lithuania, especially our youth, to realize their historic responsibility for today's Lithuania, and thereby for the independent Lithuania of the future.

Your wisdom, good will, and perspicacity must curb blind, destrucenian Community of Lithuania

D. Yuodishene, chairman of the Georgian Community of Lithuania

A. Inozemtsev, chairman of the Russian Cultural Center

I. Firkovich, chairman of the Cultural Community of the Karaim of Lithuania

V. Strikaytene, chairman of the Society of Estonians of Lithuania

M. Bayrashevskiy, chairman of the Cultural Society of Tatars of Lithuania

F. Nyunko, chairman of the Cultural Society of Belorussians of Lithuania

R. Matseykyanets, secretary of the Union of Poles of Lithuania

E. Zingeris, chairman of the Lithuanian Jewish Culture Society

A. Lyaukonis-Flik, chairman of the German-Lithuanian Culture Society

L. Zhalakyavichene, chairman of the Community of Moldavians and Romanians of Lithuania

Concerns of the Ukraine's Ethnic Minorities Discussed

90UN1014A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 27 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by V. Desyatnykov: "And the Clasp of a Friendly Handshake"]

[Text] There are representatives of 88 nationalities living in the Ukraine. The figure is unofficial as yet. It may have to be revised once the results of the last census are published. The Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia, for some reason, omits the figure. The Ukrainian SSR, we read in Volume 11, has a rather variegated population structure. Just how variegated? The republic presently has a peaceful and harmonious population consisting of 37 million Ukrainians, 11 million Russians, and, in addition, Jews, Belorussians, Poles, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Greeks, Tatars, Assyrians, and Karaites. But we are not going to list all 88 nationalities. The point is that interethnic relations in the Ukraine have been peaceful since time immemorial, and anyone who has ever lived here, however long, has sincere friends among the native population.

It cannot be said, of course, that things have always gone smoothly. Representatives of a number of nationalities—the Crimean Tatars, for example—went through the bloody mill of the Stalin era, because of which—as well as because of nationalistically inclined circles—certain other problems have persisted. Nevertheless, the Ukraine is strong in its friendship, and let us hope that it will always be so, because now we have an especially keen sense of what a terrible misfortune it is when strife takes place, when a working man of one nationality

quarrels with someone of a "different" nationality, when there is lack of understanding between them and, instead, black, hellish (there is no other word for it) hatred.

Therefore, it is especially important for us in this "peaceable" republic to be very careful and watchful today, to look ahead and strive to eliminate possible unpleasanties, to take care of even the slightest problems that may arise in interethnic relations. In August of last year, the Ukrainian CP Central Committee held a conference of representatives of small nationalities living in the Ukraine—or, rather, officers of their cultural associations. Now there has been a second such working conference, conducted by Politburo member and Ukrainian CP Central Committee Secretary Yu. N. Yelchenko with representatives of a number of national-cultural associations, which was participated in by M. O. Shulha, the head of the recently created Department of National Relations under the Central Committee, and staffers of that body. Since the time of the first meeting, a number of good events has taken place in the national-cultural life of the republic. New national-cultural associations have been created, new publications and articles in the national languages have appeared, also textbooks. One very important event was the adoption of the Law on Language in the Ukrainian SSR. Yu. N. Yelchenko commented on the consolidating role played by the CPSU's program document, the Platform titled "The Party's Nationality Policy Under Present Conditions."

Incidentally, the purpose of the working conference was not just to list accomplishments and positive factors, however important they are, but primarily to emphasize the problems and ways to resolve them. For this reason, the speakers focused on certain difficult problems. Which ones, exactly? Start with the problem which not all the speakers called the most important, although practically all of them focused on it. Namely, where are the national-cultural associations to do their work? Where are they to meet? Where are language groups, for example, supposed to work? Facilities are needed, and there are hardly any. So this is what happens here. There is not a single association the authorities would refuse. It looks like there is complete understanding—in fact, mutual understanding. There is the desire to help. But no facilities. Instead, there is a lot of talk, promises swearing fidelity to the ideas of people's friendship.

To be sure, the speech by R. Masautov, the chairman of the Republic Cultural Center for Turkic-Speaking Peoples, which functions in Kiev, showed that much also depends on the initiative and efforts of the "petitioners" themselves. To be practical people rather than petitioners—this, it seems, is the most reliable philosophy. It is astonishing to see the interesting character and activity of the Center's work, combining cultural organizations of the Tatars, the Kazakhs, the Kirghizes, Uzbeks, Karaites, Gagauzes, Chuvashes, and Chechens. A special newspaper is published for the Turkic-speaking minorities of the Ukraine. The Center also has enterprises which are, in fact, profitable: a House of Turkic Cuisine,

a Sports and Fitness Complex, an art gallery, and so on. R. Masautov himself just visited Turkey, where he negotiated the creation of a Ukrainian-Turkish enterprise which is to produce and distribute applied art products.

Of course, "dynamic effort," enterprise, the ability to do business, is a good thing—although one can also understand those conference participants who have other ideas about how cultural-national associations ought to run things.

Somewhat in opposition to R. Masautov was V. Tutyk, the managing secretary of Vidrodzhennya [Rebirth], the Ukrainian Republic Social-Political and Cultural-Educational Association of Soviet Germans. In her speech she specially emphasized the fact that their association is primarily social-political. It is striving to reinstate the rights of Soviet Germans who were repressed in the Stalin era, in particular to restore statehood.

I. Levitas, the chairman of the Republic Association of Jewish Culture, raised some important questions in his speech. "Our Association," he said, "does not confine itself just to 'our own' national problems; we consider it essential to work for internationalist upbringing of people. Surprisingly, many of the schools have people's friendship workshops. That's fine. Only why is it that the republic's schoolchildren are friends with the children of Paraguay, Ghana, Mozambique, Panama, and Costa Rica—I could extend the list—but they're practically never friends with representatives of the 'non-native' nationalities living in the Ukraine?"

Along with other participants in the meeting, I. Levitas raised the question of the necessity of state subsidies for the national-cultural associations. Examples were cited of such long-standing practices abroad. How come representatives of the national minorities in the republic, who pay their taxes to the government as they should, don't get reliable help from it?

The time has come to publish a newspaper in Yiddish. How come the small Baltic republics, with a total population of 15,000 Jews, publish four newspapers and two journals for Jews?

Language questions in their various aspects were discussed at the meeting. Courses, textbooks, teachers, and so on are needed. Here is the angle from which the problem was approached by T. Sevleshi, a member of the presidium of the Transcarpathian Oblast Association of Hungarian Culture. The Law on Language stipulates that schoolchildren are to learn Ukrainian and Russian—plus a foreign language, for example English, German, or French. But now we have the question of the native languages of many people—Hungarian, Bulgarian, Tatar, Karaite, and so on. A total of four languages. It gives rise to numerous new problems, in particular the amount of study time and the quality of language acquisition.

P. Tamrazov, the chairman of the Kiev Association of Assyrian Culture, said that until 1937, textbooks and dictionaries were published in the Ukraine which the Assyrians living in the republic used to study their language, and important literary works were produced. Stalin's genocide policy struck a deadly blow at our center, and now everything must be started all over again. P. Tamrazov asked for help in purchasing textbooks and duplicating equipment. The Association of Assyrian Culture needs facilities for a church, for Sunday schools, and, hopefully, for regular television broadcasts in the ethnic districts. Similar hopes were expressed by representatives of other national-cultural associations, in particular S. Shalatsky (Polish), I. Yali (Greek), and I. Stoyanov (Bulgarian). Participants also raised the question of setting up a publishing house in the republic which would to some extent continue the work that used to be done by Natsmenshvydav [Publishing House for the National Minorities].

Participants also discussed the idea of the necessity of creating an Association of National Cultural Associations of the Ukrainian SSR. Most of them endorsed the idea. Such an Association could unite the efforts of the various associations and provide help in resolving urgent problems.

I should like to conclude this report with the speech given by T. Hasanov, the chairman of the Kiev Dagestani Association, a wise and experienced person. He said that among the many shortages we suffer from, unfortunately, there is also a shortage of friendship and brotherhood, as attested by events in Transcaucasia. We must strive to strengthen the sacred feelings of the unity of nations, to unite in joint efforts in the name of perestroika. These are golden words.

Foreign Services Accused of Attempts to Incite Uzbek Muslims

90US0704A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
28 Feb 90 p 3

[Report by UzTAG correspondent Yu. Ibragimov: "A Package From an 'Uncle Abroad'"]

[Text] Rumors surfaced in Khorezm about unusual parcels from abroad. Indeed, several families had received in the mail unexpected parcels with foreign markings. In one case they came from the FRG, in another case, from Spain, and they were sent to a certain "Turkestan editorial board." No less surprising were the parcels' contents—tape recorder mini-cassettes.

All the riddles dissappeared the moment the cassettes were put into the tape recorder. After a brief musical introduction, a well-intoned voice started to speak in the purest Uzbek. It was recommended to listeners that they turn to some unknown "Turkestan party of national rebirth." The nature of the appeal may be judged by the epithets that resounded: "communist dictatorship," "Soviet occupiers," "Muscovite social imperialism," and the like. In a word, the typical assortment of

anti-Sovietisms. Apparently, both the "Turkestan editorial board" and the self-styled party belong to one of the "voices" being maintained by the Western special services.

We have had ideological opponents, and they remain. The voice's attempts to fabricate upon our reconceptualization of certain negative phenomena in the republic's life in the recent past, to drive a wedge into interethnic relations are alarming.

What are the authors of these anonymous "voice letters" counting on? For example, the voice states that all Central Asian peoples have common roots and are traditionally closely bound among each other. This assertion in and of itself cannot be a revelation for the region's residents. But then, suddenly the conclusion is drawn that they have become alienated and are under "Moscow's unbearable yoke." This is argued by the supposedly constant and ever-increasing oppression of Muslims in the Soviet Union.

Yes, there have been times in our history when any religion was considered potentially inimical to socialism. However, the democratic processes now taking place in the country, including our republic, are breaking many stereotypes. The understanding is gradually coming to us that religion is becoming a part of our culture; that it can, and frequently successfully, serve perestroika.

In the meantime, the voice on the tape ingratiatingly tries to inspire the listeners that Muslims in Uzbekistan do not possess genuine freedom of conscience. The celebration of the millennium of Christianity in Russia is cited as evidence. Supposedly, measures on such a scale are impossible for Muslims. How can this be answered? Those who prepared the cassette recording could not but have known that at the same time the celebration of the Orthodox, a unique sacred relic was returned to the Muslims—the (Osman) Koran. Many branches of the mass information media reported on this.

Nor could they not have known of the developing preparations for the celebration of the 1,200-year anniversary of the eminent theologian, our compatriot (Abu Isa at Termezi). As Chairman of the Presidium of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, (Mukhammad-Sadyk Mukhammad Yusif) reported in one of his interviews, the jubilee celebrations will take place in Uzbekistan this year, and will be a notable event in the republic's religious life.

More than a few such examples can be found in Khorezm as well. In this past year alone, four mosques were opened in the oblast. The faithful participate in public activity as well. Several Khorezm clerics were on the ballot in the past elections for Uzbek SSR people's deputies and to local soviets. So, fabrications about the oppression of Muslims are obviously groundless.

And quite cynical-sounding are the assertions of the "patrons" of the fate of the Uzbek people about how the former republic and certain oblast leaders convicted of

bribery had collected the money and "bought out Moscow" in order to preserve national uniqueness and culture in Uzbekistan. This hardly seems worthy of comment.

"Attempts to conduct such ideological diversions are quite frequently noted," says N.M. Galagan, Uzbek SSR KGB deputy administrative chief for Khorezm Oblast. "As we know, a multitude of foreign tourists visit Khorezm annually; of those, approximately 20,000 are from capitalist countries. And certain of them come to us not only to see the unique monuments of ancient Khiva architecture. They not infrequently 'forget' religious-mystical and other propagandistic literature at visiting places. Exploiting the hospitality and friendliness of our people, they attempt to start up conversations with them for the purpose of gathering some sort of information, for example, on the status of religion.

"And now these tape recorder cassettes have appeared. The addresses are probably taken from newspapers. I would like to note that the intentions of the organizers of this ideological pressure did not succeed. The unwilling addressees of the unrequested 'parcels' brought them to us themselves. For understandable reasons, we will not name names. They are all honest toilers, decent people, who requested that we 'guard them from such trash.'"

And one more characteristic detail. All the packages with cassettes came to our oblast C.O.D. Apparently, the senders had not counted upon success. And that is how it worked out.

British TV Director Seen Attempting to Stir up Uzbek Ethnic, Religious Feelings

90US0704B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
27 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by UzTAG correspondents A. Baranov and S. Fenyutin: "The Adventures of Judith Thomas in Samarkand and its Environs"]

[Text] "Don't come 'round to our club with your charter," is how the internationalist troops, bearers of the Order of the Red Star reserve Captain T. Muradov, reserve senior Sergeant R. Khripkov, reserve Sergeants R. Khaliulin and O. Khamidov, and junior Sergeant M. Khalilov expressed themselves in a letter to the editors concerning the visit of British television director Judith Thomas to the Samarkand "Shchit Rodiny" [Shield of the Motherland] club.

The director from Great Britain arrived for the meeting accompanied by Aleksandr Vlasov, a representative from the Moscow film firm "Granit," and Uktam Bekmukhamedov, executive secretary of the "Samarkand" social-cultural association.

She began by expressing her extreme dissatisfaction with the audience that had gathered: Gathered here, so to say, were not the people she had expected to see, the ones with whom she wished to conduct a dialogue.

It was not to Judith Thomas' liking that she saw in the hall guys of various nationalities. As it soon became clear, she had need only of those "Afgantsy" who had not fulfilled their orders on the basis of national or religious affiliation, who had refused to shoot at "brothers by blood and by Islam." In her opinion, these must be young Tajiks.

The accompanying personages nodded in agreement. And they nodded again when the guest uttered a new desire: She would like to see... participants in the Basmachi movement in Uzbekistan. Supposedly only they pursued the true interests of the people in their struggle, the TV lady pleaded passionately, floridly.

Naturally, there were no such "fighters" in the club. Nor could there have been any here. Somehow the kids scorched in Afghanistan had not thought that there would suddenly turn up in their club deserters, or violators of the military oath, or even "mentors" from the long-forgotten Basmachi bands.

According to Judith Thomas, the film which she had decided to shoot was called "The Red Empire." It is not difficult to guess at what such a picture must narrate.

...The guest from England converses with "Khudzhum" movement veteran Rafoat Mansurova. She insistently tried to persuade the old woman that the communists forced her to remove and burn the parandzha [Uzbek and Tajik women's head-to-toe clothing, from Arabic farajia]. Rafoat objects that it was not like that. But they do not hear her objections as the most direct participant and witness of the events. And they have no intention of listening.

Judith Thomas goes to Urgut. Again, she persistently seeks Basmachi participants. At the "Mekhnatabad" kolkhoz, neither Zakir Amonov, nor Radzhab Mirzayev, nor others she asked could give her addresses of "warriors for the faith and the people." They simply did not know. And those participants in the Basmach movement who are alive are for some reason themselves in no hurry to make themselves known to a foreign visitor. Thomas had to leave Urgut with nothing to show for her pains...

The adventures did not end with this. Thomas continued her search energetically in Samarkand—this time she sought those repressed in the thirties and forties. It would have seemed that the director would have no problems here: Our press publishes no small amount of material on the rehabilitation of justice with regard to individuals who suffered illegally during the years of the reign of Stalin. Through UzTAG channels alone, over the last year, about 15 such detailed reports have been transmitted for the republic's newspapers, including the Samarkand papers, with dozens of names in each. However, Thomas is not interested in the de-kulakization of the dekhkane [peasants], nor in why the workers suffered, nor in the simple people who were victims of tyranny—she must be given the leading party and soviet staffers.

Incidentally, on this score, the competent organs could officially grant in full all the material of interest; it was not at all necessary to go door to door among the Samarkanders, to shamelessly enter apartments uninvited... Today, our people look at many things in a new way. Yet they have preserved their dignity, and their own Soviet pride remains.

In a word, the director of the future "Red Empire" was thoroughly unlucky. And just because rather than taking the direct route of getting the needed information, she took the tortuous path of procuring "cooked" facts. It remains regrettable that our Soviet individuals accompanying the lady, that same Aleksandr Vlasov, did not restrain her from thoughtless actions. Or did not wish to restrain her, to say, come here, you can get substantially more information through official channels today than from chance passers-by.

Incidentally, a word about Aleksandr Konstantinovich Vlasov. He did not conduct himself at all like a gentleman in the retinue of the British guest. The staffers of the "Samarkand" hotel will never forget the minor spectacle in the lobby. Surrounded by foreigners waiting for rooms, and he dials the number of his partner on the internal line, and loudly inquires as to whether the latter had already fallen into the hands of an NKVD associate, and if he had, to get down here forthwith anyway, in handcuffs... Judith Thomas stood next to him, and as a director, she could not but evaluate the artistry of the game of provocation.

The next show she directed herself. She suddenly turned up with her guide in Dzhizak, thus violating the 24 July 1981 law "On the legal status of foreign citizens in the USSR." The city of Dzhizak and Syr-Darya Oblast were not designated in her visa as points of visitation. A foreign woman who has visited our country over 20 times could not but be informed of the rules of travelling within its territory. So what brought Thomas to Dzhizak? As she explained it, she sought encounters with participants in the Dzhizak uprising of...1916. Understandably, she did not find any such people.

We can imagine the film "The Red Empire"—in any case, the part devoted to Uzbekistan. Whom does the director see as heroes here? The soldiers who did not fulfill their military duty on national or religious grounds... The rather aged Basmachi participants, who would probably like most of all to forget some things from the past in their biographies... The party and soviet workers bearing a grudge against Soviet power... The women from whom the communists

forcibly ripped of the parandzha, so dear to women? And even the participants in the Dzhizak uprising... Pardon us, Judith, but after all, they were in no way demonstrating against Soviet power.

The guys from "Shchit Rodiny" gave the Western director's performance a harsh review—as an attempt at interference with our internal problems, including such a delicate sphere as our interethnic relations. We will work out our problems somehow on our own, without beating around the bush, declared the internationalist troops. They expressed their deep indignation with the position of Uktam Bekmukhamedov, who, judging by his behavior, fully shared the views of the visiting sensation-seeker.

It is an accustomed matter for a certain category of foreign ideologues to see our country's life in a distorted mirror. There is no sense in assuring them that this life is colorful. All the same, they have prepared for its portrayal only one color—black.

For example, we cannot complain about the lack of attention—the radio station "Ozodlik" comments eagerly upon UzTAG reports. Only here, it unfailingly selects from them the negative aspects, cutting everything positive. The agency broadcast information on the discovery of a rich oil deposit in the Kyzyl-Kum. "Ozodlik" broadcast it, having provided the report with its own question: Where is this oil going? And by its own, "competent" conclusion, "The people are not the masters of their riches." Since, they say, the people give the oil and gas to the country. Naturally, they remain silent about the fact that the republic itself is now forced to receive 2.2 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkmenia, and that the oil deposit is not yet up to full production capacity.

It has become a tradition for foreign journalists to call authors in Uzbekistan, to get information from them. References are made to Dadakhov Khasanov, Gulchekhra Nurullayeva, and Abdurakhim Pulatov... Their personal points of view are offered up as almost the gospel truth. And "Ozodlik" is not at all troubled by the fact that the information they get from their authors in Uzbekistan is far from always reliable. Accuracy is already just utter nonsense; here, as they say, the worse, the better.

It is not at all simple for any of us Soviet people to live nowadays. A great deal has settled out over the decades; a great deal must be reexamined, re-cut, and cleansed, painfully, while alive. Thus there is no need for us, Soviets, to add tar and poison to that ideological soup which people who are hardly friends are cooking up for us abroad.

Medvedev Update on Gdlyan Commission Investigation*90UN1005 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 3*

[Interview with Roy Medvedev, co-chairman of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies commission for examining the materials connected with the work of the USSR Procuracy's investigation group headed by T. Kh. Gdlyan, by S. Kredov; date and place not given: "When the Means Discredit the Goals: The Recurrence of Stalinist 'Jurisprudence'"]

[Text] A scheduled session of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies commission for examining the materials, which are connected with the work of the USSR Procuracy's investigation group headed by T. Kh. Gdlyan, has been held. Roy Medvedev, the commission's co-chairman, answers RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA questions posed by S. Kredov.

[Kredov] Roy Aleksandrovich, how do you explain the fact that some commission members, including you, began to speak out publicly long before the investigation of the work of T. Gdlyan's investigation group ended?

[Medvedev] When we began our commission's work, we agreed to refrain from public statements for two reasons. The decision establishing the commission stated that the commission would have access to materials at any level of secrecy—and indeed, we did begin to get secret documents, although not immediately and not without resistance (for example, I read all the Politburo materials connected with the Gdlyan problem). We did not have the right to publicize them widely. This was the first reason. The second was the fact that very considerable public excitement existed and the press could only pour oil on the fire. We thought that a parliamentary commission should work in a calm atmosphere; you see, it searches for the truth. We observed this agreement (you will note, mutually.) In May 1989, I sharply criticized PRAVDA which had published a premature article.... However, the stipulated procedure had lasted for two months and our commission did not violate it. Gdlyan and Ivanov gave an interview to outlying district newspapers, the newspapers of informal groups, and the western mass information media, including Radio Liberty; and they spoke at mass meetings. It turned out that we were working completely separate from the public at a time when Gdlyan and Ivanov were defending their point of view.

I recall that we had two mandates: find out whether the Gdlyan group had violated the law during the conduct of the investigation and determine how weighty their accusations against higher persons were. They did not help us solve the second task. Having sensed propaganda pressure by the investigators, we decided to perform our work as openly as possible.

[Kredov] What violations of the law by the Gdlyan group does your commission consider established?

[Medvedev] There are many of them: illegal arrest, including "family" nighttime interrogations, and various types of violations during the removal of valuables, their storage and dispatch to Moscow. The following example was cited during a commission meeting. The KGB investigative isolation building consisted of three floors. The first was a pit, a cell of the worst type where damp linen never dried. Of course, Gdlyan had not built this isolation ward; it was a carry-over from the time of stagnation. However, the entire premises here represented impermissible pressure—just as the beating of cellmates under investigation. Let us add such a pressure method as the arresting of relatives and the keeping of them under arrest until the accused gave the necessary evidence. The fact that one of those under investigation, who had been left in an official room, committed suicide after twelve or thirteen interrogations is a basis for initiating a criminal case on charges of bringing someone to commit suicide—regardless of whether the dead person was a criminal or not. Gdlyan's and Ivanov's charges against higher persons were not supported by documents and that is why it is illegal to use these conjectures during meetings and in an interview.

[Kredov] If the investigation group's violations of the criminal code were really so great and clear, what dragged out the investigation of them in the USSR Procuracy?

[Medvedev] A typical question which faces us and the other people's deputies. Actually, we have had dealings with the investigative practices that were established during the years of stagnation in almost all of the country's rayons. Gdlyan and Ivanov did not invent them. Impermissible pressure and violations of the law, which are orally blessed from above, were a mass phenomenon at the time. In this sense, some (of course, far from all) investigators in Gdlyan's group were products of their times. We, who were considered dissidents, were familiar with their methods during the years of stagnation, that is, we are not talking about exceptions but, rather, the norm. This has evoked Telman Khorenovich's somewhat understandable indignation and it is his and his defender's weapon. They say: Who acted differently? In the commission, for example, we heard Karakozov, the chief of the investigative procuracy unit, and were convinced that he was excellently informed about almost everything. We listened to Popova, the public prosecutor. She said: Bribery cases are impossible without pressure. It is a crime that is difficult to prove. You see, however, "pressure" can be understood differently. It should not have the nature of moral or physical torture.

The recent session of the USSR Procuracy Collegium, where they transformed Gdlyan and Ivanov into scapegoats, struck me. I repeat that I do not think that either one or the other is a knight without fear and without reproach. In no way were they singular warriors against the mafia—rather, they compromised this battle to some degree. However, it is not fair to depict them as almost the inventors of the vicious investigative practices.

Many procuracy directors, both former ones and present ones, should share responsibility with them. What this responsibility should be—it is not for us to determine. I think, however, that our commission will produce an integrated decision. The report, which Yarin wrote for the last congress, said that the main legal and political responsibility for what occurred in Uzbekistan lies on the USSR Procuracy and its surveillance structures.

[Kredov] The day is not far off when the commission will have to relay its decision to the judgment of the Supreme Soviet. How unanimous are its members?

[Medvedev] There are people with different views on the commission. Debates and discussions are taking place. During all past meetings, however, we have come to common conclusions in the end. However, I do not know how the commission members will regard the procuracy's petition to institute criminal proceedings against Gdlyan and Ivanov. Different opinions exist on this. Incidentally, the pressure from Gdlyan's supporters is not weakening. Meetings, picketing, threats. After the last meeting of the commission, Strukov, the former chief speaker, heard on the telephone late at night: "We recommend that you shoot yourself." Who did this? Do Gdlyan and Ivanov really not know about these cases? If they know, why do they not call upon their supporters to reject such methods? Probably, it is again being assumed that all methods are good in the struggle against the mafia. No! Not all. We know this from our country's history.

[Kredov] The question is a fair one: Do you believe the charge that Ye. Ligachev is guilty of receiving a bribe from Usmankhodzhayev?

[Medvedev] I do not believe it. Just as similar testimony against Yakovlev, Razumovskiy, Yeltsin, and - now - also Gorbachev, which is not supported by evidence. To call someone a criminal on the basis of unsubstantiated statements is a return to Stalinist "jurisprudence."

Lawyer Representation in Kazakh Supreme Soviet Planned

90UN1060B *Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 p 1*

[Article by A. Didenko, professor of the Faculty of Law of Kazan State University, candidate for Kazakh SSR people's deputy from the Union of Lawyers of Kazakhstan]

[Text] In the new Supreme Soviet of the republic, the presence of lawyer deputies is guaranteed for the first time. And the membership will be formed through people who are elected from public organizations (six from the Union of Lawyers of Kazakhstan), now lawyers have been nominated also in the election okrugs. This is a great comfort, for lawyers have a special role ahead of them, a great deal of important work.

The general ideas of the impending activity of lawyers in the Supreme Soviet were sufficiently clearly set forth in the 19th Party Conference, first of all in the resolution "On Legal

Reform", in which it was stated that it is necessary to devote paramount attention to the legal protection of the individual, to strengthen the guarantees for the realization of the political, economic, and social rights and freedoms of Soviet people and simultaneously to increase the responsibility of every citizen before his labor collective, the state, and society. There are named the basic directions along which the introduction of basic changes in legislation is intended.

I would like to share my reflections and to set forth the important specific features of the building of a rule-of-law state and the execution of legal reform in the republic in the conditions of a federation that is renewing itself.

At present, a gap in the legal regulation of some spheres of life has clearly appeared in the union republics. It needs to be recognized that this gap as a whole is not to the advantage of Kazakhstan, with respect to many questions we clearly lag behind.

There are two ways of realizing legal reform in the republic. The first is the duplication, with some correctives of the legislation of other republics, as today. It is easier and somewhat more reliable. But this path inevitably dooms us to lagging behind in the future as well and to a certain public opinion in the country about us. The second path, as an adherent of which I speak, is the search for our own juridical person. Here mistakes and cases of going too far are inevitable. And yet, only this path is the only correct method for securing self-respect and authority in the union association, for taking into account the special features of the national development of the republics.

The legislative activity of the republic must be sharply intensified. The republic has possibilities for solving many burning questions, for which legislation today either does not provide an answer or which it is not solving successfully. There is a need, for example, for normative acts in regard to the development of some types of individual labor activity. Proceeding from considerations of social justice, the increased payment for the use of excess living space should be envisaged; it is entirely realistic to permit the exchange of housing from various sources of available housing for state and cooperative apartments.

Many legislative acts that are operative in the republic have become hopelessly obsolete. For example, as of 1965 the Model Statute for Housing Construction Cooperatives has been in effect, in which the rights of the members of the cooperative are curtailed to the utmost. Here, evidently, it would be more expedient not to limit the rights of the housing cooperatives through a new Model Statute for Housing Construction Cooperatives, but to give them the opportunity to determine the rights of members in their own statutes, including the right to transfer an apartment to other persons, the right to exchange, etc.

It seems to me, what is urgently necessary today is the struggle of the new composition of the Supreme Soviet with the legal nihilism which has become too deeply rooted in society, and its recurrences already are not calling forth a stormy public reaction. Here is one example. For a year and

a half, the Alma-Ata Gorispolkom has not implemented the Ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the arrangement of the citizens for registration, proceeding from a housing norm of 9 square meters, and considering it as set too high for Alma-Ata. And even if this figure was actually established without regard to the real material possibilities (now they are established by the ispolkoms of the oblast, the Alma-Ata, and the Leningrad City Soviets of People's Deputies), but who gave the ispolkom the right, perfectly openly and on the basis of "principles", to deprive thousands of citizens of the right granted to them by the law?!

There is a multitude of examples of that sort. For this reason, support should be given to all measures called upon to demonstrate that it is precisely the Supreme Soviet which is the highest organ of state power and, if the acts adopted by it are not implemented by someone, it makes use of the full force of power to confirm the supremacy of the law. From this also follows the necessity of the creation of the republic constitutional oversight commission, independently of the union [commission]. It must be given the right of unconditional abolition of normative acts which do not correspond to the Constitution of the republic and other republic laws. In order for it not become transformed into the usual element of the administrative-bureaucratic structure, it is necessary, above all, to form special personnel of this committee, including, first and foremost, the most authoritative legal scholars and important practitioners, who are known for their independent views.

Evident is also the necessity of stipulating measures to guarantee the independence of the law enforcement organs. Here a great deal must be carefully considered and weighed. But, it seems to me, already now one can raise the question about such practical steps in this direction as the allotment, in the local budget, of a separate line of the material provision of these organs, in order for them not to be dependent on the arbitrary discretion of the ispolkom in questions of housing and construction; the centralization of a number of militia services (the investigation service, etc.) and their release from direct subordination to the local authorities and, on the other hand, the formation of a municipal militia service for the maintenance of public order. It is time, finally, to release the militia also from the performance of porters' duties in the privileged sanatoria and rest homes, soviet and party institutions.

The search for the most effective levers of the legal regulation of the economy (leasing, ownership, cooperative society, and joint enterprise) must become the most important contribution of lawyers to the work of the Supreme Soviet. For me, the idea of M. S. Gorbachev—that restructuring will be successful if it will be victorious economically—is indisputable. For example, there is an urgent necessity for the reorientation of the mainly raw material orientation of the economy of Kazakhstan to the output of finished products. Those are mistaken who believe that this is a task only for managers and economists. The creation of legislative tendencies to change the national economy proportions in favor of finished products and the periodic assessment, after a year to a year and a half, of how these

tendencies are being maintained in the adopted, normative acts—are the indisputable prerogative of the representatives of jurisprudence.

Even economic situations of the same type are sometimes seriously refracted through the prism of regional traditions that have been formed. In the course of several months, I had the occasion to become specially acquainted with the experience of joint-stock activity in Kiev, Lvov, and Tbilisi. Really, it would seem, what regional peculiarities can there be here. However, upon careful examination it is evident that the same legislation has different effectiveness depending on the economic structures and business customs that have developed in this or that region. In Kazakhstan, for example, there is a more cumbersome system of the management of the construction complex than in the other republics. It is not surprising that precisely in this sector, which suffers most from administrative management methods, there appeared the aspiration to break away from the bureaucratic paths of management through the formation of joint-stock companies and the creation of lease enterprises. But the republic legal system does not know the rules which could help the builders to satisfy the aspiration to economic independence. And in this situation and in many others, there is a need for supplements and the corresponding correction of legislation, which pertains to very narrow legal work.

There will be still more special features in the application of the legislation on land and on peasant farms, where at times it will be quite impossible to make use of any analogies. To all appearances, the center of gravity in the solution of questions on the cooperative system will be shifted to the republic level. The task of the lawyers consists in assessing the effectiveness of the legislation and in proposing the necessary legal formulas corresponding to the optimal economic solutions.

The candidates for people's deputy who are lawyers have proceeded to the election campaign. At present it is important for the election programs to be brought to broad strata of the population and the legal community, for these programs to be successfully enriched through everything reasonable in the experience of practitioners, the ideas of scientific associates, and the wishes of the citizens. And I would like to believe that the voters will pay special attention the candidates who are lawyers, my colleagues, who have been nominated in the okrugs, and will understand how important a strong corps of lawyers is today for the parliament of the republic.

Belorussian SSR Justice Minister on Judicial Reforms

90UN1057A Minsk SELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
17 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by SELSKAYA GAZETA special correspondent S. Mikhovich: "It Is Necessary To Be Law-Abiding"]

[Text] **Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice V.G. Tikhinya has held his first press conference after 4 months of being in office.**

As recently as a year ago, it would have been hard to imagine that Doctor of Juridical Sciences Professor Valeriy Guryevich Tikhinya, former dean of the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin [BGU] Law School [Yurfak] and, later, that university's deputy rector, would become Minister of Justice. This appointment probably was an unexpected one even for him because the new minister vowed, as he himself has admitted, to have no contacts with journalists for at least 3 months, so that he might study the situation in the court establishment entrusted to him.

In making visits throughout all oblasts during that time, the minister was often ashamed to look the people's judges in the eye. The shabby "palaces of justice" and their keepers' beggarly pay brought on depressing thoughts. The statistics, alas, are deplorable. There are 152 people's courts in the republic; every 4th one is in unsuitable accommodations, and 6 are in absolutely ramshackle buildings.

In the presence of such shabbiness, can the argument be made: Is the traditional form of dress—the robe—to be prescribed for the judge or not? Just for a moment, imagine a guardian of the law, in a magnificent robe, pronouncing sentence beneath a sagging ceiling beam....

However, the main argument is not about the robe. All of the courts are terribly overburdened. Last year, 124,696 civil and 26,822 criminal cases were heard in them. Whereas 21,000 persons were sentenced in 1988, the number was greater by 3,000 in the following year. And there is no guarantee of any sort that this assembly line will not mass-produce defective products. One judge's share is as many as 50 to 60 cases per month, and in 25 courts even more—up to 80. In my opinion, even if a judge were to work day and night, and on all off-duty days, it would nonetheless be physically impossible to overcome this. Let us not forget: Behind every case, especially a criminal case, there stands a person, or several persons, and their fates.

And today, the republic's Ministry of Justice, along with other concerned departments, is struggling with problems that sometimes seem unsolvable. A most difficult task has fallen the lot of the new minister and his assistants—developing and carrying out court reform in the spirit of the times, taking their foreign colleagues' experience into account.

The press conference, which took place in the minister's rather small office, was devoted to just this theme. The conversation was interesting, sometimes caustic, but the main thing I noticed was—the ministry's representatives lacked the least consternation. The first steps, already taken on the way to reform, probably furthered their optimism. What sorts of steps were these?

"A legal foundation has been laid for court reform," said Valeriy Guryevich Tikhinya. "Last year, the USSR Council of Ministers enacted a decree, according to which the position salaries for court workers were raised as of 1 January this year. Provision was made for the construction

of 33 courthouses by the Republic Decree on Stepping Up the Fight Against Crime in the Belorussian SSR. However, there are already fears that this program is threatened with discontinuance. In addition, it has been decided to increase the numerical strength of workers in the courts. We have been allotted 10 sets of staffs, each of which includes a judge, a court executive [marshal], and a court secretary. True, we had been counting on 25 sets for the courts of first instance. As for the superior courts, they have not received a single additional salary since 1963. The ice has just now been broken...."

There were many questions, and not only did the minister answer them, but his assistants as well—Administration Chiefs Valentina Vasilyevna Podgrusha, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Smirnov, and Aleksandr Fedorovich Cherednichenko.

I shall present only the most interesting dialogues.

[Question] The impression is created that different judges may pronounce entirely different sentences in similar cases, especially when a fraction of the sentences is repealed in the appellate process....

[Answer] The court approaches the awarding of punishment differentially. You know, the criminal code's articles are only relatively precise. For some of them, there are as many as 9 to 12 "prime" points that the court may consider. It seems that this is very wise—to accord freedom of action to the judges. In this regard, remember—they are not computers. By the way, fewer court sentences and decisions were repealed through appellate pleas in 1989 than in the preceding year.

[Question] Sometimes judges are inclined to abbreviate the minutes of the session for deciding a case, not entering facts and opinions stated during the hearing itself in them....

[Answer] Obviously, broad generalizations should not be made here. Yes, there are isolated cases of such malfeasance. The main reason? It is always that overburdening of the judges.

[Question] Why do some criminals, who have received a long sentence, somehow turn up at liberty very quickly? For example, there are rumors that Kasko, the major bribe-taker from the Minsk Medical Institute, has gotten out of jail, and thus has not served his deserved term of punishment....

[Answer] Unfortunately, our law is such that one may escape responsibility, if not at once, then a year or two later. As for Kasko, we do not know whether he is at liberty or not. The justice services do not control the jails.

[Question] How do you view the proposal which, by the way, is contained in the preelection platforms of certain jurist candidates for Belorussian SSR People's Deputy? The proposal is as follows: For the duration of his term in elective office, a people's judge is to discontinue his being in any political organization, in order to remain independent and subordinate himself only to the law.

[Answer] I see no need for this. Abroad, for example, judges may even be in several parties. It is another matter that it is forbidden to demand a report to the executive committee of a soviet or to a party committee bureau from a judge. By the way, such a statement of the case has become something of a concession to fashion, in my opinion, and not only with respect to judges.

[Question] Will we have trial by jury?

[Answer] A draft of the Belorussian SSR Law on Court Organization has been prepared. The republic's new Supreme Soviet, which is to be elected in March, will, I hope, consider this document. Just now the people's legal culture is low, and it is rather early, at the moment, to put the deciding of human fates at the mercy of trial by jury. In Cuba, for example, the more complicated cases in the courts of first instance are being heard by a court consisting of three professional judges and two elected people's representatives. We present such a proposal in the draft.

[Question] Is the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet's present membership sufficiently competent in the legal field, and what are the future membership's prospects in this regard?

[Answer] There are 67 degreed jurists registered as candidates for republic People's Deputy. In the Belorussian Parliament's present membership, there are only four of our colleagues. This will not hold water at all. It is hard to imagine, but it is a fact: There is not a single jurist on the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet's Commission for Legislative Proposals. We ought to have our own Belorussian Sobchaks [Sobchaki].

[Question] Today, when a trend toward humanizing our laws has been established, the so-called "Vitebsk syndrome"—dread of making mistakes—is showing up in some judges. They would rather make no effort than risk doing something incorrect, and they return cases for further investigation, and pronounce light sentences....

[Answer] In our opinion, this sort of liberalism should not be linked with the Vitebsk or Cherkov cases, which, of course, disgrace our court. We go to extremes. Extraordinary punishment measures are prescribed for 32 kinds of crimes in the present criminal code. This is an extreme. However, an extreme has not been avoided, even in the draft of The Fundamentals of Criminal Law, capital punishment having been prescribed for only six kinds of crimes. Hence the liberalism and unjustified "humanization."

[Question] What is your attitude toward a journalist's being allowed to report the proceedings of a court hearing before pronouncement of sentence?

[Answer] We are normally disposed toward this. The judges themselves do not permit it. They fear the pressure of public opinion. Not prejudicing the court's decision, you may write anything you wish and construct your own versions. However, let us await The Law on the Press.

In conclusion, the Minister of Justice asked that one very important idea, which is fundamental, be stressed in the newspaper reports. Perestroika—this is more than socialism and more than democracy. However, some citizens have regarded perestroika as permissiveness and an opportunity to ignore the laws. The laws really do need improvement. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be law-abiding. In the law-governed state that we are building, there must be strong judicial authority. Otherwise, anarchy and ruin will threaten the society.

Strengthening Function of Procuracy

90UN1060A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 3

[Report on procuracy collegium session: "In the USSR Procuracy"]

[Text] In the USSR Procuracy, at an expanded session of the collegium, under the chairmanship of A. Ya. Sukharev, USSR procurator general, the state and measures with respect to the radical improvement of procuratorial supervision of investigation and inquest in the country were examined.

It was noted that, with regard to the increased demands for the observance of legality and the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens in the investigation of crimes, a number of practical measures have been put into effect, which are aimed at securing the legality of bringing criminal actions, detentions, arrests, and the institution of criminal proceedings against citizens. Special attention was devoted to the observance of the principle of the presumption of innocence. During the past year, procurators annulled more than 5,000 unfounded decrees on the institution of criminal proceedings and discontinued about 2,000 cases as instituted without legal foundations. On the basis of the protests of procurators, quite a few judicial errors were corrected. Measures were also taken to secure the inevitability of punishment for crimes committed. During the past year, procurators repealed 184,000 unfounded decrees on the rejection and institution, on the suspension, and the discontinuation of criminal prosecutions.

Omissions in procuratorial supervision were subjected to serious criticism by the collegium. It was noted that some procurators do not manifest the proper adherence to principles in the suppression of cases of unfounded institution of criminal proceedings, detentions, arrests, and searches of citizens. Cases of malfeasance against justice have been brought to light. It was underscored that one [as published] of the basic reasons for such a state is the accusatory bias, the oversimplified approach to the observance of procedural guarantees, which have become rooted during the past years in the consciousness of many investigators, investigating officials, and procurators.

At the same time, the collegium subjected to sharp criticism those procurators who show indecisiveness in the suppression of criminal manifestations and avoid the fulfillment of their professional obligations with respect

to the application of the full force of Soviet laws in the struggle against dangerous crimes, malicious speculators, violators of the public order, and extremist elements which provoke nationality strife.

The collegium outlined measures to strengthen procuratorial supervision over investigation and inquest in order to fully meet the tasks of the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens, and at the same time to guarantee an uncompromising struggle against the violations of law and order. In particular, a vital structural perestroyka of the entire system of supervision, both at the center and at the local level, is envisaged, the strengthening of procuracy personnel in the supervision sections, and the increase of their qualifications and responsibility for the assigned task.

A decision was taken on the institution of criminal proceedings, on the institution of disciplinary proceedings

with respect to procurators who have admitted gross violations of legality and criminal negligence in the implementation of supervision for the investigation of concrete criminal cases, in particular with respect to bribe-taking in Uzbekistan.

Anxious and open discussion at the collegium was also devoted to the fact that Article 14 of the Foundations of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, on the judicial system, on the admission of the defense attorney from the moment of detention, arrest, or indictment, is not supported with the provision of personnel for the corps of advocates, which today has created serious problems in the fulfillment of the requirements of the law on criminal procedure. The collegium of the USSR Procuracy took the decision to submit the necessary proposals with respect to this question to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Armenian Scores Caucasus Reportage Content

90US0574A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
6 Feb 90 p 1

[Commentary by Professor S. Musayelyan under the rubric "Open Letter": "To the Journalist Leonid Nikitinskiy on the Occasion of an Article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA"]

[Text] Respected Editor!

I am troubled to the depths of my soul by that lie and the perversion of the facts and the situation in Baku and Azerbaijan that was portrayed in the report by the journalist Leonid Nikitinskiy entitled "There Are Victims....," published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 30 January.

You read this report and you are amazed: What touching tenderness, love, yes indeed, love for the murderers, bandits, and cutthroats who have perpetrated the latest genocide of Armenians in Baku, the city that the leadership of the republic itself has called its most international. How much labor, diligence, and effort the writer expends to give a philosophic basis to the vandalism committed at the end of the 20th century in the "international city."

However, one should not be surprised. The Moscow journalist, arriving in Baku, had a clear-cut mission: To observe at any price the criminal postulate of parity and equality between the murderer and his victim. What does a Moscow journalist care about who killed whom, who is the murderer, and who is the victim? The main thing is equality. Both opposing sides are equal for him, even if only one of them has officially declared in an ultimatum that it will secede from the USSR if the troops are not withdrawn from Baku immediately. In this context the journalist Nikitinskiy exclaims, "A genuine war between two sovereign (ignoring the power of the USSR, in any case) states: Armenia and Azerbaijan." Does the writer know that Armenia has tied its fate to that of great Russia for more than three centuries already and that there has not been a single call for the secession of Armenia from the USSR at meetings in the last two years?

What good is the statement that "...an attempt to review the established borders in the Transcaucasus provoked the war!" What review of the borders is he talking about? Is this really not about the natural desire to reunite portions of a single people that have been forcibly torn away? Has the writer determined whether Azerbaijan will have the right or not to drag the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] along with it when it secedes from the USSR? But be sure, respected journalist Nikitinskiy, that the same kind of real danger that occurred on 19 January (the day troops entered Baku) exists now too, and will exist in the future.

Nikitinskiy tries to "explain" the barbarity against the Armenians of 13-16 January using the presence in Baku of "about 90,000 'Yerazis'" (Yerevan Azeris), who carried out the genocide against the Armenians. He says these

"Yerazis" were going about wearing shoes in need of repair, treated unfairly, denied unemployment, not even registered, and therefore they were "embittered, seeing around them the old Armenian women keeping watch over prosperous apartments," and as a result they did that which the whole world, except for our country, calls genocide against the Armenians. But this statement is false from beginning to end.

Deeply respected, naively mistaken journalist! Before you write the word "refugee," never mind "Yerazis," your honor and your basic decency should have prompted you to study this phenomenon from all sides, or even just from both "opposing sides."

You should know that, according to official data (and not according to your distorted data), 350,000 Armenians have been driven out of Azerbaijan in the last two years, of which 280,000 moved to Armenia, "freeing" more than 85,000 private homes and apartments.

A total of 160,000 Azeris moved from Armenia to Azerbaijan on favorable terms. This means that each family moving to Azerbaijan could have two apartments instead of one. So why then are the "Yerazis" still "unfortunate" and "embittered"? (According to your "idea," should the Sumgait refugees have slaughtered the Azeris living in Yerevan in 1988? Incidentally, many Azeris still live in Yerevan and no one is even raising a finger against them.)

In addition, the government of Armenia has paid them more than R200 million compensation. Are you, comrade Nikitinskiy, interested in how much the Azeri government has paid its own former citizens, the Armenians? Not a single kopek!

Moreover, how are we to understand your statement that these "Yerazis" are also from "blockaded Nakhichevan?" How could Armenians, evicted from Nakhichevan to the last man as the result of a 70-year effort, drive the "Yerazis" from there? According to your logic it was the "Yerazis" who destroyed the state border in Nakhichevan and then poured into Iran in crowds of thousands for weapons, began building a bridge to Iran across the Araks River, and made short work of the families of the border guards. That is a pretty error for a Moscow journalist, right? (Or maybe everything is just the opposite?)

I consider it blasphemy that the author of the article "explains" the inhumanity of these "Yerazis" by the fact that they are from Armenia. Respected journalist Nikitinskiy! The whole world is familiar with the Armenians' hospitality and respect for other nations. If anybody does, we, the Armenians, are very familiar with grief, suffering, and the notion of "refugees." From the second half of the last century to the present we have periodically been subjected to physical annihilation at the hands of fanatical pan-Turkists. We have endured more than one genocide. And what you have written is cynical.

How can you, without a twinge of conscience (or perhaps you simply know nothing about that), quote the Azeri doctor: "Formerly there were Azeris, driven out of Armenia, lying in those same chambers. The doctors know from experience...." Parity and equality again. That means that the dozens and hundreds of dying Armenians whom you saw in the hospital imeni Semashko in Baku are lying in the very same beds where Azeris, beaten unmercifully and driven from Armenia, lay more than a year ago according to you and your Dr. Guseynov. That is not only a lie, it is slander. So is your next thought: "Armenia's answer to Sumgait was to bring increasing pressure on citizens of Azeri nationality living in the republic and in the NKAO with the goal of forcing them to emigrate." This too is a lie. After Sumgait, the genocide and eviction of Armenians began in Kirovabad, Khanlar, Shamkhor, Shusha, Mingeaur, and in all of Azerbaijan, but not of the Azeris in Armenia.

I would like to sum up. You have a task: To make the sides equal at any price, to place an "equals" sign between the barbarians and the victims. As a result you, respected journalist Nikitinskiy, so cynically and so very dangerously oversimplify the situation not only in Baku but in all of Azerbaijan. According to you, the "Yerazis" are the reason for the genocide of the Armenians in Baku. But who organized Sumgait, Khanlar, Kirovabad, Shusha, Mingeaur and the barbaric blockade of the NKAO, Armenia, and Georgia, destroyed 800 miles of the USSR border, armed 40,000 bandits with the newest weapons (including foreign weapons), overthrew the local Soviet authorities, organized mass burnings of party membership cards, and unleashed war against the Armenians? You even question the advisability of bringing troops into Baku. What touching concern for the murderers, rapists and thieves who are overthrowing the Soviet power! It is a pity, a great pity, that the troops are always late: They were three days late in Sumgait, and they were six days late in Baku. If they had been eight days late instead of six, then half of the Russian population would almost certainly have been exterminated. This is what your hypocrisy can lead to!

The events in Azerbaijan and Baku convince any sensible man that they were planned, coordinated, and carried out by the entire party and soviet leadership of Azerbaijan together with organized crime and the ring-leaders of the People's Front.

The patronage of the vandalism and barbarity that you offer (and not only you) will lead to still more monstrous events than those in Sumgait and Baku.

Finally, respected journalist Nikitinskiy, know that bleeding, blockaded, tormented, starving Armenia, surmounting its pain and sufferings, is collecting donations for a fund to aid the Russian refugees from Baku and Azerbaijan. Sacred Echmiadzin alone donated R250,000 to that fund.

Armenians were and always will be an international people.

Georgian Youth Paper Surveys Samizdat Periodicals

18130083A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI
in Georgian 3 Feb 90 p 6

[Unsigned editorial article: "The Alternative Press Under the 'Glasnost' Rubric"]

[Text] If perestroika and glasnost have left their mark on anything it is certainly the press. Having escaped their Procrustean bed, many newspapers which were alike as two peas in a pod and cut from the same cloth have found their own image, their own voice....

One positive result of this kind of "perestroika" is that a healthy competition has developed among the newspapers, a "contest" for readership....

This so-to-speak "unofficial official press" (they often take a position that is opposite to the official line on this or that issue) now also faces competition "from outside"—in the form of the informal societies' and parties' samizdat newspapers.

Papers of this sort are being published not only in Tbilisi but in a number of other cities and rayons. They are having a great impact on the readers, on public opinion, and on the national movement generally (the enhancement and strengthening of which constitute the purpose of these newspapers, which in many cases differ from one another both in terms of form and content).

It is no longer possible to "ignore" this press. For this reason, we have decided to offer you a survey of them periodically in our newspaper under the rubric, "The Alternative Press Under the 'Glasnost' Rubric." The feature will be conducted by journalist Peliks Kozhiashvili.

In these surveys we will briefly and compactly acquaint you with the latest issues of these samizdat newspapers and the material they contain, also the purposes of the parties and associations publishing these newspapers, their tasks, their position on this or that phenomenon or issue, and so on....

We request all parties and associations to supply us regularly with a copy of their newspaper's latest edition.

Today we offer you a survey of the newspapers published by the Monarchist Party and the Georgian National Constitutional Alliance.

Readers know that the Georgian Monarchist Party entered our country's political arena recently. Along with other social-political organizations and parties, the Monarchist Party has been taking part in recent and ongoing demonstrations.

The public is greatly interested in this relatively new, "peculiar" party. ("Who are they? What is their purpose? What are their political principles?" And so on.)

Now we can satisfy this curiosity directly from the primary source: the first issue of the party's newspaper DZLEVAY [Triumph] came out the other day.

The party's purposes and tasks are spelled out and formulated in the form of program principles, which we present here in full:

1. The Monarchist Party is a political organization endeavoring to restore Georgia's independence and establish a constitutional monarchy.

2. The Monarchist Party will conduct its struggle to restore Georgia's independence exclusively by peaceful, political means.

3. In order to establish a constitutional monarchy in Georgia, the Monarchist Party will resort to the path of parliamentary struggle and referendum.

4. The Monarchist Party considers the Bagration royal house to be the sole lawful royal dynasty in Georgia.

5. The Monarch in an independent Georgia shall be the head of state, whose powers shall be defined by the Constitution.

The country's domestic and foreign policies shall be conducted by the government and by a Parliament elected on the basis of universal democratic elections.

6. The Monarchist Party shall struggle to protect the interests of all Georgians in Georgia and those living outside the territory of Georgia.

7. The Monarchist Party considers Orthodox Christianity to be the state religion and recognizes religious freedom.

8. In a free Georgia, citizens' rights shall be defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Agreement, and other legal documents.

9. The Monarchist Party shall struggle for Georgia's territorial integrity.

10. The Monarchist Party believes that the land of Georgia is the property of the Georgian nation; the Party recognizes four forms of property: private, state, mixed, and cooperative.

11. The Monarchist Party shall struggle to create a multi-party national Parliament.

12. The Monarchist Party declares support for all sound political parties.

The party's purpose and program are also spelled out in detail in the editorial article "Who We Are and What We Want," in which the Monarch is defined as the living embodiment [ikon] of the nation's historical and cultural traditions.

As for the rest of the material:

The newspaper prints Leri Sikharulidze's "Candle and Incense," Akaki Asatiani's "To Whom Does the Georgian

Throne Belong?", and Zurab Askaneli's "Ilia Chavchavadze—One Who Dreamed of the Restoration of the Georgian Kingdom."

It also prints a very interesting document dated 29 October 1917, by which the Georgian nobility donated all its collective property, valued at 30 million gold rubles, to the Georgian nation.

Readers will also find an excerpt from Konstantine Gamsakhurdia's memoirs, "Flirting With Phantoms," and an article depicting the life of Japan's Emperor Hirohito and his son Akihito, titled "The King Is Dead, Long Live the King" (under the rubric "Foreign Survey").

The newspaper has also printed articles dedicated to Merab Kostava and Zurab Chavchavadze.

Issue No 3-4 of NATLISVETI [Pillar of Light], the social-political newspaper of the Georgian National Constitutional Alliance, has come out.

In an item titled "On the Creation of the Georgian National Constitutional Alliance" we read: "The demands of broad segments of society have been recognized, and the activities of the Georgian National Communist Alliance have been halted. It has been replaced by the formation of the Georgian National Constitutional Alliance...." The same item states that the Alliance's Program, which is to be drawn up by a constituent council, is to incorporate the following basic issues: attaining Georgia's full political-economic independence; recognition of collaboration among many parties; legalization of private property; guaranteed protection of human rights and the inviolability of the individual; equal rights for nationalities living in Georgia; legalization of Georgian as the state language; foundation of a national bank; creation of institutions of a national army and state defense; total abolition of censorship; and so on.

Soviet Russia's occupation and annexation of the Georgian Democratic Republic is the subject of Zurab Dzhaniashvili's lengthy article titled "White Horse and Red Banners"; the recent session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet is dealt with in G. Mosulishvili's rejoinder, "Bravo!"; G. Sardzhveladze speaks out against duplicating Georgian magazines and newspapers in Russian ("Time To Stop"); also of interest is Dzh. Zurabidze's idea, in "We're Not All That Badly Off," of selling various leaders' monuments to anyone who wants them.

The newspaper offers materials relating to readers' problems, articles dedicated to the memory of Zurab Chavchavadze and Andrey Sakharov, political riddles, Anzor Abulashvili's verse titled "The Judas Syndrome," Zurab Ratiani's satirical piece "A Very Open Letter to the Very Most Leading Humanity in All the World," and other materials.

Western Media Misinforming on Lithuania

90UN1309B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 24 Mar 90 p 3

[Report by NOVOSTI correspondent Antanas Ragayshis: "Tanks... Via Beer"]

[Text] Voyko Tanev, an employee of the Bulgarian newspaper TRUD, called Novosti's Lithuanian office from Sofia on 22 March and inquired: "Is it true that there are tanks on the streets of Vilnius?" When he heard the reply in the negative, our colleague from Bulgaria explained that such news had been transmitted by Western radios....

The Lithuanian youth paper LETUVOS RITAS (Morning of Lithuania) described the hunt for such sensationalism and the birth thereof under the heading "The Russians Are Coming!"

This is what this paper's correspondent writes: "To be mildly ironic, it has to be said that Western journalists remind me of a herd of zebras moving across the savannah. Zebras move around in search of new pasture and water holes, and journalists seek the 'hottest' sensational news. But both are united and try not to leave one another in the lurch. Today the journalists are in Vilnius, tomorrow they will be in Riga, the day after in Warsaw, then in Vilnius once again, and all together, what is more. If one or several become agitated, the agitation is immediately conveyed to the rest."

The Lithuanian journalist describes how that evening life in the Hotel Letuva was taking its customary course. As usual, the corps of foreign journalists which is now in Lithuania was eating and drinking beer in the foreign currency bar. Nothing could spoil the tranquil evening, it seemed. "But suddenly the rumor that there were tanks on the streets of Vilnius swept through out of the blue," the journalist writes. "The energetic TIMES correspondent burst into the bar and declared that at 2330 hours Supreme Soviet Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis would make a statement for the press. It might from his tone have been assumed that the chairman would be speaking in a building surrounded by troops. The Briton said that he was rushing to the Supreme Soviet building, theatrically threw on his scarf, grabbed his bag and was gone in a flash.... And then it began: leaving their dinners unfinished, cameramen rushed for their equipment and journalists dashed onto the streets to grab taxis. About 10 minutes later the automobiles were driving up to the parliament building."

The journalists were allowed up to the Supreme Soviet chairman's reception room. The secretary knew nothing, either. "There was soon a rumor that Swedish Radio had reported: 'Vilnius is surrounded by the Soviet Army,'" the paper commented. "A group of representatives of Swedish Television, which had also left their dinner, arrived. An American woman of Lithuanian extraction, working in a nearby room crammed with first-class communications equipment and computers, whispered

to her secretary: 'American Lithuanians have just received from the U.S. State Department news that the center of Vilnius is controlled by five Spetsnaz units'."

When the Supreme Soviet chairman emerged from his office, the journalists thirsting for stunning news could learn nothing new. The energetic TIMES correspondent once again made a dash for the telephone and "withdrew" the Soviet tanks from Vilnius. He had, it turned out, already conveyed this sensational news earlier. Then a search was on to find the guilty party who had released the false rumors and interrupted dinner. It transpired that the panic had been raised by BBC correspondents.

Nonetheless, the false information, going by the report of our colleague from Sofia, had flown around the world.

Reorganization in Lithuanian Printed Media

90UN1228B Vilnius *SOVETSKAYA LITVA* in Russian
2 Mar 90 p 1

["Decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau on the reorganization of the weekly VALSTIBES ZHINES and on the status of the newspapers TIYESA, SOVETSKAYA LITVA, and KURYER VILENSKI"]

[Text] Considering the fact that on the basis of the new version of Article 6 of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution a multiparty system is becoming increasingly firmly established in the political life of the republic and that a separation of the functions of party and state is occurring, the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the LiSSR Council of Ministers, and the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau resolve:

1. To reorganize the weekly VALSTIBES ZHINES as a newspaper for the purpose of exercising the official functions of a state press.
2. With regard for the history of the creation and existence of the newspaper TIYESA and its affiliation the whole time to the party budget, and also in connection with the need to separate this newspaper from official functions of a state press, to henceforward consider it the newspaper of the Lithuanian Communist Party.
3. For the purpose of more fully reflecting the opinions of representatives of various nationalities and social strata of the republic, to establish that SOVETSKAYA LITVA and KURYER VILENSKI are the newspapers of the LiSSR Supreme Soviet and the LiSSR Council of Ministers.
4. To instruct the administrations of affairs of the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the LiSSR Council of Ministers, and the Lithuanian Communist Party Central

Committee to determine the procedure of these papers' material-technical support following their change in status.

[Signed] A. Brazauskas, chairman of the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

V. Sakalauskas, chairman of the LiSSR Council of Ministers

V. Berezov, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee

Vilnius, 23 February 1990.

Russian Writers Protest 'Anti-Russian Media Campaign'

Open Letter to Central Committee, Supreme Soviet

90UN1174A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No 9, 2 Mar 90 pp 2-4

[Open letter by various writers: "To the USSR Supreme Soviet, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the CPSU Central Committee: A Letter from the Writers of Russia"]

[Text] In the last few years, under the banner of proclaimed "democratization," the building of a "law-governed state," and the struggle against "fascism and racism," the forces of social destabilization have been unleashed in our country; the successors of blatant racism have advanced to the forefront of ideological perestroika. Their refuge is the multimillion-circulation central periodicals and national television and radio. Mass persecution, defamation, and victimization unprecedented in the entire history of mankind are being inflicted on representatives of the country's core population, who have essentially been declared "outside the law" from the standpoint of that mythical "law-governed state," which, it seems, will have no room for either the Russian or any other core peoples of Russia.

OGONYOK, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, IZVESTIYA, OKTYABR, YUNOST, ZNAMYA, and others, tendentious publications full of ethnic intolerance, arrogance, and hatred, force us to conclude that the main stepchild of the current "revolutionary perestroika" is the Russian people. Daily, representatives of three of its currently living generations, starting with the veterans of the Great Patriotic War who saved the world from Hitlerism, representatives of various social strata and professions—people of Russian descent—are, without any objective foundation, called "fascists" and "racists" in the press or—with intensely biological contempt—"the children of Sharikov," that is descended from dogs. This brings directly to mind Hitler's propagandistic terminology for the Russians, the "lowest" Slavic race.

Russia's entire historical past—pre- and postrevolutionary—is subjected to regular racist abuse.

Russia—the "thousand-year slave," the "dumb retort to slavery," the "serf spirit of the Russian soul," "what can a thousand-year slave offer the world?"—these slanderous clichés regarding Russia and the Russian people, which reject not only the fact but the very possibility of a positive contribution by Russia to world history and culture, unfortunately determine the attitude of the central periodic press and central television to the great, heroic toiler-nation that shouldered the immeasurable burden of creating a multinational state.

"Historically, the Russian character has degenerated, reanimating it means dooming the country once again (?) to lagging behind, which could become chronic"—we read

printed in Russian, on paper manufactured from the Russian forest. The very existence of a "Russian character," a Russian ethnic type, is inadmissible according to this monstrous logic! Today the Russian people are proclaimed a superfluous, profoundly undesirable nation. "This is a nation with a distorted national self-awareness," conclude Soviet political figures and journalists about the Russians. Hoping to dismember Russia, to deprive it of its geopolitical concept, they call her a "country populated by specters," Russian culture "stolen" (!), and the thousand-year Russian state a "utopia." In the press, the aspiration to "extradict" Russians beyond the limits of homo sapiens has taken on the form of clinical, maniacal racism for which there are no analogies, we submit, among all past "annals" of unbridled misanthropy. "Yes, yes, all Russians...the people are schizophrenics. One half is a sadist thirsting for unlimited power, the other is a masochist thirsting for beatings and chains"—this kind of "typology" of the Russians is deliberately spread by Moscow "humanists" in the union republics' press—in order to mobilize all the peoples of the country, including Slavs, against the fraternal Russian people. Today in the mass media of the USSR, Russophobia has overtaken and surpassed foreign, transoceanic anti-Russian propaganda. A characteristic of the local critics and slanderers is their denial of the true nature of their actions, their denial of the indisputable fact of Soviet Russophobia, their refusal to recognize their own trespass against Russia and the Russian people.

His real civil rights violated, defamed as a "slave," as a "phantom" or a "specter," the Russian is at the same time nearly always called a "great power chauvinist" menacing other nations and peoples.

For this the history of Russia is being rewritten, falsely, mockingly, so that the defense of the Fatherland, the sacred heroics of Russian patriotism, are treated as "genetic" aggressiveness, self-fulfilling militarism. "Who has it not warred against?" Central Committee Politburo member A. N. Yakovlev grieves for Russia's "bullies" in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (14 February 1990). "And all this is in our memory. All this shapes consciousness, lingers in the genetic pool.... Psychologically it is a burdensome legacy."

Isn't that why—to alleviate us of the genetic, psychological burden of patriotic military glory—the central press is now denying Russia equally both its victory over Napoleon and its victory over Hitler's Germany? Examples of this kind of shameless lie by the mass media, which are attempting to outshout both Karamzin and his HISTORY OF THE STATE OF RUSSIA and Pushkin's TO THE SLANDERERS OF RUSSIA, and L. Tolstoy's WAR AND PEACE, and the testimony of our still living contemporaries, are truly dishonorable.

Obviously sympathizing with the nationalist movements and fronts (from the Baltic to Moldavia and the Trans-Caucasus), which are permeated with Russophobic tendencies, much of the mass media are saying nothing about the tragedy of the Russian people, its great sacrifices in the

past and present, the numerous pogroms the Russian population is now enduring in the union republics.

On the background of these pogroms, organized in various regions of the country, in the face of tens of thousands of Russian refugees deprived of a haven in their own state, crude provocations aimed at evoking repulsion toward Russians, presenting them in their zoological form—as was done, for example, in the television show “Vzglyad” on 2 February 1990 in connection with a NASH SOVREMENNİK gathering—are becoming more and more frequent in the mass media. The Pamyat bugbear is being blown up provocatively, passed off for a powerfully aggressive force, rather like Hitler’s Abwehr, although it is nothing more, essentially, than a few cardboard characters who in no way can be said to express the worldview of the entire people, to say nothing about the indisputable fact that their amateurish posters, which turn up on television, are not the least bit more nationalistic than the slogans of many “democratic” “popular” fronts in the union republics.

An example of a large-scale provocation ridiculing the honor of numerous peoples of Russia are the concerted efforts of the central press to proclaim the 6th plenum of the RSFSR Union of Writers administration an “anti-Semitic sabbath.” Meanwhile scarcely 70% of the plenum participants represented the fraternal writers of the RSFSR.

By saying nothing about the multinational makeup of the plenum, the democratic mechanism by which decisions were reached, or the unanimity among the overwhelming majority of its multinational participants, the central press is deliberately narrowing public opinion of Russia’s writers, placing only and exclusively Russians at one of the poles of the current literary-ideological confrontation, exclusively Russians, only and specifically them.

Pseudo-internationalists from OGONYOK, KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, NEDELYA, etc. have no use for the unity proclaimed by the plenum. For this powerfully self-assertive unity of views, this awareness of the commonality of national fates for the peoples of Russia, does not agree with the slanderous goal of the press and the central television: to frighten the population of the USSR with “Russian great power chauvinism.” In its “reports” of the 6th Plenum of the RSFSR Union of Writers administration, the central press ignored the speeches of writers from Russia’s autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs, did not find space for them in their numerous pages, and that alone casts grave doubt on the so-called internationalist position of the authors of these provocative “reports.”

An outrageous and, perhaps, “innovative” example of provocation was the instigation of the Leningrad press and television on the eve of the cultural-educational “Russian evenings” planned in Leningrad for writers from Moscow, Vologda, and other cities of Russia. “Political recklessness and irresponsibility,” “a splash of

the nationalistic wave,” which threatens the city with acts of “hooliganism, assaults, and, God forbid, bloodshed”—this is how the provocative, slanderous press depicted the arrival of Russian cultural and literary figures to the “city on the Neva.” You would think it was a matter of a foreign, enemy invasion! You would think the Russian cultural figures were heading not to a Russian city, Russia’s recent capital, but into the gnashed encampment of its despisers, and encroaching upon a foreign land prepared to beat back the aggressors. “Our city must respond by refusing . . . to accept them on Neva ground,” appealed the members of the Leningrad Komsomol Obkom Buro in the newspaper SMENA. “Holding ‘Russian evenings’ could become a destabilizing element for the situation in our city,” raved the workers of the Leningrad Komsomol Obkom, calling over and over for an “organization to rebuff” the Russian visitors.

It is worth noting that nothing of the kind regarding a much more appropriate rebuff was published either by the “Neva” or the other Soviet press on the eve of the gathering in Russia’s capital in December 1989 of approximately 60 representatives from the foremost Zionist organizations of the West and Israel, including S. Dinitz, executive chairman of the World Zionist Organization.

If you really think about the fact that the Leningrad press (and television) wanted to forbid entry into a Russian city to such prominent Russian writers as Vasilii Belov or Vladimir Soloukhin, to front-line soldiers Sergey Vikulov and Mikhail Alekseyev, as well as to the children and grandchildren of those who laid down their lives at the approaches to Leningrad in 1941-44, who built the Road to Life across Lake Ladoga for the sake of aiding Leningrad’s blockaded inhabitants, then what becomes clear is how utterly without parallel this provocative, organized persecution of the best representatives of Russia’s core people is in the world and in history.

This abusive persecution did not abate during the actual week of “Russian evenings” either, despite the popularity of these literary-publicistic, creative evenings among Leningraders. The city was inundated with Russophobic, racist-oriented brochures; there were incidents at the doors of the concert halls where the Russian writers appeared, the visitors required the protection of law enforcement organs. One such unworthy provocation committed by Leningrad journalist A. Repina has been staunchly supported by the all-union newspaper IZVESTIYA, despite a clarification on television by workers from the Leningrad GUVd regarding the provocatress’s feigned injury at the hands of the Russian writers.

One wonders why some journalists put themselves in such an unenviable, humiliating position. Not only do they lie with their own blackened pens, their distorted TV and print shots, which twist people’s racially “unattractive” faces, but they are prepared to make practical insinuations, to fabricate “outrageous” acts in public places where there are many witnesses to the strange, at times rowdy behavior of “objective” journalists.

One form of provocation is hysterical exaggeration, inflation, and forced trashing of undesirable events, even the most local in actual scale.

Such a provocation is the "Open Letter to the Members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo," published in the 6 million-circulation LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (14 February 1990), by the Communists of the splinter organization of Moscow writers known as April. The letter is devoted to the "raid (!) by extremists from Pamyat on the House of Writers," to the "quite well detailed in the papers" (and the central periodicals) "pogrom in the House of Writers."

The "Open Letter" makes it clear that the extremist "raiders," "pogromists" (a group of individuals, as yet unidentified by investigation, who God knows how penetrated the House of Writers, the administration of which bears full responsibility for entry into the House of Writers by nonmembers of the Union of Writers), were armed...with a megaphone. The "Open Letter's" authors equate this megaphone of April's unknown opponents with "the deadliest forms of weapons," with which "our storehouses are filled," our "terrible arsenals." But they place the doubly vulgar incident at the House of Writers itself, which is not without its comic features, on a level with the "tragic events of recent months in Fergana and Azerbaijan."

Even unjust opinion and conduct ought to know some measure in means and forms of argument! But, however annoying the scandalous incident at the House of Writers, the provocation of the April committee's "Open Letter," it would seem, goes well beyond the essence and plot of this manifestly overblown fact. After all, the megaphone of the unidentified raiders at the April meeting incites the "democratic" members of that political organization to want to grab...machine guns. "We have to be able to stand up for ourselves!" the April people write. "There are still enough front-line soldiers among us who have had a good look at a machine gun in their equally hirsute arms. So we can defend ourselves from these raiders." It is telling that this "answering" militaristic pronouncement in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was signed by the women of April (who were scarcely front-line soldiers). Is this the honor and duty of writers, to call for repressions in the face of a stray, and possibly set-up megaphone "opposing" their political passions and, categorically rejecting discussion, to gear themselves, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA'S millions of readers up for no less than civil war?

The accusation against the RSFSR Union of Writers administration is highly provocative and unfounded, as if they had anything to do with the obstruction of April by individuals not belonging to the RSFSR Union of Writers.

The persistent efforts of several organs of the press to lump together the RSFSR Union of Writers with disguised hecklers from the vainglorious wing of Pamyat—a

few inveterate demonstrators—is also highly provocative. It is as if the secretariat of the RSFSR Union of Writers administration had dumped responsibility directly on April for the actions of, let's say, the well-known provocateur A. Norinskiy. The RSFSR Union of Writers and its press organs have refrained from framing the issue in such a way, although—and this cannot be disputed—the aforementioned provocateur owes the notoriety of his acts to some of these very April writers, who even now are scaring the public with the bugbear of Pamyat.

Here it must be stated that undoubtedly the attempt to trace any thought about Russia's resurrection, its political and economic equality, the originality of its historical path, or the uniqueness of its national culture to the posters of the decried, although essentially obscure and self-appointed, individuals from Pamyat serves today as a cover for agenuine racism and neofascism whose considerable forces are united in the USSR Union of Zionists, which possesses militarized detachments of Beytarovites. Shouting hysterically about the threat to mankind, to all the peoples of the USSR from the odious figures from Pamyat, the central press doggedly shades or shamelessly embroiders the ideological essence of Zionism and painstakingly diverts the attention of our country's citizens away from the fact that the Beytar organization, which has been legalized in the USSR, has to its credit not only racist slogans of Jewish national "exclusivity" but has also been implicated in such acts as the slaughter in the camps of Palestinian refugees Sabra and Shatila, in hundreds of bloody crimes, terrorist acts that have made world opinion shudder.

Hiding behind the genuine "brown shirts" of today, unconstitutionally penetrating with their international gathering to the very heart of Russia, Moscow (the Jewish-Zionist conference of 18-21 December 1989), developing practical activity and ultraracist propaganda throughout our country, the "progressive" press, including the Party's press organs, is implanting the blasphemous concept of "Russian fascism," "Russian Nazism," "Russian neonationalism"—phenomena that we have never had in the past and do not now.

Speaking at the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Academician S. S. Shatalin expatiated on how "Great Russian chauvinists," to his, the academician's, "mortification," "have decided to resurrect, on our Russian soil, National Socialism, which...is equivalent to national chauvinism" (PRAVDA, 8 February 1990).

It is characteristic that no one at the Plenum raised any objections to the "mortified" academician and his irresponsible, groundless accusation. Although "the resurrection on our soil of National Socialism" implies that the latter has already occurred on it in the past, it seems that the academician at the least has confused peoples, countries, and soils—Russia with Hitler's Germany, aggressors with the aggressors' victims. This kind of "fuzziness," perhaps, is natural for an educated man hovering among empirical formulas, but is it appropriate

for the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee? It remained unclear what Communist S. S. Shatalin actually knows about "Great Russian" plans to conquer the world and subjugate other peoples. And who exactly does the scholar mean by "Great Russian chauvinists," Nazis, so predatory that they make him blush with shame for Russia?

The bald, provocative lie about "Russian fascism," "conceived long ago" (!)—according to the assurances of the Soviet press—"which for the time being is lying low," apart from everything else, unforgivably mocking the people who vanquished Hitler's fascism in 1945, who saved the world from him, including millions of Jews. This kind of blasphemy looks especially monstrous on the eve of the 45th anniversary of the people's heroic Victory, which closed the ranks of all the peoples of the country, as well as the peoples of Europe.

It is the official mass media, having fabricated the spurious concept of "Russian fascism," who bear moral responsibility for the spread in Moscow and other cities of broadsides with caricatures of Hitler wearing a Russian shirt and blacked boots. And for some reason there has been no mention of the authors, publishers, or distributors of this propaganda being called to criminal responsibility for slander against the Russian people, for blasphemy against the tens of millions of Russians who fell at the front during the Great Patriotic—"the people's, the holy"—War!

In the absence of facts pertaining to "Great Russian fascism," sociopolitical motifs of similar intent clearly find their way into print. IZVESTIYA (19 February 1990) is "plunged into despair," by the harbinger of "tragedy" (!), the "slogan on the square," that is the "poster raised by one hooligan (!)": "Russian teachers for Russian schools." Here it is—"Russian fascism"!—the newspaper sounds the alarm in a review of readers' letters.

As the organ of the Congress of People's Deputies, IZVESTIYA is decisively refusing Russians those very elementary social rights that this newspaper welcomes all the time when it is a matter of any African country, or when analogous rights are strengthened (albeit in hypertrophied form) in the Baltic, Armenia, or Georgia. Thus, IZVESTIYA did not perceive "fascism" in Sh. Amnashvili's speech at the 1st Congress of People's Deputy calling for the development of a "Georgian school," where not only would teaching be conducted in Georgian but children would be educated in national ideals, love for Georgia, and national pride.

We too agree with the people's deputy from Georgia. However, we do not see what in essence distinguishes him from that "one hooligan" who dreamed of a "Russian school" with Russian teachers who would (as Nekrasov said) "instill Russian thoughts in the minds" of Russian children, educating them in the Russian language, Russian thought—"the Russian outlook on life" (Turgenev).

We are led to one inevitable conclusion: The phantom of "Russian fascism" is being called up today to "justify" the lingering and possibly intended thoroughgoing discrimination against Russia.

Was the infamous protest against the creation of the RKP [Russian Communist Party] and even against the Russian Academy of Sciences raised at the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum—by this same Academician Shatalin, just on the heels of his fabrications about "Great Russian National Socialism," "national chauvinism"—merely a coincidence? He made it seem as if the history of the Russian Academy since the time of Mikhail Lomonosov had always stood for just one thing—fascism.

The phantom of "Russian fascism" has been conjured up for various—including foreign policy, naturally—purposes. According to its inventors' intention, it, in conjunction with the mass media, can decisively distract the peoples of our country from any external threat to the state.

The phantom of "Russian fascism," the "antifascist" hysteria in the USSR mass media unleashed on this imaginary grounds, has also been evoked eventually to hamper the possibilities of the unionist blocs of our country and other states in the event of a common external threat.

The fabrication of "Russian fascism" has been planted in order to justify the destruction of the Soviet army, undermining our country's defensive strength.

The lie inculcated in mass consciousness—both here and abroad—about "Russian fascism" was elaborated, in particular, in the name of annulling the foreign policy consequences of the Second World War, the results of the victory of the Soviet Union and the European countries of the anti-Hitler coalition—all the peoples who rose up to rout fascist Germany. The provocative lie about "Russian fascism" is advanced now as a "moral background," profoundly demeaning to Russia, for the unification of Germany. As an ideological way of transforming the victor country into a country covered in shame.

Implanting ideas about "Russian fascism" in fact leads to a "reconceptualization," a categorical abolition from the list of crimes of such realities as betrayal of Russia and collaboration with foreign firms and governments on the basis of betraying the state interests of our country.

As for domestic political consequences, the unbridled lie about "Great Russian national chauvinism" has inflicted (and will inflict) an unprecedented, profoundly calculated blow against the traditional, historical friendship of the peoples of the Soviet country whom "Great Russia has rallied together" and who now may be doomed to a ruinously adventurist political fate.

The feigned horror in the face of "Russian fascism" has reached the point of the absurd, the cheapest provocations, which unfortunately even the top parliamentary press does not disdain. It is dumbfounded, for example ("We must sound the alarm, the chime—whoever, wherever,..." as IZVESTIYA writes), by the "fascistic" desires of Russians to help one another in our common misfortune. "How did it ever happen," the mouthpiece of the Congress of People's Deputies writes in horror, "that the youth newspaper could print such a notice: 'Prepared to shelter the family of a Russian war veteran'? With an address. Does that mean that if a 'swarthy' woman left without shelter were to refer to that address they wouldn't open the door to her?'"

Such, in all its blatant insanity, is the terrorizing Russian, siccing on him the conclusion of the all-union press organ! "Here is the kernel of brutalization"—IZVESTIYA points a finger at the Russian tribe.

But we must also draw a general, much more objective, realistic conclusion equally affecting both the "fair" and the "swarthy" of our compatriots: the ideological, widely financed, and technically equipped anti-Russian campaign that has been unleashed in the USSR mass media can have only one logical, practical result—the establishment in Russia, in the country as a whole, of an uncompromising "regime of Pretoria." After all, it is not hard to note that the moralistic, political tribunal is irresistibly, extensively categorizing all the peoples of the country as "nationalistic," in their own way "chauvinistic," although many of them at the same time are being used for a global anti-Russian campaign. Poisoned against each other and invariably then against the fraternal Russian people, they inevitably will see themselves just as "worthless" as the Russian nation, material for transnational extremists, political gangsters of the ultraleft, tyrannical persuasion, and their historical territory, natural wealth, and cultural values as a subject of international speculation, a source of profit for the "national liberation movement" and mythical "democracy" mafiosi common to all mankind.

Isn't it remarkable that the fabrication of a myth about "Russian fascism" has taken place on the background of the decisive rehabilitation and heedless idealization of Zionist ideology?

This idealization affects equally now both Soviet and foreign cultural and public figures of Jewish descent—including political figures in the fascist aggressor state of Israel. This purely racist idealization has now reached the point of ignoring virtually all world opinion, with its sober judgments and conclusions. Thus, Zionists and pro-Zionists in the Soviet press (among them people's deputies and certain workers in the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee and individual figures in the Politburo) paint the criminal face of Zionism, clean it up, duplicitously assert that "Zionism...has been slandered by the UN," which in 1948 passed over a thousand resolutions condemning Zionist aggression in the Middle East and defining Zionism as a form

of racism and racial discrimination. These Pharisees of "democratization" in national politics are attempting to give Zionism the confessional status of a "spiritual," "religious" movement or the heroic coloring of a "national liberation" (from the Arabs in Palestine, from the Russians in Russia?) movement.

This kind of ahistorical, systematic idealization is a tried and true means for forming a picture of a "super-nation," an "über nation," a higher nation.

An uncritical, saccharine, smarmy, essentially servile attitude toward Jews of the past and present, here and abroad, toward imperialists as well as Zionists, is turning out from the standpoint of the leading mass media to be a prime measure of the personal, public, and professional worth of Soviet people of non-Jewish descent.

Simply formally establishing Jewish nationality of a concrete individual or individuals dooms a Russian (or a Ukrainian, or a Belorussian, or a Chuvash, or an Azerbaijani, et al.) to the stamp of "anti-Semite." This kind of objective identification is deemed an "infringement" on the "rights of man," on the—newly introduced—"national mystery," a "malicious" revelation of it that has been equated to divulging a doctor's or, it seems, even a state secret. For the rights of a "higher" nation in fact include simultaneously both concealment of national identification, and, the obverse, speculation with it (its privileged status) and ethnic self-appointment, a masquerade under a strange name, and nationalistic arrogance. In sum, this guarantees freedom from historical responsibility and even worse from that national "repentance" that is being forced out of other peoples of the country, above all, the Russian people.

In these circumstances even many honest, fair Soviet Jews are not safe from accusations of "anti-Semitism," with all the ominous consequences proceeding therefrom.

In these circumstances even sympathy with the Arab nation in Palestine fighting for its legal rights turns out to be "sowing international strife in the USSR."

In these circumstances, it should be noted with alarm, Russians find themselves under special suspicion for lacking sufficient "appropriate" servileness and humility, although they are "thousand-year slaves"! Despite the historical facts, they are accused of "zoological," sort of innate anti-Semitism. And the Jewish Research Center of the Soviet Sociological Association of the Academy of Sciences is now publishing in VESTNIK YEVREYSKOY SOVETSKOY KULTURY (No 4, 1990) "data" selected by Academician Zaslavskaya about Russia's lead in "manifestations of anti-Semitism" (unnamed, unfortunately) compared with the other republics of our country.

If you think about it, in the backwards mirror of the mass media, everything that is not advantageous—not to Jews as a whole but to Zionists—is "anti-Semitism," "racist torpor," "Russian fascism," "Russian Nazism." And inasmuch as Zionists are particularly oriented to the

interests of the state of Israel, to the self-seeking interests of the black sheep of the Jewish people, what is not advantageous is the absence of anti-Semitism in Russia (which thwarts emigration to Israel, inhibits the privileged status of "political refugee" for Jewish emigrants from the USSR), and the recognition of the absence of anti-Semitism in Russia is interpreted as "anti-Semitism." Such is the casuistry of nationalistic intrigue! This is how the true interests of the many Soviet Jews who do not want to defame their Russian homeland or support the aggressive plans of Israel are undermined. This, we note, is how the objective concept of fascism, which is purposely reduced exclusively to "manifestations of anti-Semitism," is narrowed, misinterpreted. It is as if genuine fascism, too well known from the times of Hitler and Mussolini, had limited itself to the persecution of merely one nation, merely against Jews—and consequently, "there's no such thing" as Zionist fascism or Nazism. Meanwhile that is what has been directly responsible for many pogroms, including Jewish ones. For "circumcising dry branches," the tree of their nation—in Auswenzheim and Dachau, in Lvov and Vilnyus.

In connection with the friendly contacts between the USSR and the state of Israel that have expanded despite the will of the Russian people, the free export of Zionism to our country has become a dangerous reality, and the danger of it for all the peoples of the country has come to the forefront. This danger usually masks itself in various real-life and ideological forgeries. Thus, the explosive, hate- and panic-sowing rumors about impending Jewish pogroms in Leningrad, Moscow, and other cities of Russia are in no way different from all the aforementioned. These rumors have been broadcast on television and fanned by the press nearly every day in recent months.

If you like, we can point out one of the sources of these kinds of rumors.

The aforementioned Jewish VESTNIK reports that a questionnaire was conducted among "the delegates and visitors to the first congress of Jewish societies and organizations" held in Moscow, which included 352 Jewish activists.

"Do you think," inquired the questionnaire, "that a flareup of anti-Semitism accompanied by acts of vandalism, cruelty, and aggression could happen in your location in the near future?" (output of the Jewish Research Center of the Sociological Association, headed by Academician Zaslavskaya).

The blatant provocativeness of this kind of survey, its publicity, and its publication in the press, need no commentary.

These sociological games—under the aegis of the USSR Academy of Sciences and with the approval of the Jewish forum "visitors" in Moscow, among them pillars of international Zionism—were already being played back in

December of last year, anticipating the broad wave of panicked rumors about the "imminent future" of Soviet Jews.

But today the matter has reached the point that other leading party and soviet workers, instead of discovering the sources of the provocative thinking that is alarming—we stress—by no means Jews alone, instead of taking measures against those experts at frightening Soviet people, are calling on the population from the television screen to denounce recklessly anything may even be imagined to have a connection to the "Jewish pogroms."

No other people in our country, even those long since drawn into bloody interethnic conflicts, has been favored with anything like this kind of concern on the part of the "vigilant," "philanthropic," and powerful mass media.

This "concern," however, is looking, in turn, more and more like thinly disguised ethnic provocation, is more and more convincing that one of "the powerful of this world" thirsts for pogroms and, in essence, is paving the way for them by gradually shifting responsibility onto untarnished individuals who have been struggling against the provocations; onto the RSFSR Union of Writers administration, its 6th Plenum, and many of Russia's cultural figures and patriotic organizations.

The ultimate goal of this spreading political provocation is all too clear: having caught innocent people up in the Jews' political machinations, the Jewish pogroms that are today being so powerfully incited on the Russian land would in the end become a bloodbath for the Russian people, and then for the other peoples of the RSFSR as well. "But what if they can't wait for the pogroms?" the most impatient journalists are already asking.

In this respect, the press's trashing of the issue about a specific, exclusive "anti-Semitism law" that would protect one specific nation is very telling. The very framing of this in reality unreal and narrow issue of the privileged status of a select nationality, or of a special law on government protection, attests to the national—essentially nationalistic—prejudice of many mass media. After all, this biased-legislative, national-egotistic issue is being raised in the context of uncounted human sacrifices being borne today by various peoples of the country (but not all of them by any means Jewish)!

There is no doubt that all the peoples of the USSR have an equal right to legislative and practical protection of their national pride and vital interests. Therefore we say a decisive NO both to the provocation (and possible inspiration) of Jewish pogroms as well as to specific legislation benefiting any one people. We say a decisive NO to the intentional scratching of uninflicted wounds—the cultivation and imposition of public hysteria. In a situation of calculated flareups of fratricide in the country, we are profoundly outraged by the hypocritical, speculative press falling into fits of theatrical, melodramatic "horror... at the side of spilled blood"; "there, where it spilled not literally as yet but

figuratively (IZVESTIYA, 19 February 1990). For by exacerbating readers' nerves, this press, while sanctifying figurative sacrifices, is cruelly indifferent to real-life sacrifices. It dismisses both Russian refugees from union republics, the innumerable Slavic victims of Chernobyl, as well as the threat to the very existence of the many "forgotten" peoples of the RSFSR. It shamelessly brands the Russian soldiers going to the slaughter, into the blazing bonfires of interethnic intestine strife—the youth, the hope of the Russian nation sentenced to extinction—as "occupiers."

As for the abovementioned "anti-Semitism law" that has been extorted by the mass media, a group of people's deputies, and several "democratic" fronts and movements, then in the context of everything stated above, this synthetic law is particularly dangerous for the Russian population, which already experienced its effects in full in the 1920s and 1930s. As we know, this was in essence a LAW ON THE GENOCIDE OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE.

The moral blackmail of the patient, good-hearted empathetic Russian people, the daily trampling of its national pride, has reached a degree where the provocateurs ought not to rely so out of hand on the mild and forgiving Russian nature. This unexampled moral terror based on national identification is going on in conjunction with a demographic catastrophe being experienced by the Russian people, with 72 years of economic, social, and political discrimination, with the shameless theft of its natural, labor, and cultural riches. The status of the Russian people in its own state is so bad that it is worthy, alas, of becoming an object of paramount, extraordinary concern by the United Nations and the Security Council. Only blind or sold-out politicians could expect the demise of the Russian people, who have played such a great role in modern world history, not to have a tragic effect on the destinies of the entire world, especially the West. Only paranoid maniacs, having surpassed such teachers of theirs as Trotskiy and the "strategists" of the Third Reich, could, blackening the Russian sky, assert in our press the catechism of suicidal malice: "Russia must be destroyed... It very nearly is already, but Koshchei's egg is intact."

It is worth remembering, by the way, that the people, once led to the brink of despair, are capable at times of throwing out all "computer" calculations of its resigned death.

Cynical citations of "pluralism of opinion," so fashionable in the mass media (which have been advancing, however, down a monopolistic path), illusions of a "dialogue among equals," ostensibly guaranteed by the "epoch of glasnost," as they are cast down upon us from the highest tribunals, cannot allieve our alarm, grief, or anger.

There cannot be two, let alone "multiple," opinions with respect to the total—across the entire historical retro- and prospective—abuse of the Russian (or any other) people.

There cannot be a dialogue among equals between a people defamed as a nation of "slaves," or even as "Sharikov dogs," on one hand, and representatives of a "higher," privileged force "chosen" for rule and government, on

another. By no stretch of the imagination do these basic principles of "dialogue," which have triumphed in the years of "democratic" perestroika, offer the Russians either a moral or a material base that would guarantee true equality. Under these circumstances, "dialogue" tends to something more like deadly single combat.

We demand an end to the anti-Russian, anti-Russia ideological campaign in the press, radio, and television. We demand an immediate and categorical prohibition against all types of Russophobia throughout the entire territory of Russia and the other soviet socialist republics. We demand a fair redistribution of the print media in favor of Russia to correspond to the RSFSR's material-economic contribution to the country's monetary funds, to genuinely serve the interests of the Russian people and the other peoples residing in the Russian Federation, and to conform to the numbers of each. We demand equal rights for the RSFSR with the other union republics in volume of television and radio broadcasting. These powerful mass media, which play a monopolistic role in the formation of public opinion and the ideological education of the population, must in the RSFSR be directed wholly to the pains, worries, hopes, and national ideals of the Russian people themselves and the other peoples of our federation whose fate is closely tied to it.

Ratio: 1.5 million overall circulation of patriotic periodicals in the Russian language, as against 60 million (not counting the sea of "informal" newspapers and journals) circulation of Russian-language but Russophobic periodicals that offend the national pride of the Russian people—this ratio is absolutely intolerable as well as destructive for Russia!

In addition, we call on all Russian people—workers, peasants, the national intelligentsia:

Despite all the misfortunes, oppression, humiliation, inflicted in the 20th century on our people, always remember the national pride of the Great Russians willed to us by our glorious ancestors, by Russia's thousand-year history; Every day remember that we Russians are a highly talented, heroically valiant, spiritually powerful people who know the joy of thoughtful, constructive labor. The "Russian nature," the "Russian heart," the selfless Russian devotion to truth, the Russian sense of justice, compassion, truth, and finally, ineradicable, whole-hearted Russian patriotism—no one can ever remove all this from the repository of the human soul.

LET US TAKE HEART! LET US TAKE OUR HOMELAND'S—RUSSIA'S—FATE IN OUR OWN HANDS!

Vitaliy Maslov (Murmansk), Sergey Alekseyev (Vologda), Yuriy Kuznetsov (Moscow), Petr Proskurin (Moscow), Leonid Leonov (Moscow), Vladimir Lichutin (Moscow), Viktor Likhonosov (Krasnodar), Karem Rash (Moscow), Fedor Sukhov (Gorkiy), Anatoliy Ivanov (Moscow), Mikhail Vishnyakov (Chita), Nikolay Voronov (Moscow), Boris Bursov (Leningrad), Irina Strelkova (Moscow), Victor Kochetkov (Moscow), Vladimir Bushin (Moscow), Tatyana Glushkova

(Moscow), Tamara Sablina (Omsk), Mikhail Lobanov (Moscow), Boris Lapin (Irkutsk), Yegor Isayev (Moscow), Vladimir Bondarenko (Moscow), Anatoliy Znamenskiy (Krasnodar), Sergey Lykoshin (Moscow), Oleg Mikhailov (Moscow), Anatoliy Vasilevskiy (Vladimir), Nikolay Doroshenko (Moscow), Sergei Vikulov (Moscow), Dmitriy Zhukov (Moscow), Stanislav Kitayskiy (Irkutsk), Stanislav Kunyayev (Moscow), Eduard Skobelev (Minsk), Arseniy Larinov (Moscow), Valentin Rasputin (Irkutsk), Yuriy Prokushev (Moscow), Margarita Nogteva (Moscow), Valeriy Murzakov (Omsk), Vilyam Kozlov (Leningrad), Yuriy Sbitnev (Moscow), Apollon Kuzmin (Moscow), Rostislav Filippov (Irkutsk), Igor Shafarevich (Moscow), Vladislav Shapovalov (Belgorod), Vadim Kozhinov (Moscow), Tatyana Chetverikova (Omsk), Aleksandr Prokhanov (Moscow), Viktor Petelin (Moscow), Sergey Panyushkin (Lipetsk), Mayya Ganina (Moscow), Valentin Sorokin (Moscow), Mikhail Godenko (Moscow), Mikhail Petrov (Kalinin), Sergey Voronin (Leningrad), Nikolay Shundik (Moscow), Galina Litvinova (Moscow), Viktor Korotayev (Vologda), Viktor Kalugin (Moscow), Vladimir Kruptin (Moscow), Yuriy Borodkin (Yaroslavl), Petr Vykhodtsev (Leningrad), Grigoriy Kalyuzhnyy (Moscow), Petr Palamarchuk (Moscow), Aleksandr Bologov (Pskov), Aleksandr Segen (Moscow), Vladilen Mashkovtsev (Magnitogorsk), Lev Knyazev (Vladivostok), Oleg Kochetkov (Moscow), Vladimir Shirikov (Vologda), Viktor Smirnov (Smolensk), Nikolay Kuzin (Sverdlovsk), Yuriy Loshchits (Moscow), Nikolay Shipilov (Novgorod), Valeriy Rogov (Moscow), Boris Sporov (Moscow).

'April' Group Counters Protest

90UN1174B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 10, 7 Mar 90 p 2

[Article commissioned by the 'April' soviet by Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, Anatoliy Pristavkin, Vadim Sokolov, Yuriy Chernichenko, and Mikhail Shatrov, cochairs of the organization committee of the 'April' All-union Writers Association: "National Pride But Not Imperial Arrogance"]

[Text] When a malicious handful of hooligans are called "Sharikov's children" with Bulgakovan sarcasm and someone imagines Russophobia if not "genocide of the Russian people" in it, it's funny. But it is not at all funny when they try to do a blood analysis on the pages of newspapers and magazines in order to determine who wrote it—a "genuine Russian" patriot or only a "Russian speaker"?

It is both senseless and impossible to argue with the "Letter" by seventy-four "writers of Russia," who are interrogating all literature and all society under torture in the name of Russia, in the name of a "Great Russia" out of a hymn that has justly lost its text. If they believe what's written, real facts and circumstances are not going to change their minds. And if they themselves don't

believe it (which is more likely), then it makes even less sense to try to convince them.

Cries of Russophobia, of "Zionists and pro-Zionists in the Soviet press," among them "people's deputies and certain workers in the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee and individual figures in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo," is the last trump of the anti-perestroika forces. Manifesto 74, whose very first lines place ironic quotation marks around both democratization, and law-governed state, and revolutionary perestroika, demolishes the myth about universal and unanimous support for the current, tragically difficult revitalization.

"It is obvious that only a literature that is universal is also genuinely national," as Belinskiy wrote. It has never occurred even to these vulgar gentlemen to contemptuously call Pushkin a "Russian-speaking writer" for his Ethiopian blood or Lermontov for this Scottish blood.

The Russian intelligentsia's national pride never spilled over into imperial arrogance. All aggressive nationalisms, including chauvinism, are anti-Christian, anti-humane, and anti-intellectual. Chauvinism is the attempt to turn descent into privilege. Chauvinism is careerism with a blood certificate. Chauvinism is the first sign of carefully concealed lack of talent or talent beginning to break down. An aggressive inferiority complex transforms imperial arrogance into imperial paranoia.

The strident Manifesto 74 is like a manifesto of one's own persecution mania, to which seemingly only seemingly pursued Russian patriot-writers are seemingly subject. Let us recall that quite recently these same "persecuted" drove the editor-in-chief, front-line soldier and writer M. Kolosov, out of that same LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA. Among the "persecuted" who signed this manifesto there are those who also drove Pasternak out of the Union of Writers, Tvardovskiy out of NOVIY MIR, and Solzhenitsyn out of his native land. There are also those Stalinists who to this day, as they themselves express it, stand as unshakable as a cliff. There are those who wrote hymns to the war in Afghanistan. There are those who were not too shy to insult the too soon deceased Vysotskiy. There are those who allowed anti-Semitic attacks. There are those who advised setting up a "reservation" for minority peoples.

Leonov's signature is distressing, for it is impossible to imagine the signatures of his departed contemporaries—Bulgakov, Platonov, Paustovskiy, Kazerin—beneath the words of this manifesto.

It is sad that certain other key writers in our literature put their names alongside names of people long since compromised by history. It is these key writers in our literature to whom we direct our appeal not to take up the path of exhausting mutual enmity between peoples and their writers, not to make Russian national pride into their own private property and take it away from everyone else. Think carefully about the dangerous

absurdity of a manifesto that asserts that a synthetic anti-Semitism law is "especially dangerous for the Russian population." Is an anti-apartheid law really dangerous to the entire white population on earth rather than to concrete racists in concrete countries? The manifesto calls the blatantly racist sortie into the Central House of Writers a "doubly vulgar incident, which is not without its comic features." That's quite a comedy when the actors shout that today they've come with a megaphone but tomorrow they'll bring machine guns. To some people the first stormtroopers' meetings also seemed nothing more than vulgar, comic incidents. Does history really teach us nothing?

The genocide directed against the Russian people and all the peoples of our country was the direct result of the terrible "international nationality"—from the mucky-mucks of all shades who were and remained nothing but simultaneously became everything. We cannot allow such genocide to be repeated.

Soon two writers plenums are to be held—all-union and Russian. Perhaps there it will at last be clarified who has granted the composers of such manifestos the moral and professional right to act in the name of the "writers of Russia." We believe that the writers of Russia, and not only Russia, will render an unequivocal opinion of act 74.

Kazakh 'Aprel' Writers Group Formed

90UN1245B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 12, 21 Mar 90 p 7

[Article by A. Samoylenko, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's staff correspondent for the Kazakh SSR: "Aprel' in March"]

[Text] The support of all writers who are fighting for the triumph of restructuring, the active promotion of literature's international mission, and the fight against manifestations of chauvinistic and nationalistic ideas and recurrences of Stalinist ideology in literature. Such are the main positions in the program of the society recently formed in Alma-Ata under the name of "Kazakhstan Aprel—Writers in Defense of Restructuring."

And so, Kazakhstan Aprel has been announced, its program has been published, and the organizational committee of the All-Union Aprel Writers' Association has given its first members their membership cards. We must welcome and congratulate the first republic "division" of the All-Union Aprel, express hope, wish it—And ask a few "mercenary" questions, the resolution of which will determine whether the Kazakhstan Aprel becomes a reality of the republic's sociopolitical and literary life, or whether what awaits it, instead of the "promotion of restructuring," is an exhausting and fruitless altercation with the apparatus, which feels that "its own" writers, "its own" literature and "its own" Writers' Union are quite enough in the republic today.

How does Kazakhstan Aprel intend to "support," "promote" and "resist," if (as the Aprel members reckon), it has

no publishing house, magazine or newspaper? In its program initiatives, Kazakhstan Aprel does not count on the existing republic newspapers and magazines. Is this aplomb or justifiable mistrust? It is more likely the latter. The founders of the republic Aprel society (and they include writers such as M. Simashko, Sh. Yeleukenov, Yu. Gert, S. Sanbayev, G. Chernogolovin, M. Auezov and others, who are extremely well-known in the republic and the country) cite a whole series of instances in which the Kazakhstan mass media have refused to publish their articles and essays containing criticism of Stalinism and of works promoting great-power ideology and national arrogance. The founders of Kazakhstan Aprel have currently begun negotiations with a joint Soviet-French printing firm located far away from Kazakhstan for the publication of their anthology. And for the time being they are publishing in NEVA, DRUZHBA NARODOV, OKTYABR and LITERATURNYY KIRGIZSTAN, having been turned down in advance by Kazakhstan's newspapers and magazines.

During the days when Kazakhstan Aprel was announcing itself, candidates were being nominated for Kazakh SSR people's deputy. The Aprel members' program could not better fit the criteria that are being applied today for future members of the republic's parliament. However, strangely enough, there is not a single Aprel member among the 20 writers who have been nominated as candidates for people's deputy. The candidates are all secretaries, chairmen and directors. And in my view, that indicates that "ordinary writers," such as the members of Kazakhstan Aprel are, will not have an easy time of it in their future sociopolitical activity.

And a final question that all members of the USSR Writers' Union are asking today: Is Aprel an organic part of the Writers' Union or an independent writers' organization? "We are together with the Writers' Union," say the founders of Kazakhstan Aprel. But what does that "together" consist of, if there is not a single executive of the Writers' Union in Kazakhstan Aprel, if anthologies of the Public Affairs Writer Club were shelved by the Kazakhstan Sociopolitical Izdatelstvo before the very eyes of those executives (and it was that club that last year became a center for the consolidation of Aprel's members), and if "leftist" articles by members of Kazakhstan Aprel are not published in republic newspapers and magazines? The Aprel members are together with the Writers' Union. But is the Writers' Union together with Aprel?

Kazakhstan Aprel announced its existence in March. Such a thing does not happen in nature. From every indication, it is premature in Kazakhstan's literary life, as well. Yet after March, Aprel inevitably follows. And is it possible that tomorrow it will be timely?

Writers Union Selection Process Described

90UN1245A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 12, 21 Mar 90 p 7

[Interview with V. Smirnov, chairman of the Moscow Writers' Organization acceptance commission, conducted by T. Rasskazova: "We Ask You to Consider"]

[Text] LG readers who do not belong to the literary periphery may be interested in knowing how people who simply write turn into members of the Writers' Union. How does this happen with Muscovites, for example? Eight times a year (and, when necessary, nine or ten times), the acceptance commission of the Moscow Writers' Organization meets in order to consider candidates presented by the bureaus of the creative associations. The number of them is known ahead of time. Three or four prose writers, two poets, one playwright, etc. Approximately 12 people are considered at one session. In the event they are successful, the candidates are submitted for confirmation by the secretariat of the Moscow Organization's board. In short, there is a three-stage structure.

Granted, in the words of V. Smirnov, chairman of the Moscow Organization's acceptance commission, sometimes a year or two, or even more, goes by between meetings of the creative section's bureau.

[Rasskazova] Viktor Vasilyevich, why are talented people forced to wait in such a slow-moving line?

[Smirnov] If an association has discovered a new "star" in its genre, it can ask the commission to consider his acceptance out of turn and over and above the quota. So the paths are open for talent.

[Rasskazova] So the commission has to like him?

[Smirnov] No, the association does. We are an entity that to some extent checks on the associations' work but does not dictate to them. In order to pass the acceptance commission, a candidate has to get two-thirds of the votes of those present. A decision is made by secret ballot. In the case of open voting it immediately becomes known who has voted against whom, and in the present situation that would cause dissension and reproaches. A quorum is two-thirds of the commission's membership. Today it has 38 members.

[Rasskazova] In what case is it possible to submit a dispute to the secretariat?

[Smirnov] In the case of a "shortfall" of two or three votes, if the association believes that the acceptance commission has made a mistake. Approximately 30-35 percent of the candidates are turned down by both the acceptance commission and the secretariat.

[Rasskazova] How would you explain the many cases that have been made public in recent years in which known, widely published authors applying through the Moscow Organization have been turned down at various stages of the acceptance process? They include V. Pyetsukh, A. Parshchikov and M. Pozdnyayev. T. Tolstaya had difficulties joining, and just recently A. Borovik was turned down for admission to the union.

[Smirnov] You are simply calling attention to individual names, yet that sort of thing has always happened. Incidentally, Pyetsukh has long been a union member. The bureau of the poets' creative association has not presented Parshchikov and Pozdnyayev to us. As for

Tatyana Tolstaya, she "breezed through" the acceptance commission. But two appearances on foreign radio immediately after that served, as I suppose, to provoke the displeasure of the Secretariat, which did not admit her on the first try, but then admitted her all the same. In general, there is nothing criminal about that, because Tolstaya's talent won out. But I do not consider her personal conduct entirely proper. She tried to gain admission to the writers' organization, but as soon as she had passed the commission she literally fulminated against the Writers' Union as a "community of retrogrades." Where is the logic there?

[Rasskazova] Is it possible that people are admitted to the union not for their talent alone, but for their conduct?

[Smirnov] That happens at every step, and not just with us. We are all very politicized today. I should say that at our last meeting we had serious statements made against Artem Borovik. A statement was made that his sentence to the effect that the war in Afghanistan was like a sex act committed by an impotent man, aroused anger among the military. Nonetheless, Borovik passed the acceptance commission, but he was turned down by the Secretariat.

[Rasskazova] And can it happen that a decision by the commission is determined by people who have not read a candidate's books? That is, don't you play the role of an office that simply puts on its seal, its visa?

[Smirnov] Yes, we listen to reviewers and ask questions. The reviewers' prestige is extremely important. In certain cases, especially controversial ones, the commission members are well acquainted with all the texts. N. Shmelev, say, was read by the majority of commission members (as were T. Tolstaya, V. Pyetsukh and others), but the reviewers' opinions were divided (that happened twice). As a result, he fell short by two or three votes. But since a clear majority voted for admission, the Secretariat had every reason to admit him. With regard to Yu. Shchekochikhin's books, the reviewers noted that they were not so much the works of a writer as those of a journalist, although a lot of good things were said about him as a journalist and public figure. I will not be revealing any big secret if I note that a writer's political activity plays a certain role, and judgments get mixed up.

[Rasskazova] Are you referring to the fact that not everyone likes Yu. Shchekochikhin's political personality?

[Smirnov] I wouldn't say personality, but the decision might have been affected by Shchekochikhin's television appearance in which he told in rather panicked tones about the row caused on 18 January in the Central House of Writers. His statement was so strong that I had friends phoning me and telling me that they were packing their bags and getting ready to go to Israel. I had to try to calm them down and explain that that row was a highly isolated episode that should not be regarded in such a way.

We have had cases even more serious than the one involving Shchekochikhin, in which we have rejected an

author unconditionally, rather than postponing admission until his next book. That is what happened with Yuriy Azarov, the author then of five books, and now of eight. The decision may have also been influenced by the fact that he is a doctor of pedagogical sciences, a different sphere of occupation. Although that was not the main thing.

[Rasskazova] So the acceptance commission takes all sorts of subsidiary motives into account: a beginning writer's material situation, a mature journalist's political views, a candidate's affiliation with a different sphere of activity, other than writing. And how is purely literary quality taken into account? After all, not everyone even reads what they are voting for or against.

[Smirnov] The writing, of course, comes first. But if, all other factors being equal, a dispute arises, lots of subjective arguments come into play. After all, that sort of thing happens everywhere, no matter for what you are being considered—admission to the party, a job, etc.

[Rasskazova] Tell me, if it were in your power, how would you improve the procedure for admission to the union?

[Smirnov] There have been a lot of proposals on this score. One of them is for the creative associations to have the first and last—that is, the only—word. But I assure you that the influx of writers—what's more, not the very best—would increase severalfold. The system would be ruined. Another idea has come up: create a small acceptance commission consisting only of prominent writers. However, that would be a very difficult job—reading numerous books, writing reviews, attending meetings, enduring heated debates. There are even cases in which anonymous threats are made over the phone after discussions. I would not change the structure. The key is the people. Those who consider applicants for admission, and those who apply.

[Rasskazova] Does someone who has been hopelessly rejected have any possibility of appealing?

[Smirnov] Technically he is supposed to get back in line for consideration by the bureau. But if the bureau says to us, "comrades, this person has just had another book published, and we ask you to consider it out of turn," we will meet that request, of course.

[Rasskazova] Don't you think that it is the acceptance system, in part, that prompts people to engage in polemics with the union and attempt to discredit it? Why should a person constantly be asking someone to "petition" for him, if his professional qualities are obvious? And don't you have a sense of the acceptance commission's subjectiveness?

[Smirnov] Are professional qualities always obvious? I'm not sure. But, first of all, I would like to note that all the commission members are nominated by the bureaus of the creative associations democratically, that is, "from below." And if the acceptance commission is not

without its shortcomings, they are all reflections of the actual situation in the organization as a whole. Secondly, as far as I can recall, the chairman of the acceptance commission used to always be a party member: it was considered an area of party work and party control. I am the first chairman who is not a party member; I am not even acquainted with the secretary of our party committee. And in my six months as chairman I have felt no pressure from it along the lines of: take a look at so-and-so. People decide everything for themselves. The difficulties experienced by the acceptance commission today are associated with the democratic process by which decisions are made.

If it is possible not to touch the existing structures, let's wait! I am afraid that right now breaking them up would bear the mark of political strife and would lead to confusion and uncontrolled admissions. Incidentally, matters of admission to the Writers' Union are presently being simplified. One stage is disappearing. It is proposed that the Secretariat of the Moscow Writers' Organization not review positive decisions by the acceptance commission but merely confirm them. In that case, the right to appeal on the part of those whom the commission turned down would remain in force: that would reduce possible mistakes to a minimum.

[Rasskazova] Without commenting on V. Smirnov's words, let us name all the members of the acceptance commission [for the first time in LG]: D. Urnov, S. Kryzhanovskiy, N. Bannikov, V. Bogatyrev, V. Bondarenko, I. Velembovskaya, R. Vinonen, Yu. Galkin, V. Gorbachev, N. Doroshenko, N. Durov, M. Yeregin, V. Ilyin, R. Kafrielyants, Ya. Kostyukovskiy, P. Koshel, M. Kudinov, I. Kuznetsov, N. Kuzmin, Ye. Lebedev, I. Lyapin, A. Menkov, O. Mikhaylov, S. Mnatsakanyan, N. Panchenko, A. Poperechnyy, V. Razdolskiy, B. Rakhmanin, R. Sef, A. Skalon, Yu. Skop, N. Starshinov, V. Semenov, V. Surganov, N. Tomashevskiy, G. Bazhenov, V. Sukachev. Until recently E. Safonov, S. Rybas and A. Borshchagovskiy also served on the commission.

Institute Rector on Economic Independence of Higher Schools

90UN1084A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 9, 3-9 Mar 90 p 5

[Interview with G. Vyatkin, candidate for RSFSR people's deputy, rector of the Chelyabinsk Polytechnical Institute, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by Yu. Savin: "For Power One Has to Fight"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The restructuring of the higher school and our country has given greater economic independence to the VUZ's. Among those which have not simply used the freedoms granted, but are actively developing the self-management of the VUZ's, is the Chelyabinsk Pedagogical Institute. G. Vyatkin, candidate for RSFSR people's deputy, rector of the Chelyabinsk Pedagogical Institute,

and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, tells us about the problems which his collective is encountering.

[Savin] Chelyabinsk is one of the largest "closed" cities in the Urals. What problems are its inhabitants encountering, among them—28,000 students and teachers of the Chelyabinsk Institute?

[Vyatkin] 95 percent of the industrial output in our oblast is produced in enterprises belonging to union ministries. Practically the entire profit is going to the state, and nothing remains for the development of the oblast. The "closed city" status of Chelyabinsk does not give us the opportunity to develop international links in the appropriate volume. I repeatedly appeared in the obkom buro with proposals, such as, how to solve the food and housing problem in the city, but I did not find support. And then I decided to put all my cherished dreams into effect in my institute.

[Savin] Your VUZ is considered now to be almost a model in the Union. What has been done at the Chelyabinsk Pedagogical Institute that is so unusual?

[Vyatkin] We have gone over to complete "self-management." Above all, we have repudiated the patronage assistance to villages, we have ceased to send there "for a potato," but on the other hand we have started to contribute money for the construction of vegetable storage facilities there, houses for the peasants (in the last year alone, a student detachment handed over 1,000 square meters of housing for the workers of the Novyy Mir Sovkhoz), and processing complexes. For this we receive from the village, on a contractual basis, agricultural produce at advantageous prices (if it is not available in the stores of the city). We have practically put our entire profit into the computerization of academic classes. That decision was taken by the collective of the Chelyabinsk Polytechnical Institute itself—they decided even to wait with the construction of housing for staff members. In our VUZ there is one of the youngest doctoral corps in the country, young people in our oblast have somewhere to develop—and this is not simply a word.

[Savin] And how much does your graduate "cost" the national economy?

[Vyatkin] The Chelyabinsk Pedagogical Institute is one of the largest VUZ's of the country. From the "deliveries" of our graduates to enterprises in the Urals and Siberia alone, we received 3 million rubles in profits during the past year. On the average, the "price" of a specialist from the Chelyabinsk Pedagogical Institute comes to 3,000-25,000 rubles. The commodity, as they say, goes like hotcakes.

[Savin] But if you are elected as deputy, you will, it seems, have to leave the Chelyabinsk Pedagogical Institute.

[Vyatkin] I believe that in the parliament there must certainly be a group of professionals, but there must also be people who must work there "as a rule," that is without leaving their previous place. As far as my views on the present situation in the country are concerned, the key to success in society lies in the speediest implementation of reforms in the party.

The crisis in society is connected with the monopoly of power. As a result of this, the whole accumulated negative during the entire history of the Soviet state has come down precisely on the party. I believe that people, in any circumstances, must without fail have a choice, but the processes of changes in society are, unfortunately, moving slowly up to now. But, indeed, it is extremely dangerous to test the patience of the people for long.

Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Official On Religious Conflict

90UN1059B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 7, 12-18 Feb 90 p 16

[Interview with Nikolay Kolesnik, chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, by Zinoviya Kovtuna: "Everyone's Right To His Beliefs"]

[Text] Kiev—[Kovtuna] Nikolay Afanasyevich, lately the mass media have been devoting more and more attention to events taking place on religious grounds in the Ukraine's western oblasts. They are reporting on a veritable battle that Eastern-rite Catholics are waging against the Orthodox. Orthodox churches are being seized without authorization. Priests who faithfully served their parishoners for many years are being driven out of them. Things have reached the point of fisticuffs. There have been casualties. What is going on? Why have believers of that religion forgotten one of the primary Christian teachings of love for one's fellow man?

[Kolesnik] Unfortunately, all those things are taking place. But to understand this conflict even partially, it is necessary to turn to the past. For that is where the root of this evil is to be found.

The Catholic Church has long sought to unite with the Orthodox. The first such attempt was made in the 13th century (the so-called Lyon Uniate). It was not recognized in the Orthodox East. It was followed by the equally unsuccessful Florentine Uniate (in the 15th century). And only in the 16th century, when the western lands of the Ukraine and Belorussia were seized by Poland and Hungary, did an opportunity arise to implant a Uniate, which is to say a union of Orthodoxy and Catholicism in which most Orthodox rites are preserved. The authority of the Pope was recognized in the process. The Uniate was proclaimed at a church synod in Brest in 1596. Initially Orthodox believers were compelled to switch to the Uniate by force. But as the centuries went by, the Uniate church failed to take root in most of the Ukraine. But in the western lands, which

incorporated in Catholic states for many years, the church did take root and became traditional for part of the population.

In 1946, after the unification of all Western lands into a single state, a synod of the Greek Catholic Church that was held in the city of Lvov took the decision to sever the Uniate with Rome and, as was written at the time, to return to the bosom of the ancestral Russian Orthodox church.

[Kovtuna] But as we know, neither the Vatican, the Uniate clergy, nor a segment of the believers recognized the Lvov Synod's decisions. They continue to maintain that they were victims of the Stalinist repressions and the arbitrary conduct of local authorities, and that the turn to Orthodoxy was a result not of the expression of a majority of believers' will but of violence to their conscience. What is your view of this?

[Kolesnik] I don't think you and I have to determine whether the Lvov Synod was of a canonical nature and had the power to decide various matters. This is an affair of the church itself. I can only point out that the serious investigator will call attention to the fact that both the Brest and the Lvov synods were organized according to the same scenario. In the first instance, King Sigismund III and the Pope organized and blessed the holding of the Brest Synod, although the Patriarch of Constantinople, the Orthodox hierarchy, was against it. In the second case, our government, as well as the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church (RPTs), ignoring the Vatican's view, promoted the convening of the synod.

But let's be objective. At the time, the Great Patriotic War had just come to a victorious end. During that war, the Soviet people sustained enormous human and material losses. A period began in which all those forces that had collaborated with the occupation forces were called to account. Among these forces were many clergymen of the Greek Catholic Church. Naturally, rank and file believers viewed them accordingly. And how were they to regard hierarchs who had compromised not only themselves but also the Uniate Church? Think about it.

[Kovtuna] I agree. The decisions of the Lvov Synod were foreordained. But among its participants were quite a few patriots, religious people convinced of their rightness, such as, for example, Gavriil Kostelnik and others who sincerely sought unification with the RPTs. It's no accident that a large segment of the clergy and believers followed them. But there were others as well—ordinary believers, and also clergymen, who in no way besmirched themselves during the fascist occupation but who nonetheless suffered only because they remained faithful to their previous religious convictions. Some concealed their faith, while others gathered for worship services illegally. And this has gone on for 43 years.

[Kolesnik] Yes, that is the reality. But Greek Catholics are not the only ones who suffered during those years; adherents of other religions suffered too. Orthodox churches and monasteries were closed, and religious

associations of Evangelical Christian Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and others were disbanded. The view existed that, as the building of developed socialism proceeded, religion would certainly become extinct.

Perestroyka of all spheres of our life and the democratization of Soviet society have made it possible to take a fresh look at state-church relations. Important steps have now been taken on the path to fuller exercise of freedom of conscience and to the further strengthening of legality in this sphere. Local authorities are taking an attentive view of believing citizens' needs. As a result, the number of religious congregations in the Ukraine was increased by 40 percent in the past two years, and nearly 2,000 church buildings have been opened.

It is in this same context that one must view the statement of the Council for Religious Affairs to the effect that Eastern-rite Catholics can create their own religious communities, register them in the prescribed procedure, resolve matters relating to the place where prayer meetings are to be held, and freely practice their religion. In other words, the Greek Catholic Church has finally acquired legal status.

Most Ukrainian Catholics have welcomed the government's decision. Believers are applying to local Soviet executive committees for registration of their religious congregations. They are expressing wishes having to do with creating conditions for the holding of worship services and with resolving matters pertaining to church buildings, clergymen, and so forth. In a word, this humanitarian step has met with approval abroad.

And here we return to your first question. What is happening? Why this impatience, why so much emotion? For time is needed to form appropriate hierarchical structures for the new church. This depends not only on the state but also on the leadership of the Catholic and Orthodox churches, whose interests are closely intertwined in this region.

[Kovtuna] Are you talking about a new church?

[Kolesnik] Precisely. The RPTs rejects the Uniate and does not recognize that artificial symbiosis. Why should state agencies interfere in this purely theological question? For this reason we are registering Greek Catholic congregations as new religious associations. But "rights defenders" in Lvov and various unofficial organizations close to the church disagree with this. They are demanding that the state refuse to recognize the decisions of the 1946 Lvov Synod, that it "rehabilitate" the Greek Catholic Church, and that it compensate the church for losses incurred. The absurdity of these claims against official bodies is obvious. I repeat: In our country, church and state are separate, and therefore we have no right to intervene in its internal affairs, including the deeds of church synods.

But it seems to me that Eastern-rite Catholic activists aren't at all interested in resolving these problems, since they have used them for many years to further their own

political aims. How else is one to assess their instigatory actions in forcibly seizing Orthodox churches, even if the churches were Uniate in the past? Or their unauthorized rallies with public prayers, at which various provocative slogans are to be heard, such as "down with the occupation forces" and "Orthodox believers [za zbruch]." Such actions are criminally punishable, as they incite religious enmity and could have tragic consequences.

[Kovtuna] Extremist sentiments and illegal actions have never had positive results. What do you see as a way out of this situation?

[Kolesnik] First, it is essential to strictly observe legality where the religions are concerned, on both sides. The republic's Eastern-rite Catholics have the right to practice their religion, as do members of any other religion in our country. But the state can hardly show a preference for some believers at the expense of others. Why should it tolerate illegal, forcible actions? The Council for Religious Affairs will not register or work to resolve pressing matters concerning those congregations that act unlawfully, seize church buildings without authorization, and incite religious enmity.

In Ivano-Frankovsk, it seemed that the conflict between Eastern-rite Catholics and Orthodox over the Resurrection Cathedral would be a protracted one. But common sense and goodwill came to the rescue. The local authorities took the wishes of both sides into consideration. The Resurrection Cathedral was turned over to the Eastern-rite Catholics (they had occupied it up till 1946), while a no less majestic cathedral that used to house a museum was returned to the Orthodox.

As you see, state agencies are looking for ways to resolve the questions that have arisen. For their part, the leadership of the Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches are trying to resolve their internal problems at the negotiating table. Their representatives met in Moscow in January of this year. They worked out a whole series of recommendations that will make it possible to normalize relations between the Christians of the two churches in the western oblasts of the Ukraine.

Let's not dramatize the events. For we have entered a new phase of the development of Soviet society and are creating a rule-of-law state in which the law must prevail over all.

Extremists 'Use' Ukrainian Religious Tensions

90UN1059A Kiev POD ZNAMENEN LENINIZMA
in Russian No 3, Feb 90 pp 82-84

[Article by V. Chemodanov: "The Religious Factor: Overcome Enmity"]

[Text] It is impossible today to understand and predict many social processes in society without taking the religious factor into consideration. It is this factor, among others, that has influenced the emergence of

tension and mass violations of public order in certain of the republic's western oblasts.

It will be recalled that the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers' Council For Religious Affairs recently adopted a decision to register Greek Catholic congregations. It proceeded from a recognition of every citizen's right to freedom of conscience and to exercise his religious beliefs. However, this step, which laid the foundation for a just solution of a pressing issue, is aimed at promoting national unity and accord, and has met, on the whole, with approval in religious circles both in our country and abroad, fails to suit certain extremist circles. On the contrary, these circles want to heighten political and social tension over the problem of Greek Catholics.

The Greek Catholics under their influence, citing the injustices that took place in the Stalin and subsequent periods of our history, have promptly begun flagrantly flouting the rights and dignity of other Christians, forgetting about Christian precepts and about any morality in general.

What accounts for this turn of events? Let us turn to history for an answer.

In my opinion, it must be pointed out that the decisions of the 1946 Lvov Synod on the reunification of Greek Catholics with the Russian Orthodox Church (RPTs) have not been fully implemented. The RPTs came under heavy administrative pressure and, since the late 1950s, has not had sufficient capabilities to conduct widespread missionary work in the Ukraine's western oblasts. It is naive to think that, after the Uniate's nearly 400-year existence, all believers without exception continue to be drawn toward Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, if one is to be objective, there was a desire among a certain segment of the Greek Catholics for reunification with Orthodoxy.

However, some of the former Greek Catholic priests and monks continued to uphold their interests. Nor is it hard to imagine how believers at the level of ordinary religious consciousness viewed the substitution of incomprehensible Church Slavonic for homilies in their native language (though not their entire worship services, as some authors write).

The Greek Catholic Church has its own traditions. During the time of the foreign yoke, in which the population of the western Ukrainian lands suffered greatly, the church supported, to a certain extent, the people's characteristic customs and rites, and most importantly, it helped preserve the native language (the basis of any national culture). Today, against the backdrop of such provocative slogans as "Russification is taking place" and "all national characteristics are being eradicated," the idea of a "national church" has become fairly widespread.

We must not overlook the fact that such sentiments have continually been encouraged from abroad by nationalist emigre communities and other forces. For example, a

recent assembly of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists emphasized: "The need for the closest cooperation between Ukrainian churches and the liberation movement is greater today than ever before." Reference is to both the "Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church" and the "Ukrainian Catholic Church" (which is what the Greek Catholic Church is called in the West).

Clearly, this religious omnivorousness is explained by the fact that it is well understood there that any religion, as a means of regulating people's behavior, can be used as an additional means of intensifying extremist manifestations. A nationally-oriented religion is an effective means of encouraging nationalist feelings.

What is taking place in the western oblasts of the Ukraine is not simply a clash between Orthodox and Catholics, but to a significant degree an interreligious conflict with political overtones, with a national underpinning in which religious ideas and feelings are being used to incite passions.

And here is the result: Some people, proclaiming their religion to be more righteous and their church to be more national, are trying to forcibly take back church buildings and property from others whom they consider to be less worthy. In this way, they are not only failing to promote the democratic processes of perestroika, but also throwing society far back, to methods of resolving conflicts by force.

As we see, those who are inciting people to do this are trying to amass political capital by playing the role of "true champion of the interests of their people." In fact, however, they are far removed from the people's interests. For all this is nothing other than an attempt to divide the people, to plunge them into the abyss of internecine strife.

Let us examine the question of "national churches." The Greek Catholic Church and the "Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church" use the same language in their services—the national language. But in the Russian Orthodox Church too, services are held in the Ukrainian language where believers so desire. The Ukrainian exarchate is now publishing corresponding literature, and a journal is coming out.

In response to differing opinions about the Russian Orthodox Church being a Russian national church, it should be pointed out that, as in the case of Ukrainians, the Church Slavonic language in which services are conducted is not the native language of Russians either. Consequently, the so-called "activists" for "national churches" are striving not to protect national culture.

Orthodoxy has spread to virtually all regions of our country. And the question is apparently one of breaking all that links the Ukrainian people with the other peoples of the Soviet Union, above all the Russian people. Including this religious link. But these unworthy games are hurting rank and file Greek Catholics first and foremost. Their being drawn into political intrigue is

making it harder for the state to resolve the matter involving their church and is impeding a speedy transition to the normal satisfaction of religious needs.

Nor do Orthodox believers find themselves in the best situation. For they often live in the same villages as Greek Catholics, are their colleagues at work, and so forth. As a result, a rift is opening up between residents of the republic's western oblasts.

The upshot is that the Greek Catholics picketing state institutions in Moscow have been supplanted by their fellow countrymen—Orthodox believers. They too are protesting with sad faces, in this instance against the actions of those who earlier considered themselves to be the aggrieved party.

The rank and file believers are by no means the source of this difficult situation. A number of social and political groupings with extremist leanings saw a certain social base in the Greek Catholics and have tried to use them to further their own political aims—aims that are far removed from the interests of religion.

The situation is of course difficult, but it is essential to look for a solution to it. The basis of such a solution must be a realistic position on the part of the state and society, and mutual understanding and mutual respect between Greek Catholics and Orthodox believers.

Above all, it must be recognized that social tension stemming from religious grounds has existed in the republic's western oblasts for a long time. But the problems that have arisen have been dealt with largely through administrative means, as is the case with respect to other religions as well, incidentally. However, religious issues cannot be settled by force, which only incites fanaticism among believers.

In search for a solution, we must turn to existing experience in which believers of different faiths live together in peace in the same area and take a tolerant view of others' religious convictions. There are examples in which they use the same church buildings. The ecumenical movement is fostering a rapprochement and a search for the things that unite believers of different faiths.

Confrontation and inflamed passions in no way help to meet Greek Catholics' desire for the creation of a Greek Catholic Church, in keeping with the new thinking. The stumbling block is the canonicity or lack thereof of the (1946) Lvov Synod. Of course, this is a problem first and foremost for the theologians themselves. In my view, however, that synod was a political action, just as the 1596 Brest Synod and the 1054 schism of Christianity into Catholicism and Orthodoxy were, strictly speaking, political actions. At that time, the Bishops of Rome, who in the fifth century became Popes, were seeking to make their church dominant in the Christian world. The patriarchs of Constantinople nourished similar ambitions. The rivalry between the two churches led to differences on questions of dogma and religion, and later to the official schism of the Christian church.

We cannot forget history, of course. It shows that the forefathers of both the present Orthodox believers and the Greek Catholics created in equal measure the material base of religion in the republic's western oblasts. Clearly, both have equal rights, and these rights must be exercised in as fair a way as possible.

In view of the fact that the decision to register Greek Catholic congregations has been taken, the most important thing now is to overcome the enmity that has arisen between fellow citizens on religious grounds and to prevent religion from being used as a means of fomenting tension and strife. It is important to ensure an objective, balanced attitude toward all religious schools and the equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of their faith, and to unconditionally condemn violence and unlawful actions.

This very subject was discussed at the meeting of representatives of the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches held in Moscow in the patriarchal residence at St. Danilov Monastery on January 12-17. The discussion focused on the status of Orthodox and Eastern-rite Catholics in the western Ukraine and on the prospects for normalizing relations between them. In their speeches, the participants in the discussion expressed the conviction that the problems of interchurch relations cannot have anything in common with enmity and violence, which must be condemned as incompatible with the Christian spirit.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Radyanska Ukrayina,"
"Pod znamenem leninizma," 1990

22161

59

NTIS

ATTN: PROCESS 103

5285 PORT ROYAL RD

SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government public policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.